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Kurzfassung (Deutsch)
In den letzten Jahren erfolgte ein Wandel von Dokumenten auf Papier zu elek-
tronischen Dokumenten, welche auf Computern verarbeitet werden. Neben
Vorteilen bringen elektronische Dokumente aber auch neue Risiken mit sich.
Sie lassen sich zum Beispiel einfacher stehlen und die Gefahr von absichtlicher
oder versehentlicher Lo¨schung ist gro¨ßer als bei Dokumenten auf Papier. Um
diese Gefahren zu reduzieren wurde eine Reihe von technischen Maßnah-
men entwickelt. Zu diesen Maßnahmen geho¨rt auch die Zugriffskontrolle.
Bei der Zugriffskontrolle wird definiert, wer unter welchen Umsta¨nden auf
welche Daten zugreifen darf. Durch Zugriffskontrolle kann man die zuvor
beschriebenen Risiken reduzieren, indem man die erlaubten Zugriffe auf die
notwendigen beschra¨nkt.
Es gibt viele verschieden Mo¨glichkeiten ein Zugriffskontrollsystem zu ge-
stalten. Die einzelnen Mo¨glichkeiten unterscheiden sich unter anderem in der
Art der Daten, auf die der Zugriff kontrolliert wird. Diese Arbeit behandelt
ein Verfahren fu¨r die Zugriffskontrolle auf XML-Dokumente, da XML ein
weit verbreiteter Standard fu¨r den Austausch von Daten geworden ist und
eine Reihe von technischen Vorteilen gegenu¨ber anderen Formaten bietet.
Ein weiteres Unterscheidungskriterium ist, wie erlaubte oder verbotene
Zugriffe definiert werden. Bei einfachen Verfahren muss dies fu¨r jedes Objekt
manuell definiert werden. Aufwa¨ndigere Verfahren ko¨nnen die Zugriffsrechte
aus den Eigenschaften der Objekte ableiten. Hierfu¨r wird in der Regel ihr
Dateninhalt herangezogen, aber nicht ihre Herkunft oder Entstehungsweise.
Diese Informationen werden in dieser Arbeit als “History” bezeichnet und
bei der Bearbeitung eines Dokumentes aufgezeichnet.
Mit Hilfe der History la¨sst sich der Schutzbedarf von Objekten pra¨ziser
definieren, da neben dem Dateninhalt auch die Art und Weise der Erstellung
herangezogen werden kann. Sind Objekte beispielsweise durch Kopieren ent-
standen, la¨sst sich der Ursprung der Kopie bei Definition der Zugriffsrechte
mit beru¨cksichtigen. Ebenso kann in Betracht gezogen werden, wer ein Ob-
jekt erstellt hat, wann es erstellt wurde und welchen Inhalt es fru¨her einmal
hatte. All diese zusa¨tzlichen Eigenschaften erlauben es, die Zugriffsrechte
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fu¨r Objekte pra¨ziser zu spezifizieren, da diese Eigenschaften eine weitere Dif-
ferenzierung ermo¨glichen.
Fu¨r diese Art von Zugriffskontrolle entwickelt die vorliegende Arbeit ein
Modell, eine Systemarchitektur sowie die beno¨tigten Sicherheitsmechanis-
men.
Abstract (English)
In the recent years, there was a development in which paper documents were
more and more replaced by electronic documents. As electronic documents
introduce several advantages, they also bring new risks. Electronic docu-
ments can be stolen more easily and its also happens easier that they are
deleted accidently.
Access control mechanisms were introduced, to reduce this risks, which
is achieved by restricting all accesses to the required ones. Many different
solutions were developed to provide access control for different types of stor-
ing data. Since XML is widely used and offers many technical advantages,
we focus on access control for XML documents in this thesis.
Previous methods for access control defined access for each object indi-
vidually and manually, which is error-prone and time-consuming. Advanced
approaches derive the access rights from the properties of an object. They
use the content of an object to derive the required level of protection and
finally its access rights. An essential property, which has not been regarded,
is how objects have been created. We refer to this as the “History” and
record it while a document is edited. This history allows us to derive the
access rights more precisely, since it adds a further way of differentiating
between objects. For example, it can be regarded from where an object was
copied, when it was created or by whom it was created. Furthermore, is the
previous content of a document can be regarded to define the access rights
of a documents.
In addition to our history-based access control model, we present a system
architecture for it and describe the security mechanisms for the architecture.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter, we will give a motivation for access control in general and
history-based access control in particular. In addition to this, we give an
outline for this thesis.
1.1 Motivation
In the recent years, there was a development in which paper documents were
more and more replaced by electronic documents. As electronic documents
introduce several advantages, as space saving storage, faster electronic trans-
fer and the possibility to perform an electronic search, they also bring new
risks. One such risk is that electronic documents can be stolen more easily.
For example, a hacker can steal electronic documents remotely without en-
tering the building where the computer on which the documents are stored is
located. According to studies of the FBI/CSI [GLLR05, GLLR06], unautho-
rized access and information theft are responsible for a major part of damages
caused by computer crime. In addition to that, electronic documents can be
more easily destroyed, e.g., one inconsiderate command can deleted an entire
document. Moreover, it is much more difficult to control the propagation of
information contained in electronic documents, since they can be copied very
efficiently compared to paper documents. As a consequence, criminals exploit
the new opportunities of electronic documents to steal digital information.
Figure 1.1 shows the amount of loss for several types of computer crime
incidents as reported in [GLLR06]. The second largest amount of loss is
attributed to unauthorized access to information, which clearly shows the
high demand for access control mechanisms, which are mechanisms to restrict
access to authorized persons. In other words, these mechanisms define who
is allowed or denied to access which object. The fourth largest amount of
1
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loss is caused by the theft of proprietary information. This sum of this
type of loss and of unauthorized access exceeds the amount of loss by virus
contamination. Since the sketched types of loss can be reduced with access
control mechanisms, this highlights the importance of access control even
more. Moreover, Figure 1.1 shows that only a relative small amount of loss
is created by outsiders penetrating the system. This indicates that protection
mechanisms should focus on inside attackers, which are authorized users of
the system.
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$161.210
$162.500
$260.000
$269.500
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$469.010
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Other
Exploit of DNS server
Password sniffing
Web site defacement
Sabotage of data or networks
Misuses of public web application
Instant messaging misuse
Abuse of wireless network
Phishing
System penetration by outsider
Bots within the organization
Telecom fraud
Insider abuse of net access
Financial fraud
Denial of service
Theft of proprietary information
Laptop or mobile hardware theft
Unauthorized access to information
Virus contamination
Figure 1.1: Loss in dollar for different types of incidents (source [GLLR06])
Access control mechanisms were introduced, to reduce the risks described
above, namely the risk of information theft and the risk of accidental deletion.
Many different solutions were developed to provide access control for different
types of storing data. Access control systems must be designed differently for
different methods of storing data, because the methods can differ significantly
in structure and in semantics. For example, concerning XML documents, it
is not useful to grant access to a node without granting access to the parent
node, because nodes in an XML document have a parent child relation and
they form a semantical unit. Without the parent node, the semantics of the
child node is not clear. In contrast to this, the semantics of files stored in
directories is much different. Here, granting access to a subdirectory without
the parent directory is acceptable. Moreover, tables in a relational database
have different semantics than XML documents and files in a file system. In
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addition to this, different representations of data can require a different level
of granularity. For example, for a system that stores files of different formats
and the internal structure of these files is not known, it is useful to define
access on the level of files. In contrast to this, a system that stores files of
one specific type and the internal structure of these files is known, it can be
required to define access to parts of these files individually. In this case, it
also depends on the structure of these files how access must be defined, e.g.,
it makes a big difference whether these files contain flat list structures or the
data is organized as a tree. As a consequence, we will have a closer look on
methods of storing data and different document formats.
Up to then, many different data formats and methods to store data ex-
isted. Most applications had their own data format and the interoperability
between systems with a different data format was limited. Moreover, some
systems store their data in databases, whereas others use files organized in
a specific directory structure. To exchange data the corresponding formats
must be converted from one format to the other. In some cases, this was es-
pecially difficult, since some formats were highly dependent on the properties
of the processing computer, e.g., the byte order of the processing computer.
Besides these problems, some formats suffered from the problem, that they
were difficult to extend. More simply, some formats were designed in a way,
that does not allow to store information that was not specified in the existing
format. For example, some formats stored the date as two decimal digits,
which caused problems when the date changed from the year 1999 to 2000.
As a result of the previous considerations, the Extensible Markup Lan-
guage (XML) [Con04] was introduced in 1998. The language XML offers
several advantages compared to other representations of data, e.g., binary
representation. First of all, it is both readable for humans and for com-
puters. Moreover, it supports the storing of unicode text and can represent
common data structures like lists and trees.
Although much work on access control in the areas of file systems or rela-
tional databases has already been done, defining access to XML documents
is a different issue as stated in [FM04]. The structure of XML documents
is not always known in advance, e.g., if an XML document has no schema.
Moreover, as stated above, elements in XML documents are much more de-
pendent on their context than files in a file system or records in a database
are, e.g., it is not always useful to grant access to an element without granting
access to its descendants.
Since XML is widely used and offers many technical advantages, we focus
on access control for XML documents in this thesis. As a remaining question,
we must evaluate how we want to define access for XML documents. There
are many different approaches for this task, which we will discuss in the
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following.
Previous methods for access control defined access for each object individ-
ually and required to manually maintain lists of allowed and denied objects.
For example, newly created objects must be manually added to the access
control list. But this approach has several drawbacks. First, the manual
assignment of access rights to objects is both inefficient and error-prone. Ad-
ditionally, this approach does not allow to implement a central access control
strategy in an automatic and systematic way. Instead, we need an approach
in which objects are described by their properties and access control defini-
tions are derived by rules which make use of these properties. In contrast
to the manual approach, only the set of rules must be maintained and it
must only be updated when the overall access control strategy changes. This
rule-based method of specifying access is required in many business scenarios
due its advantages in security and its lower effort of maintenance.
In these scenarios, company internal rules define how access should be
granted. For example, a set of documents to which access should be denied
can be defined by a set of rules that specifies the corresponding documents
by using conditions on certain properties of these documents. We refer to
these rules as access control rules. When new documents are created or
existing documents are changed the access control rules are evaluated again
and the resulting set of documents and their corresponding permissions is
updated. To sum up, instead of manually maintaining access control lists,
access control rules can be used to define access with the help of conditions
about certain properties of the objects automatically.
Models for access control for XML documents differ in their expressive-
ness for defining the conditions used in access control rules. The models
expressiveness for these conditions has direct impact on both usability and
security. In the following, we will discuss the consequences of having an ac-
cess control model that lacks expressiveness and cannot express the required
conditions to express access control rules for a specific scenario.
If the used model is not able to express a required condition for granting
or denying access in an access control rule, an alternative condition must
be chosen that can be expressed with the model. There are three different
types of alternative conditions besides the intended condition. Figure 1.2
illustrates the resulting sets of objects, depending on the chosen alternative
condition.
The first alternative is to chose an expressible condition that specifies a
set of objects which is too large and includes the intended set of objects. If
the access to these objects is denied, access to some objects is denied even
though it was not intended to do so. The result is a limitation of usability,
because access is denied in a case where it is not required. If the access to
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All objects of the system
Intended set of objects
A too large set of objects
A too small set of objects
Overlapping set of objects
Figure 1.2: Alternative sets when the desired set cannot be specified
these objects is allowed, access to objects is granted, which is not intended to
be granted, which results in a security problem, since access to some objects
is granted but should be denied.
The second alternative is to chose an expressible condition that both
misses some objects that should be included and selects additional objects
that should not be included in the resulting set. The result of such a condition
is a set which overlaps with the intended set of objects. In any case, such a
specification both limits the security and the usability.
Finally, the third alternative is to chose an expressible condition that
specifies a set that is a subset of the intended set of objects. This alternative
is the opposite to the first alternative. Depending on whether the access to
these objects is allowed or denied, this specification limits either security or
usability.
As a result of the previous discussion, we learn that the expressiveness
of the model for defining access control rules is very important. However,
the expressiveness always depends on the requirements of a specific scenario,
because different scenarios can require very different conditions for specify-
ing objects in access control rules. As a consequence, there is not absolute
measurement for expressiveness. We only can say that the expressiveness of
a model for specifying object in access control rules is sufficient for a specific
scenario.
In the previous discussion, we focussed on specifying objects in access
control rules, but the concept of defining objects by rules can also be used for
subjects. In many cases, there are much more objects than there a subjects
in the system. For this reason and to reduce complexity, we focus on how
to specify objects in this thesis. Nevertheless, approaches that focus on the
specification of subjects can be combined with our approach as these two
aspects are independent of each other.
The question is what are the properties that should be used in access
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control to define access. A common approach is to use the content of a XML
document itself in access control rules to define access. An XML document
consists of elements that are organized in a tree structure. These elements
have a name and can optionally have text content and attributes that further
specify the element.
We can use the tree structure of the XML documents to define subtrees
which are allowed or denied to access. Consider a set of equally structured
XML documents, which have a root element Patent application. This root
element has two children elements, namely Description and Main part.
The first element contains a public description of the patent application,
whereas the second elements contains the confidential content of the patent
application. Both elements can have children elements themselves, which
contain the actual content of these parts. In this example, we could allow
access to the subtree starting at the element Description and deny access to
the subtree of Main part. In addition to this, we can specify objects more
precisely if we also use attribute values in conditions. In addition to the
previous example, assume that the Patent application has an attribute
granted, which is either set to true or false. If the attribute is set to
true, the patent application is granted and no longer confidential, otherwise
it is not granted and still confidential. Next, we can formulate access control
rules that use attribute values. Thus, we can now specify that access to
the main part of a patent application is only denied when the corresponding
attribute granted is set to false. In this example, we raise usability since,
we remove the unnecessary restriction that granted patent application cannot
be accessed.
Summing up, the content of an XML document is a very useful aspect
to be used in access control rules. As a consequence, many approaches
[BF02, DdVPS02, MTK03, GB02] define access to parts of XML document
depending on the content of the document itself, e.g., attribute values, tag
names or text content. Although the approach of using the content allows
to express complex conditions on the content of an XML document, certain
policies cannot be expressed. This regards all policies that depend on infor-
mation which is not contained in the XML document. This information is
referred to as context information and is used to describe the situation or
the document parts more precisely. Common types of context information
are location and time, e.g., in [BGBJ05] access can be defined depending on
time, the model described in [BCDP05] allows to define access depending on
location, whereas [Han07] considers both time, location and additional ap-
sects. With that information access to certain documents can be restricted
to specific locations or specific times, e.g., sensitive documents can only be
accessed within the company building and within the office hours. Besides
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time and location there are many other kinds context information, e.g., the
team to which the current user [Tho97] belongs or the situation [BEE07],
which is defined by properties of the network connection and the proximity
of other detectable devices. Many, kinds of context information require sen-
sor hardware to capture the context information. For example, the location
of human users can be measured using the Global Positioning System [PS96]
and nearby persons can be detected with cameras and image recognition.
All the context information described above helps to characterize the
situation of the access or the accessed object more precisely. These char-
acteristics can be used in access control rules to define more precisely what
is allowed and denied. Some of this context information is more useful and
other context information can be less useful for security or usability. For
example, the room temperature, which is a specific context information, is
not relevant for most of the scenarios.
However, there is another type of context information that can be very
helpful for both security and usability. We think that the information about
how a document was created is very useful for access control, because the way
how the content was created can contain many important aspects, which can
be used in access control rules. We refer to all information concerning how a
document was created as the history. We will give two motivating examples
of aspects of the history, which can be important for access control.
Reconsider the example with the patent application from above. There,
we used the location of a document part within a document to define access
to it. In todays business world the concept of reusing existing information
is very important, because it is inefficient to recreate document parts that
have been already created elsewhere. Therefore, document parts are copied
between different documents. As a consequence, in addition to the current
location of a document part, it is also very helpful to know from where it
was copied, in case it was not created from scratch. For example, assume
that a part of the main part of the patent application is copied to another
document. In that case, the current location of that copied document part is
not so relevant, but it is very important to know from where it was copied. It
would be very useful to define an access control rule that states “deny access
to all document parts that are copied from the main part of a pending patent
application”.
The history can contain many useful aspects that help to specify ob-
jects in access control rules. Another such aspect is the knowledge of who
has created a specific document part. In addition to the knowledge which
individual person has created a specific part, it can be helpful to know in
which job function the subject was active in. This knowledge helps to fur-
ther characterize a document part. In some cases, it might not be relevant
8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
where a specific document part is located, but by whom it was created or
modified. For example, assume that some documents are created by subjects
with differently ranked job positions, e.g, junior researcher and senior
researcher. In this example, junior researchers develop suggestions and se-
nior researchers make the final modifications. In this example, it is required
that after a senior researcher has modified a part of a document, the junior
researches must be denied to make further modifications. Similar processes
occur in many scenarios, where subjects in a higher job position have the
authority to declare something as final.
Above, we illustrated that history information is important and helpful
for access control. In addition to the content of a document, the information
how this content was created helps to determine its protection requirements
and finally to define access to it. To the authors knowledge there is no model
aiming at history-based access control. Therefore, the goal of this thesis is
to develop such a model. Due to the wide usage and importance of XML, we
will develop a model for history based access control for XML documents.
Within this thesis, we will also discuss which parts of the history must be
considered and how they can be used within access control.
1.2 Structure of this Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we pro-
vide background information about three technologies used in this thesis.
The first of these technologies is access control, which is the main topic of
this thesis. We explain the basic concepts of access control and give an
overview of common models for access control. The second technology is the
extensible markup language (XML), which is the format of the documents
on that we focus in this thesis. We present details about XML itself as well
as information on related technologies. The third technology is about the
concepts defined by the Trusted Computing Group, which we use as a part
of our security architecture. In Chapter 3, we present a scenario to illustrate
several challenges for an access control model for XML documents. Next,
we extract several individual requirements for our access control model from
these challenges. After this, we describe our model for access control for XML
documents that we have developed based on the requirements in Chapter 4.
Since, we have specified our model on an abstract level, we must design a
system architecture that supports our model in Chapter 5 to apply the model
in a real world scenario. In Chapter 6, we first perform a risk analysis for our
previously defined architecture and then describe security mechanisms that
reduce that kind of risks. After this, we give details on the implementation of
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our system architecture in Chapter 7. We use this prototype to demonstrate
feasibility of our approach. Moreover, we present the result of a performance
evaluation of the implementation. Next, we present related work in three
different areas in Chapter 8. We explain previous work on access control,
on enforcement mechanisms and on integrity reporting. Finally, we conclude
and point out future work in Chapter 9.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we provide background information for the technologies used
in this thesis. In Section 2.1, we give an introduction to access control and
present some common models which are helpful to understand our model
presented in Chapter 4. Next, in Section 2.2, we give details to the Extensible
Markup Language (XML), which we use to represent the documents and the
corresponding metadata of our model in Chapter 4. We present information
to the XML Path Language (XPath) in Section 2.2.5, which is the language to
define the applicable objects of the access control rules of our model. Finally,
in Section 2.3, we present details on the mechanisms defined by the Trusted
Computing Group (TCG), which we use as part of our security architecture
in Chapter 6.
2.1 Access Control
In this section, we give an introduction to access control. For this purpose
we first explain access control in general and then we continue with the
description of some common models for access control.
The purpose of access control is to limit the actions or operations
that a legitimate user of a computer system can perform. [SS94]
Subjects are the more general concept of users to describe the active
components of a system. A subject can either be a human user, a process
that acts own behalf of a human user or an autonomous process acting on its
on behalf, e.g., a software agent or a maintenance process of the operating
system.
Subject perform their operations on objects, which are the passive com-
ponents of a system and can be any kind of resource of the system, e.g., a file,
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a network socket, a data base entry or a variable in a program. Objects can
be modeled in different granularities. This granularity defines what is the
smallest data unit an object can represent. For example, if a directory is the
smallest unit an object can represent, we regard that as a coarse granularity.
In contrast to this, if parts of files are treated as the objects of the system,
we call this a fine granularity.
Depending on the kind of objects, there can be different modes of access.
A mode describes what kind of access is performed. Common modes of
access are read, write and execute. But if the object is a variable in a
program, possible access modes can be update, decrement or increment. In
many systems, access modes are also referred to as operations or as access
attributes.
Independent of the way subjects, objects and access modes are modeled,
access can be defined in three different ways. One option is to define what
is allowed and to assume that access to not specified objects is denied. This
concept is referred to as having positive permissions. The next option is to
define what is denied and assume that the not specified objects are allowed
to be accessed, which is referred to as having negative permissions. The third
option is to combine both concepts and define both what is allowed and what
is denied. Conflicts can occur if a specific access is both allowed and denied.
To solve this problem, a conflict resolution strategy must be defined. The
simplest of such strategies is to define that either deny overrides allow or vice
versa. More complicated strategies use priorities to define which statement
takes precedence.
Moreover, there are two different overall strategies for access control mod-
els in which way access is defined. The first strategy is Discretionary Access
Control (DAC), which is defined by the Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Criteria (TCSEC) [Uni85] as follows:
A means of restricting access to objects based on the identity of
subjects and/or groups to which they belong. The controls are
discretionary in the sense that a subject with a certain access
permission is capable of passing that permission (perhaps indi-
rectly) on to any other subject (unless restrained by mandatory
access control).
Systems or models that use DAC have in common that permissions are
defined for individual objects and individual subjects. The definition is usu-
ally performed manually. In most cases, the owner of an object defines these
permissions. In most cases, the owner is the subject that has created the
corresponding object. As a consequence there is only one owner. The owner
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also defines permissions of other subjects on his objects. In [Uni85], the
concept of an owner is not mentioned. Therefore, DAC does not necessarily
imply that permissions are defined by the owner of an object. Although,
most DAC system do so. This is why the term DAC and the owner concept
are often used synonymously.
Systems based on DAC have the disadvantage that permissions are not
necessarily defined in a systematical way. Each subject may apply its own
strategy and it is in the responsibility of that subject that these permissions
are set up correctly, which means that only subjects which are supposed
to access an object actually have the permissions to do so. While DAC is
convenient in scenarios, where users manage objects, for which they are the
only person that is responsible, e.g., a user managing his private files on
his home computer or a self-employed individual editing his own business
documents. In scenarios, where users manage objects on which they are
legally restricted in their usage, e.g., employees of a an enterprise handling
confidential enterprise documents, DAC is not an appropriate choice. In
these scenarios, it is more advisable to use MAC, which we describe next.
The opposed strategy to DAC is MAC, which is short for Mandatory
Access Control . MAC is defined in [Uni85] as follows:
A means of restricting access to objects based on the sensitivity
(as represented by a label) of the information contained in the
objects and the formal authorization (i.e., clearance) of subjects
to access information of such sensitivity.
In systems using MAC, permissions are derived from the properties of
an object with the use of rules. These properties can be represented by a
label that is attached as meta data to the object or they can be properties of
the object itself, i.e., its content. Subjects are treated in the same manner.
Instead of defining or deriving permissions for individual subjects, subjects
are grouped by their properties, e.g., by their clearance or by their function
within the organization. It depends on the system whether the subjects still
have limited options to define permissions. Im some models, the least restric-
tive permissions are defined automatically by the system and the subject has
the choice to make permissions more restrictive.
Next, we continue with the description of some common models for access
control. We start with the most basic and oldest model, which is the access
matrix model [Lam71, GD72]. This model is also a a basis for the model
described in Section 2.1.3.
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2.1.1 Access Matrix Model
In the Access Matrix model [Lam69, Lam71, GD72], access is defined with
the help of a matrix. Since this matrix can change over time, we denote it
with the index t for a specific point in time as Mt. The objects Ot, for which
access should be defined, define the columns of the matrix. Analogously,
the subjects St define the rows of the matrix. The resulting matrix has the
dimensions |St| × |Ot|. Each entry of the matrix, denoted as Mt(s, o) =
{r1, . . . , rn}, defines the access rights of the subject s for the object o.
An example of such a matrix is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The illustrated
matrix defines the access rights of three users to four different files. In this
case, User 1 is allowed to read files 1, 2 and 4 and to write file 1. User 2 is
allowed to read files 2 and 3 and to write file 3. Finally, User 3 is allowed
to read files 2, 3 and 4 and to write files 3 and 4.
File 1 File 2 File 3 File 4
User 1 write, read read read
User 2 write, read read
User 3 read write, read write, read
Figure 2.1: Example of an access matrix
There are two different types of models using access matrices: Models
with a access matrix, where the matrix can change over time and models
with a matrix, where the initially defined matrix does not change. In the
first case, additional operations are used to modify the matrix. In [HRU76],
Harrison, Ruzzo and and Ullman define six primitive operations for that
purpose. The operation enter adds new rights, whereas delete removes
rights. The operations create subject and delete subject are used to
create and delete subjects. Similarly, the operations create object and
delete object are used to create and delete objects.
While the Access Matrix model is a simple model, it still offers the possi-
bility to model subjects and objects with an arbitrary fine granularity. If the
implementation of the model stores the matrix as a two-dimensional array
the amount of required memory will be high, especially when the number
of subjects and objects is high. To solve this problem, efficient implementa-
tions of this model store the rows or the columns of the matrix individually.
If the matrix is stored as a set of rows the implementation is referred as a
capability-based system. In the other case, the implementation is described
as an access control list. In both cases, the cells are labeled to denote to
which subject or object they refer to and empty entries can be omitted to
save resources. In situations with a high number of subjects and objects, the
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amount of saving can be high, because subjects often have access only to a
fraction of the total number of objects of the system.
On the downside, the model does not have a high level of abstraction, be-
cause all subjects and objects are treated equally, have no further properties
and are not related to each other. For example, two subjects that perform
the same task and therefore need the same access rights require manual steps
to assign the same access rights to both of them. As a consequence, the costs
to update and maintain the access matrix can be high. Moreover, if there is a
high number of subjects and objects the matrix will be big and manual main-
tenance of the matrix can become difficult. In the following section, we will
discuss a model which offers a higher level of abstraction. As a consequence,
this model simplifies the maintenance.
2.1.2 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
The concept of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is described in [SCFY96]
by Sandhu et al. in 1996. Since our model, which we describe in Chapter 4,
uses roles to model subjects, we describe the RBAC model in this section.
Instead of assigning access rights, which are called permissions in RBAC
terminology, directly to subjects, permissions are assigned to roles. Such a
role is used to model a specific task. Therefore, all permissions that are re-
quired to perform a specific task are assigned to a role, e.g., a role “cashier”
can be used to collect all permissions that are required for performing the
job of a cashier. In addition to assigning permissions to roles, RBAC assigns
subjects to roles. A role must be activated by a subject to use the corre-
sponding permissions. Multiple active roles of a subject are referred to as
a session. A subject can also have more than one session. The relations
between the components of the RBAC model are illustrated in Figure 2.2.
An RBAC model consists of the following components:
1. U , the set of users of the systems,
2. R, the set of roles defined in the system,
3. P , the set of all permissions of the system,
4. S, the set of sessions,
5. PA ⊆ P ×R, the relation which assigns permissions to roles,
6. UA ⊆ U ×R, the relation which assigns roles to users,
7. user : S → U , the function which maps each sessions to a single user,
and
8. roles : S → 2R, the function which maps each sessions to a set of roles.
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…
Session
UA PA
Active Roles
Figure 2.2: Components of the RBAC model
In addition to this base model for RBAC, other concepts are described in
[SCFY96] that increase the flexibility and expressiveness of the model. The
first such concept are role hierarchies, which define a partial order among the
roles of the system. This partial order defines a specialization relationship
among the roles, where the more special role inherits all permission from the
less special role. As a consequence, more special rules have more permission
than less special rules.
Figure 2.3 shows an example of such a role hierarchy. By convention less
powerful rules are depicted at the bottom and more powerful rules above
them. In this example, Project Member is the role with the smallest num-
ber of permissions. Both, Engineer and Researcher are specializations of
this role, inherit its permissions and add further permissions to it. Senior
Engineer and Senior Researcher both inherit permissions from their corre-
sponding non-senior roles. Finally, the role Project Supervisor is derived
by multiple inheritance from both senior roles. As a result, this role combines
the permissions of both senior roles.
In general, multiple inheritance can lead to problems, where the resulting
role inherits more privileges than are required to fulfill the corresponding
task, which violates the principle of least privilege [SS75, Den76]. Saltzer et
al. describe this principle in [SS75] as follows:
Every program and every user of the system should operate using
the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job.
This principle aims at reducing misuse of privileges, e.g., fraud, and at
reducing errors where privileges are used accidently in a wrong way, e.g.,
accidently deleting an important file.
In [SCFY96], Sandhu et al. describe constraints as another mechanism
that can be added to RBAC. Constraints can be defined both for role to user
assignment and for role activation. The first case is used to model a static
2.1. ACCESS CONTROL 17
Project Member
Engineer
Senior Engineer
Researcher
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Figure 2.3: Example of a role hierarchy
separation of duties, which defines that certain roles are mutually exclusive.
As a consequence, a user can be assigned only to one role of a set of mutually
exclusive roles. This mechanism is designed to prevent fraud in situations
where a user is able to act in two or more roles for certain tasks that should
not be executed by a single person, e.g., chief buyer and accounts manager
are two jobs that should not be performed by a single person, even if they
are not executed at the same time.
Static separation of duty is too strict for some cases, where it is only
required that different roles are not activate by one user at the same time.
For this case, constraints are defined for role activation to model dynamic
separations of duties. Here, sets of roles are defined that can not be activated
simultaneously. This mechanisms is designed to prevent fraud, where a user
would need two different permissions simultaneously to commit fraud, e.g.,
an employer of a bank can also be as costumer of the bank, but he should
not be active in both of the corresponding roles at the same time.
In addition to separation of duties, other constraints can be defined as
well. For example, cardinality constraints define that a specific role has a
maximum number of members, e.g., there should be at maximum one project
supervisor. Other constraints can be defined for the assignment of permis-
sions to roles, which can be used to ensure that certain powerful permissions
are only assigned to a small number of roles.
In addition to the constraints discussed so far, many other types of con-
straints are described in literature. For example, in [BBF01] Bertino et al.
describe activation constraints for roles that depend on the current time and
the time of events that occurred in the system. In [AC04], Alotaiby et al.
present constraints that depend on the configuration of teams. The activation
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of roles depends on the geographical position of the subjects in [BCDP05].
Moreover, there are many other models which are based on RBAC. In
[CMA00], Convington et al. specify “Generalized Role-Based Access Con-
trol” (GRBAC) which extends RBAC in two aspects. Object roles are used
similarly to the subject roles of RBAC. They classify objects by their prop-
erties, e.g., level of confidence or document type. Environment roles classify
the environment by properties which are considered to be relevant for secu-
rity. These Environment roles can be used as an activation constraint for
subject roles.
In [KKC02], Kumar et al. describe a similar but more flexible approach.
In this approach, an object context contains all security-relevant properties of
an object. Similarly, an Context!user contains the security-relevant proper-
ties of a user. A role context defines a condition for activating a specific role
and is a boolean expression, which uses attributes of the object context and
of the user context. As a result, both objects and users can be described in
a flexible way independent of concrete instances by classifying both by their
properties. Moreover, the definition of roles can be based on the properties
of the user and the object.
2.1.3 Chinese Wall model
The Chinese Wall model [BN89] was designed by Brewer and Nash to prevent
misuse of insider knowledge. When the Chinese Wall model was introduced,
this problem was most critical in the financial domain, e.g., a bank with cos-
tumers that are competitors to each other. In such cases, a bank employee
should only have access to the objects of one of the rivaling enterprises. A
similar scenario is the consulting business. Here, a consultant should have
access to only one company out of a group of companies in the same business.
Today, the problem of not accessing documents of competing companies af-
fects the entire service sector. Since we use the Chinese Wall model as a
motivating example in Chapter 4, we briefly describe it in this chapter.
The model is based on an access matrix (see Section 2.1.1) and defines
three modes of access: read, write and execute. The objects of the model are
organized as a tree structure with three levels and the objects being the leafs.
The level directly above the objects is the level containing company data sets,
where each node represents a different company. All objects attached to one
such node belong to the corresponding company. The level directly above the
company data sets denotes the conflict-of-interest classes , where each node
represents one such class. The children of such a node are companies that
are competitors to each other.
An example of such a tree is depicted in Figure 2.4. In this example,
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we have two conflict-of-interest classes, which are “Banks” and “Petroleum
Companies”. The class “Banks” consists of “Bank A”, “Bank B” and “Bank
C”. Similarly, the class “Petroleum Companies” consists of “Oil Company
A” and “Oil Company B”. The children of a company node are the objects
that belong to the corresponding company, e.g., the objects o8 to o10 belong
to “Oil Company A”.
Banks Petroleum Companies
Bank A Bank B Bank C Oil Company A Oil Company B
o2 o3 o4 o5 o6 o7o1 o8 o9 o10 o11 o12 o13
Figure 2.4: An example of the tree organization of the objects
As illustrated in the previous example, each object belongs both to a
company data set and to a conflict-of-interest class. In the model, xi denotes
the the conflict-of-interest class of the i-th object oi and yi denotes the cor-
responding company data set. In our example, x5 is “Bank B” and y12 is
“Petroleum Companies”. A special case is denoted by y0 and x0, which is
used for public information that is not restricted in any way.
The Chinese-Wall model uses two matrices to define access. The first
matrix M defines the permissions that subjects have on different objects.
This matrix works as described in Section 2.1.1. In addition to this, a second
matrix N records the history of access. The matrix N has the dimensions
|S| × |O|, where S is the set of subjects and O is the set of objects of the
system. Each cell of this matrix corresponds to a pair of subject and object
and denotes whether the subject already had accessed the corresponding
object. The cell N(i, j) contains the access modes that the i-th subject had
used to access the j-th object. If the object was not accessed by that subject,
the cell is empty. After each access, the matrix M is updated to reflect to
new situation.
The Chinese Wall model uses two rules to define access. The first rule
is used for read and execute access and states that access to an object oi
is only granted if the accessing subject did not access any object of the
same conflict-of-interest class that belongs to a different company. As a
consequence, after an access to one object, all objects of the same class that
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Banks Petroleum Companies
Bank A Bank B Bank C Oil Company A Oil Company B
o2 o3 o4 o5 o6 o7o1 o8 o9 o10 o11 o12 o13
Banks Petroleum Companies
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Figure 2.5: Situation after access to objects o6 and o9
belong to different company data sets are blocked for that subject. This rules
can also be expressed formally. A subject si is allowed to perform an access
a ∈ {read, execute} on the object oj if and only if:
a ∈M(si, oj) ∧ ∀ok ∈ O, k 6= j :
N(si, ok) 6= ∅ =⇒ (yk = yj ∨ xk 6= xj ∨ yj = y0).
This definition states that a subject si first of all must have the required
privilege, which is formally expressed as a ∈ M(si, oj). For all other objects
that have been accessed so far (N(si, ok) 6= ∅), at least one of the following
three conditions must be true. First, the object belongs to the same company
data set, which is formally expressed as yk = yj. Second, the object is in a
different conflict-of-interest class, i.e., xk 6= xj. Third, the object is marked
as being public information, which is formally expressed as yj = y0.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the rule presented above and shows the situation
after a subject has accessed objects o6 and o9. In this case, objects from
“Bank C” and “Oil Company A” have been accessed. As a consequence,
access to objects of “Bank A”, “Bank B” and “Oil Company B” is denied.
This rule above alone is insufficient, because unwanted data transfer that
enables misuse of insider knowledge is still possible. For example, the subject
s1 reads o1 and writes the corresponding data to o8. After that, the subject s2
reads that data from o8 and writes it to o4, where it should never be written
too, because it belongs to an competitor of “Bank A” to which o1 belongs
to. As a consequence, another rule is required that prevents this type of data
transfer. A subject si is allowed to write to an object oj if and only if:
write ∈M(si, oj) ∧ ∀ok ∈ O, k 6= j :
read ∈ N(si, ok) =⇒ (yk = yj ∨ yj = y0).
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This rule prevents transfers like the one sketched above, because it allows
to write data to an object only if the previous read accesses (read ∈ N(si, ok))
refer to the same company data set, i.e., yk = yj, or the read information is
public, i.e., yj = y0.
The Chinese Wall model allows to model subjects and object with arbi-
trary fine granularity. Its basis is the matrix M where users the define access
rights for individual objects. This basic strategy follows the DAC principle,
whereas the overall strategy that enforces the chinese wall is a MAC strategy.
One drawback of the model is that it is based on an access control list, which
is not desirable in an enterprise scenario. Moreover, the model is designed for
a special type of scenarios and is limited to enforce only one type of manda-
tory policies, which is the chinese wall policy. It is not possible to specify a
policy that is more specific for the current scenario, e.g., exceptions to the
chinese wall policy or more fine-grained rules which also depend on the type
of document.
2.2 The Extensible Markup Language
In this Section, we give an introduction to the Extensible Markup Language
(XML), explain how XML documents are structured and describe how XML
documents are specified with the use of an XML Schema. In addition to
this, we describe how document type definitions and schemas can be used
to define the structure of a document. After this, we will explain the XML
Path language, which us used to address specific parts of an XML document.
2.2.1 Introduction to XML
The Extensible Markup Language (XML) [BPSM+06] is a standard for a
language recommended by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) [Wor06]
and is used to describe XML documents. We use XML in this thesis as the
format of the documents that we want to protect. Therefore, we will present a
summary of the technologies related to XML, which are helpful to understand
this thesis.
The language XML was designed to exchange data between different com-
puter systems and is a simplified subset of the Standard Generalized Markup
Language (SGML) [ISO86]. XML offers five advantages compared to other
representations of data, e.g., binary representation. First, XML is both read-
able by humans and by machines. Second, XML is self-documenting because
XML documents both contain a descriptive label for each data element as
well as the data element itself. Nonetheless, one has to agree about common
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names for labels to enable automated exchange of data. Third, XML docu-
ments can contain records, trees and lists, which are common data structures.
Fourth, XML documents support Unicode [The91], which is a standard to
represent character data and allows XML documents to contain almost any
written language of the world. Fifth, the strict and simple syntax of XML
documents enables tools to process XML data efficiently. After describing
the benefits of XML, we continue with the description of the structure of
XML documents.
2.2.2 XML Documents
XML documents consist of elements which can have attributes and further
elements as children. Both, elements and attributes, are typed. Elements
are denoted as a sequence of start tag , text content and end tag . A start
tag is a sequence of “<”, the name of the tag and “>”, e.g., <Report>. An
end tag is a sequence of “</” the name of the tag and “>”, e.g., </Report>.
Alternatively, elements can also be empty. In this case, elements are denoted
in an abbreviated form, which is the sequence “<”, the name of the tag and
“/>”, e.g., <Section />.
An example of an XML document is illustrated in Figure 2.6. The first
line of this document is the prolog of the document. The prolog contains
general information about the document, such as the version number of the
used XML specification and the document encoding. Moreover, the prolog
can contain a schema or document type definition to which the document
must be conform, which is not present in this example. The document in
Figure 2.6 is represented by its root element Report, which has an attribute
funded-by set to the value Company A. The root element has two children.
Both of them have the type Section. The first Section element has both
an attribute and text content. The second Section element is an example
of an empty element.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<Report funded-by="Company A">
<Section title="Introduction">
text of the introduction
</Section>
<Section />
</Report>
Figure 2.6: XML example document
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An XML document must be well-formed, which requires it to comply with
five conditions. First, an XML document must have only one root element.
Second, non-empty elements must be enclosed in both a start and an end
tag. Third, all attribute values must be placed either in single quotes (”)
or in double quotes (“”). Forth, tags must be nested and must not overlap
each other. In other words, each element except of the root element must be
contained completely in another element. Fifth, the XML document must be
encoded as stated in its prolog or as specified in the corresponding transport
protocol, e.g., HTTP. In addition to being well-formed, a document can also
be valid, which means that the document is conform with a document type
definition or a schema. We will explain both concepts in Section 2.2.4. Before
we introduce these concepts, we must explain the concept
2.2.3 XML Namespaces
XML Namespaces [Con99] are used to combine data from different documents
in one XML document. Namespaces can be assigned both to elements and
to attributes. This can be done to give elements or attributes with the
same name different semantics as it was intended, because Namespaces define
in which context an element has to be interpreted. Consequently, the use
of Namespaces helps to avoid collisions of data type names from different
sources. As a result, documents can be combined even if parts of their data
types share the same name but have different semantics.
Namespaces are identified using a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)
[BLFM05], which is the more general concept of a Uniform Resource Lo-
cator (URL) [Net02]. These URIs are used to name or to locate a specific
resource. Namespaces can be assigned either directly to an element or with
the use of a prefix. Elements inherit the Namespace of their parent elements,
if no Namespace is assigned directly to them. Only the most specific Names-
pace is effective for an element. Consequently, an element or attribute can
have only one Namespace.
Figure 2.7 illustrates the usage of Namespaces. In this example, we assign
the Namespace urn:example:report to the root element Report and define
the Namespace urn:example:ac with the prefix ac, where ac is short for ac-
cess control. We use the prefix ac to assign the the corresponding Namespace
to the to two block elements.
In this thesis, Namespaces are used within the implementation in Chapter
7 to store history information together with the original content of a docu-
ment without having collisions of names of the corresponding elements and
attributes.
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<Report xmlns="urn:example:report"
xmlns:ac="urn:example:ac">
<Section>
<ac:block>text part 1</ac:block>
<ac:block>text part 2</ac:block>
</Section>
<Section />
</Report>
Figure 2.7: Example usage of Namespaces
2.2.4 XML Schema
XML Schemas [Con04] are used to describe classes of documents with a
common structure. Before Schemas were introduced in 2004, Document Type
Defintions (DTDs) were used for this purpose. Compared to DTDs, Schemas
offer three advantages. First, Schemas are denoted in XML in contrast to
DTD, which are written in a different syntax. Storing Schemas as XML
enables one to use the same tools for both Schemas and XML documents to
verify their well-formedness and their validity. Second, Schemas offer a richer
language to express constraints on the structure of documents, which makes
the resulting specification more precise. For example, to define a data type
in a DTD one has to enumerate all possible values for that type. In a Schema
one can use data types or regular expressions for this purpose, which is both
more expressive and more precise. Third, Schemas can be derived from each
other by inheritance, which makes the definition of Schemas more expressive
and therefore more efficient. Schemas can also be combined by using other
Schemas in the definition of one Schema. In this cases, Namespaces are used
to avoid conflicts in names and to resolve ambiguity.
The Schema in Figure 2.8 defines Report documents like the one illus-
trated in Figure 2.6. In its root element schema, the Namespace with the
prefix xs is defined, which is used for all elements of a Schema. Next, the
root element of a Report is defined as a complex type (complexType) consist-
ing of a sequence of Section elements and a required attribute funded-by.
The Section elements in the sequence must occur at least 0 times, which
states that it is optional, whereas their maximum number of occurrences is
unbounded. The Title attribute of a Section is marked as being optional.
Both the attributes and the content of the element are defined as a string,
which means that they can contain any text.
Summing up, Schemas describe how certain types of XML document must
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<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema">
<xs:element name="Report">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
<xs:element name="Section">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:simpleContent>
<xs:extension base="xs:string">
<xs:attribute name="Title"
type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
</xs:extension>
</xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="funded-by"
type="xs:string" use="required"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:schema>
Figure 2.8: Example of a Schema for a Report
be structured, but they do not define the semantics of the corresponding
elements. Schemas are relevant in this thesis in two aspects. First, to define
access control rules in our model it is essential that documents are conform
to the structure defined in their Schemas. Otherwise, it would be impossible
to specify access control rules. Second, in the implementation of our model
in Chapter 7, we make use of Schemas to define the data structures for access
control rules and histories.
2.2.5 XML Path Language (XPath)
The XML Path Language (XPath) [CD99] is a language to address parts of
an XML document. XPath is used in many different ways and for differ-
ent purposes. Many implementations that manipulate XML documents use
XPath to specify the objects on which an operation should be performed.
Moreover, XPath is also used as a query language to retrieve a specific part
of a document that is of special interest. In addition to this, XPath is used in
other languages such as XPointer , XSLT and XQuery , which use XPath as
a basis mechanism to address parts of an XML document. Finally, XPath is
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used in access control to describe the objects within an access control rule. In
this thesis, we use XPath as a mechanism to specify objects in access control
rules. For this reason, we briefly explain the basics of XPath.
XPath operates on the logical structure of an XML document, which is
interpreted as a tree with three types of nodes: elements, attributes and text
content. The basic expression of XPath is the path expression, which consists
of a sequence of element names divided by “/”, e.g., /Report/Section is used
to address all Sections elements of a Report. A condition using predicates
can be placed after each step in the path and is used to specify the nodes
in question more precise, e.g., /Report/Section[@Title="Introduction"]
only returns the Section elements with an attribute Title that is set to
“Introduction”. These previous examples made use of the child relation of
elements among each other. In addition to the child relation, other relations
can be used in XPath as well.
An XPath expression is evaluated for a specific node, which is called
the context node. The context node changes within a sub-expression to the
resulting nodes of the previous expression. The result of an expression has
one of the following four types: boolean, node set, string or floating point
number. XPath defines a set of operators that can be used to manipulate
these data types. This includes boolean operators, arithmetic operators and
comparison operators. In addition to these operators, XPath has a built-in
function library which includes functions for string manipulations, functions
on node sets and mathematical functions.
In XPath, other relations of the elements among each other can be used
to specify nodes in expressions as well. For this purpose, XPath offers so-
called axis for each relation. For example, the child axis is used to describe
elements by their child relation among each other. The child axis is also
the default axis of XPath and is specified the “/” character in expressions.
The “/” is part of the abbreviated syntax of XPath, which is used to make
expressions shorter. The expanded syntax can be used to make expressions
easier to understand or to emphasize a specific relation between nodes. For
example, /child::Report/child::Section is the expanded syntax of the
pattern presented above.
2.3 Trusted Computing Group Mechanisms
This section gives an overview of the mechanisms described by the TCG. For
a more detailed description, we refer to the TPM specification [Gro06] or
[Pea02].
The core of the TCG mechanisms [Gro06, Pea02] is the Trusted Platform
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Module (TPM), which is basically a smartcard soldered on the mainboard of
a PC. The TPM serves as the root of trust, because its hardware implemen-
tation makes it difficult to tamper with, and therefore it is assumed to be
trustworthy. One must also assume that the hardware vendor is trustworthy
and has designed the TPM chip according to the specification. Although
the TPM chip is not specified to be tamper-resistant, it is tamper-evident,
meaning that unauthorized manipulations can be detected.
The TPM can create and store cryptographic keys, both symmetric and
asymmetric. These keys can either be marked migratable or non-migratable,
which is specified when the key is generated. In contrast to non-migratable
keys, migratable keys can be transferred to another TPM. Due to its limited
storage capacity, the TPM can also store keys on the hard disk. In this case,
these keys are encrypted with a non-migratable key, assuring the same level
of security as if the keys were stored directly in the TPM. The TPM is able
to perform calculations on its own, e.g., it can use the generated keys for
encryption and decryption.
In the context of this thesis, the Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs)
are of particular interest. These registers are initialized on power up and
are used to store the software integrity values. Software components are
measured by the TPM and the corresponding hash-value is then written
to this platform configuration register by extending the previous value of a
specific PCR. The following cryptographic function is used to calculate the
values for the specific registers:
Extend(PCRN , value) = SHA1(PCRN ||value)
For every measured component an event is created and stored in the
stored measurement log (SML). The PCR values can then be used together
with the SML to attest the platform’s state to a remote party. To make sure
that these values are authentic, they are signed with a non-migratable TPM
signing key, the Attestation Identity Key (AIK). The remote platform can
compare these values with reference values to see whether the platform is in a
trustworthy state or not. The TCG assumes that a trusted operating system
measures the hash value of every process started after the boot process.
Such s trusted OS is not part of the TCG specification. For a description of
a trusted OS see [GRB03, SZJvD04, Bas06].
The TPM additionally offers a number of different signing keys. One
major key is the Endorsement Key (EK) which is generated by the module
manufacturer and injected into the TPM. The EK uniquely identifies the
TPM and is used to prove that the TPM is genuine. In addition, the EK is
used to obtain an Attestation Identity Key (AIK). An AIK is created inside
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the TPM, signed with the private portion of the EK, and the public part is
transferred to a third party (a Privacy-CA). The Privacy-CA verifies that the
platform is a genuine TPM and creates a certificate which binds the identity
key to the identity label and generic information about the platform. This
certificate, also known as identity credential is sent to the TPM and later
used to attest the authenticity of a platform configuration.
2.3.1 Remote Attestation
The remote attestation is used to attest the configuration of an entity to
a remote entity. This procedure is widely used to get integrity information
before a client proceeds with the communication in order to use a service or
receive data, e.g., digital content. This mechanism is referred as integrity re-
porting and can be applied in many scenarios and different applications, such
as controlling access to a network depending on the trustworthiness of the
client [SJZvD04]. The integrity reporting mechanism is also one requirement
mechanism in the context of DRM applications, since it is obviously required
that the DRM-client software is in a trustworthy state and executes a cer-
tain policy to prohibit unauthorized use, copy or redistribution of intellectual
property [RC05].
2.3.2 Integrity Reporting Protocols
The concept of remote attestation has been developed to enable integrity re-
porting protocols. In this section we discuss an integrity reporting protocol
proposed by [SZJvD04], which is based on the challenge-response authenti-
cation [BM92] and is used to validate the integrity of an attesting system.
Figure 2.9 illustrates the remote attestation of B against A. In step 1 and
2, A creates a non-predictable nonce and sends it to the attestor B. In step 3a,
the attestor loads the Attestation Identity Key from the protected storage of
the TPM by using the storage root key (SRK). In the next step, the attestor
performs a TPM Quote command, which is used to sign the selected PCRs
and the provided nonce with the private key AIKpriv. Additionally, the
attestor retrieves the stored measurement log (SML). In step 4, the attestor
sends the response consisting of the signed Quote, signed nonce and the
SML to A. The attestor also delivers the AIK credential which consists of
the AIKpub that was signed by a Privacy-CA.
In step 5a, A validates if the AIK credential was signed by a trusted
Privacy-CA thus belonging to a genuine TPM. A also verifies whether AIKpub
is still valid by checking the certificate revocation list of the trusted issuing
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1. A : create a non-predictable 160bit nonce
2. A → B : ChallengeRequest(nonce)
3a. B : loadkey(AIKpriv)
3b. B : retrieve Quote = sig{PCR, nonce}AIKpriv
3c. B : get stored measurement log (SML)
4. B → A : ChallengeResponse(Quote, SML) and cert(AIKpub)
5a. A : validate cert(AIKpub)
5b. A : validate sig{PCR, nonce}AIKpriv
5c. A : validate nonce and SML using PCR
Figure 2.9: Integrity reporting protocol [SZJvD04]
party. This step was designed to discover masquerading by comparing the
unique identification of B with the system identification given in AIKpub.
In the next step, A verifies the signature of the Quote and checks the
freshness of Quote in step 5c. Based on the received stored measurement
log and the PCR values A processes the SML and re-computes the received
PCR values. If the computed values match the signed aggregate, the SML is
valid and untampered. A now only verifies if the delivered integrity reporting
values match given reference values, thus A can decide if the remote party is
in a trustworthy system state.
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Chapter 3
Scenario and Requirements
In this chapter, we first present a scenario to illustrate different challenges for
history-based access control for XML documents. Within this scenario, we
sketch different situations that illustrate requirements for an access control
system. We use these specific situations to derive general challenges for ac-
cess control. Based on these general challenges, we define explicit individual
requirements for our model.
3.1 Scenario
In this section, we present a scenario to illustrate the requirements for history-
based access control. In our scenario, we consider five types of documents,
which are listed in Table 3.2. These document types differ in their required
level of protection. We list protection levels of this scenario and their descrip-
tion in Table 3.1. The document types in this scenario are an example for
document types in todays real world scenarios. We believe that documents
with similar properties can be found in other scenarios as well.
In this scenario, a project report contains confidential research results,
more precisely, the results from a current project. A project summary is
a summary of current projects. As a consequence, it contains confidential
information, too. A patent application contains research result that are con-
sidered to be of high value. Therefore a patent application is top secret
and accessible for only a very small fraction of the employees. In contrast
to this, information in a press release is public and accessible for anyone.
Finally, an internal newsletter is addressed to all employees. This newslet-
ter contains internal information that is accessible for every employee of the
company. Nevertheless, this information should only be read by employees
of the company.
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Level Description
Top secret Very sensitive information
Accessible for a small fraction of the employees
Confidential Sensitive information
Accessible for some of the employees
Internal Internal information
Accessible for all employees
Public Public information
Accessible for anyone
Table 3.1: Different protection levels of documents in the scenario
Name Abbr. Content Level
Project report ProRep Confidential research results Confidential
Project summary ProSu Summary of current projects Confidential
Patent application PA Top secret research results Top secret
Press release PreRel Public available information Public
Internal newsletter IN Information for all employees Internal
Table 3.2: Document types used in the scenario
The subjects of our scenario act in five different roles (roles are described
in [SCFY96] and explained in Section 2.1.2), namely employee, researcher,
senior researcher, accountant and senior accountant. These roles are
organized in a hierarchy as depicted in Figure 3.1. In this example, employee
is the generic role for every employee of the company. A researcher is work-
ing in projects and performing research. A senior researcher is the super-
visor of one or more researchers. In similar fashion, a senior accountant is
the supervisor of one or more accountants, who execute administrative work.
Researcher
Senior researcher
Employee
Accountant
Senior accountant
Figure 3.1: Role hierarchy of the scenario
In the following, we present different situations that illustrate challenges
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for a history-based access control model. We believe that similar processes
and requirements can be found in many other scenarios, e.g., in health care,
public administration or academic research. The data transfers described in
situations 1, 2 and 3 are illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Situation 1: Text content of XML elements can be composed from different
sources.
Let us assume that in our scenario a project leads to some promising results,
so that a press release is created (Step 1 in Figure 3.2) to announce the
success to the public. The press release carefully avoids to expose any trade
secrets. Shortly afterwards, a project report is written, too, consisting of
several sections including an introduction and a main section. Some parts of
the former press release are reused in the introduction of the project report
and some parts of the introduction are also written from scratch (Step 2). As
a consequence, the XML element carrying the introduction contains parts of
text from different sources.
PreRel ProRep 1
Introduction
Main
IN ProRep 2
Intro
Main
PA
New part
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
ProSu
6.
Figure 3.2: Data transfers of Situations 1, 2 and 3
Situation 2: Allow copying depending on source of copied elements.
Later, a company internal newsletter is published to inform all employees
about the new results. For that, some parts of the project report are reused
(Step 3), but only those which were extracted from the press release before,
because the other parts are considered to be confidential and are therefore
not allowed to be copied.
Situation 3: Deny viewing depending on location of copied elements.
Additionally, the same public information, which originally came from the
press release, is also put in a company-wide project summary (Step 4), which
contains an overview of all current projects. Other projects reuse parts of
the project report as well and transfer copies of the confidential parts to the
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corresponding documents (Step 5). After that, parts of the project report
are copied to a patent application (Step 6). As a consequence, the protection
level of these parts must be raised to top secret, until the patent application
is granted. This also affects copies of that part, which reside in other project
reports.
Situation 4: Deny viewing depending on previous content of a document.
Another situation arises when some top secret information is inserted into
an existing report. At the time the information is present in the report,
researchers are not allowed to view the entire report anymore. Later on, the
top secret information is deleted from the report. Even though that the top
secret information is now deleted, researchers are still not allowed to view
the report, because they could learn from the remaining document about the
very confidential information.
Situation 5: Allow copying depending on the previous value of an attribute.
Moreover, some projects are funded by an external company, which is denoted
in the funded-by attribute of the corresponding reports. In our example, a
policy states that results of a project funded by “Company A” are not allowed
to be copied to projects funded by “Company B”. Even when A stops to fund
a certain project and the attribute funded by now reflects a different funder,
it is still prohibited to copy the corresponding content to a project report
funded by B.
Situation 6: Allow operations depending on the subject that performed a
previous operation.
Additionally, a policy states that certain modifications of a document made
by a senior researcher cannot be changed by subjects in an inferior role, e.g.,
by a researcher. For example, a researcher can change the title of a section,
e.g., to make a suggestion, until the title is changed by a senior researcher,
who has the authority to declare the title as final.
Situation 7: Allow operations depending on previous operations of the sub-
ject.
A different situation arises, when the company of our scenario executes
projects for other companies that are competitors to each other. In this
case, the access control system must ensure, that a researcher only gains
access to data of one of the competing companies. Otherwise a conflict of
interest could occur, because a researcher could misuse the knowledge gained
from the data of one companie. This problem is typical for the consulting
business, but in general it affects all industries of the service sector, e.g.,
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the IT service industry. To enable restrictions that deny misuse of insider
knowledge, the access control system must be able to grant or deny access
depending on former accesses of a subject.
Situation 8: Default policies and exceptions from policies.
Another policy states that every employee is allowed to view company inter-
nal newsletter. Some parts of the internal newsletter can contain confidential
information. Although these parts of the newsletter are not considered to be
top secret, they should not be viewed by specific groups of employees. For
example, some parts should not be visible for accountants, whereas other
parts should not be visible for researchers. Additionally, some of these re-
strictions may not apply for the corresponding senior position, e.g., a senior
accountant is allowed to view certain parts, which are denied for accoun-
tants. Alternatively to writing one newsletter and automatically censoring
some parts of it, the company could also create several versions newsletter
manually, which is clearly less efficient and less comfortable.
There are several ways to define access control rules for situations like
the one sketched above. The most efficient way to specify the corresponding
access control rules is to define default policies for the most common cases. In
this example, all employees are allowed to view the entire newsletter. After
this, each exception can be specified by an additional access control rule. For
example, a rule that denies viewing of some research related information for
accountants. As senior accountants are allowed to view some parts which
are not allowed to be viewed by accountant, another rule can specify this
exception.
The alternative to specifying both positive and negative rules, is to specify
only one kind of rules, e.g., only positive permissions. The drawback of this
approach is that rules get more complex. We illustrate the reasons for the
increased complexity in Figure 3.3.
all xy
Sets of objects Viewable for accountants Viewable for senior accountants
Viewing allowed Viewing not allowed
Figure 3.3: Sets of objects with different permissions
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This figure illustrates three sets of objects where each set is depicted as
an oval. These sets are depicted for three situations. On the left side, we
show the sets in general. In all cases, the outmost oval represents all reports.
The oval labeled with “x” denotes the set of objects that accountants are
not allowed to view, whereas the oval labeled with “y” represents the set of
objects that senior accountants are allowed to view in addition to that what
accountants are allowed to view. In the middle, we show the viewable objects
of an accountant and on the right we show the viewable objects of a senior
accountant, where the viewable objects are indicated by the shaded area in
the ovals.
If we use positive and negative rules, each rules needs to specify a set of
objects corresponding to one of these ovals. In contrast to this, if we only have
positive or negative rules, the specification of rules gets much more complex.
For example, the rule that defines the viewable objects for accountants must
specify a set of objects that corresponds to the subtraction of “x” from “all”.
The rule for senior accounts is even one step more complex.
3.2 Requirements
The previous situations have illustrated several challenges for an access con-
trol system. In the following, we extract requirements from these challenges
and define them individually. These situations were illustrated within our
example scenario. Concerning the requirements, we abstract from our ex-
ample scenario and define requirements that are useful for a wide range of
scenarios that share some properties with our scenario.
Requirement 1: Support of protection units smaller than XML elements.
We have illustrated in Situation 1 that XML elements can contain text frag-
ments, which differ in the way how they were created. This can be very
important for security. For example, one part of an element can be created
from scratch, whereas the other part is copied from a top secret document.
Therefore, the access control system must keep track of these parts individ-
ually. Moreover, text fragments can differ in the subject which has created
them. Consequently, we need a mechanism that keeps tracks of these parts.
Requirement 2: Set of operations to view and edit XML documents with
appropriate level of abstraction.
We need to define a set of operations that allows to view and edit XML
documents. There are many alternatives to design such a set of operations.
These alternatives differ in the level of abstraction of the proposed oper-
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ations. The simplest set of operations is a set consisting of a read and a
write operation. The level of abstraction of this set is too low to capture the
semantics of the operations in a way that is sufficient for our needs. For in-
stance, we cannot distinguish whether elements were newly created or copied
from somewhere else in case of this simple set of operations. We need to be
able to differentiate whether a document part was created from scratch or
whether it was copied from somewhere else. Moreover, concerning editing,
me must differentiate between the creation of new data and the deletion of
existing data. A simple update operation, which only defines that an element
was changed, is not sufficient, since the aforementioned details would not be
captured. Consequently, we need a create operation, a delete operation
and a copy operation for elements and their text content. These operations
must be applicable to entire XML elements or to parts of their text. We also
need the create and delete operation for attributes, because we want to
keep track of their creation and deletion as well. Since we regard attributes
as atomic units, we model the changing of an attribute value with the op-
eration change-attribute. Finally, we need a view operation that is used
when the user wants to view a document or parts of it.
Requirement 3: Record the source and destination of copy operations.
We have illustrated in Situation 2 and Situation 3 that it is relevant for access
control to know from where or to where certain parts of a document were
copied. The source of a document part is an important aspect to determine
its required level of protection. When a document is considered to be top
secret, we also consider copies from it as being top secret. Moreover, to
know to where a document part was copied, is important, too, especially if
the destination is a confidential or top secret document. In these cases, it is
desirable to restrict access to the source parts to avoid information leakage.
As a result, we must record the source and destination when documents parts
are copied to another location. In addition to this, we must be able to use
the gathered information for access control to enable the policies mentioned
in this paragraph.
Requirement 4: Access control for the copy operation.
In Requirement 2, we explained that we need an explicit copy operation as
part of our model. To be able to define access for situations as Situation 2
and Situation 5, our model must also be able to define permissions for this
operation. We formulate an individual requirement for this, since having a
copy operation as part of a model does not imply that the model is able to
define access for that operation. For example, the copy operation can be
internally translated to a pair of read and write operations and access could
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be defined only for those operations.
Requirement 5: Recording of previous attribute values and the previous
elements in a document.
In Situation 5, we illustrated that some situations require to define access
based on a previous value of an attribute. We think that many similar
situations can be found in other scenarios as well. Generally speaking, the
knowledge of previous attribute values helps to determine the required level of
protection of a document, because they characterize a document in addition
to its current content. Therefore, our model must record previous values of
attributes and allow to define access based on that information.
The previous content in form of elements is of also interest, since it also
helps to characterize a document. The knowledge that a specific element
was contained in a document can be used to specify its required level of
protection. For example, the protection level of a document can be raised if
it has previously contained a top secret element.
Since we require to record the previous values of attributes and the pre-
vious elements in a document, we could also record the previous text content
of these XML elements. But, here again, we assume that attributes and the
text of an XML element differ in their semantics and how they are used. As
stated above, we consider attribute values to have clear defined semantics
and the text content to have less clear defined semantics or undefined se-
mantics. We assume that attributes define certain properties of an element
and its text content carries continuous text. Without clear defined semantics
it is impractical to write access control rules. As a consequence, we do not
record the previous text content of XML elements.
Requirement 6: Record operations performed by each subject.
We have illustrated in Situation 6 and Situation 7 that some policies depend
on the operations performed by a certain subject. To enable this kind of
policies, we must record the operations performed by each subject. Moreover,
our model must be able to express policies based on that information.
Requirement 7: Record the context of previous operations.
In Situation 7 we gave an example, where access is defined depending on
the subject that performed a previous operation. Besides the subject of a
previous operation, other aspects can be relevant, too. We refer to these
aspects as the context of an operation. This context helps to specify an
object more precisely as it can make the essential difference when something
was created or who has created an object. It is an open question which
aspects of the context should be regarded. Our model must record the subject
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that performed an operation, the role the subject was active in and the
time of the operation. We believe that these aspects are the most helpful
ones. Nevertheless, further aspects might be of interest to. Therefore we
require that our model is extendable to handle these additional aspects, too.
Our model must be able to define access depending on the recorded context
information to enable policies based on that information.
Requirement 8: Positive and negative policies.
We have illustrated in Situation 8 that it is comfortable and efficient to have
positive (allow) and negative (deny) rules. This reduces the complexity of
individual rules and makes access control definition more efficient. Therefore,
we require our model to support positive and negative rules.
Requirement 9: Flexible conflict resolution strategy.
To support the definition of default policies and corresponding exceptions,
we need a flexible conflict resolution strategy that defines an order among all
rules for the case where multiple rules are applicable for an object.
More specifically, the rules should be ordered in a way that a rule defining
an exception has a higher priority than the corresponding default rule. In
order words, the rules should be ordered depending on how specific they
are. A too simple conflict resolution strategy would not allow to specify
exceptions from a default rule, e.g., the strategy “deny takes precedence
over allow” without further mechanisms does not allow to specify positive
exceptions as we illustrated in Situation 8.
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Chapter 4
Model
In this chapter, we give an overview of our model and its components, which
are explained in detail in the following sections. We start with an overview
of our model, continue with the operations defined in our model, go on with
a description of the history and finally present the syntax for access rules.
As part of the access control rules, we extend the function library of XPath.
Therefore, we give details to these extension functions. We conclude this
chapter, with an example of how to use our model. For this purpose, we show
how we can express Chinese Wall policies with our model. In this example, we
show that our model is better suited for real world scenarios than the original
Chinese Wall model, since our model overcomes unnecessary restrictions of
the Chinese Wall model.
4.1 Overview
Our history-based access control model defines which subjects are allowed
or denied to access certain parts of an XML document. Concerning the
subjects of our model, we design our model for human users. We use roles
(as described in [SCFY96] and Section 2.1.2) to model these subjects. The
objects of our model are different parts of an XML document. These parts
can either be entire XML elements (including attributes and text content),
attributes or parts of the text content of an XML element. We define a set
of operations, which enables the user to view and edit XML documents. The
effects of these operations are recorded in the history. When we record an
operation in the history, we also log the context information of that operation.
Generally speaking, context information can be any information that helps to
specify the situation of the operation more precisely. In our case, we record
the date and time of the operation, the subject that performed the operation
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and the role the corresponding subject was active in. If it is required, this
context definition can be extended. Summing up, the history stores how a
document was created.
Finally, we use access control rules to define that subjects in a certain
role are allowed or denied to perform a given operation on specific objects.
These objects are described by a condition, which defines predicates on the
content of the current document and on the history. When a user tries to
perform an operation on an object, we must check whether there is an access
control role that matches with the the active role of the user, the operation
that he wants to perform and with the object. The first two aspects can be
checked directly. In contrast to this, to check whether a rule matches with
an object, we must check whether the object has the properties described by
the condition of the rule. Therefore the condition must be evaluated for the
current object.
4.2 Subjects
The subjects of our system are human users, which view and edit XML
documents. As stated above, we use roles to model the subjects. This
leads to a higher level of abstraction and therefore leads to more flexibility
compared to directly listing individual subjects. There are many variations
of the RBAC model, where each variation adds further enhancements to the
model. Since we focus on how to specify the objects based on their history, we
only use the basic version of RBAC [SCFY96]. We use the role hierarchies to
solve conflicts between positive and negative rules. Nevertheless, advanced
versions of the RBAC model can be combined with our model, since the
modeling of subjects and objects is more or less independent of each other.
4.3 Objects
We have three types of objects in our model. The first type of model is the
XML element. The second type are attributes and the third type is a text
block, which we use to structure the text content of an XML element. In the
following, we give details to each type of object.
4.3.1 XML elements
XML elements are one of the three types of objects in our model. The
attributes and the text content of an XML element also belong to this type
of object. As a consequence, if access is granted to an XML element, its
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attributes and text content can also be accessed. However, in cases where
finer granularity is needed, our model can address the attributes and the
text content individually. The children elements of an XML element are
not part of this type of object. In contrast, these are individual object
themselves. Consequently, if access is granted to an element, access to is
children elements is still undefined. But if access to an element is denied,
access to its children elements is also denied, since XML elements require to
be interpreted together with their parent element to determine the intended
semantics.
4.3.2 Attributes
In cases were the granularity of elements is too coarse, our model can also
address attributes as individual objects. For example, if data about persons
and their personal preferences is collected to create statistics, one can grant
access to a person on the level of XML elements and deny access to attributes
of a person that allow to identify the person. Using this method, data can
be censored to avoid loss of privacy. Moreover, by only denying access to
certain attributes the structure of an XML document, which is required to
interpret the elements, is maintained.
4.3.3 Text blocks
Our model splits the text of an element internally into smaller units, which
we refer to as text blocks . These text blocks are used in this model for two
purposes. First, they are one type of object, which allows to define access for
individual text blocks. Second, text blocks are needed to keep track of text
content, where different parts of the content were created in different ways.
In other words, we also must internally use text blocks to record details of
the editing process.
We need text blocks because the text content of an XML element can
be composed of several parts, which were created in a different way. Their
creation can differ in several aspects. Text can either be created newly or
be copied from a different location. Moreover, the text can be created by
different subjects or at different times. Our model internally uses text blocks
to keep track of these individual parts and how they were created. Every
create operation on the text of an XML element creates a new text block.
In other words, when new text is added, we create a new text block. In
addition to this, text blocks or parts of their text can also be deleted. If new
text is added in the middle of an existing block, we split the existing block
and create a new block for the added text. We use a rule, which defines the
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structure of the text content in terms of text blocks. The corresponding rule
is given by Definition 4.3.1. Our model enforces this rule by splitting existing
text blocks and by creating new text blocks.
Definition 4.3.1 (text block). Each part of the text content of an XML
element that differs in the way how it was created or to where it was copied
from the remaining text of an element, must be kept as an individual text
block.
4.4 Operations
In this section, we describe the set of operations of our model. This set of
operations must have a level of abstraction that allows to keep track of the
way how a document was created. We must be able to differentiate whether a
document part was created from scratch or whether it was copied from some-
where else. Moreover, concerning editing, me must differentiate between the
creation of new data and the deletion of existing data. Consequently, we need
a create operation, a delete operation and a copy operation for elements
and their text content. These operations must be applicable to entire XML
elements or to parts of their text. We also need the create and delete
operation for attributes, because we want to keep track of their creation and
deletion as well. Since we regard attributes as atomic units, we model the
changing of an attribute value with the operation change-attribute.
Finally, we need a view operation that is used when the user wants to
view a document or parts of it. Most of the operations can be applied to
elements, text and attributes. Each operation has an effect on the document
itself as well as on the history. In addition to the operation itself, we also
record the context of each operation. In our case, the context consists of the
date and time of the operation, the subject that performed the operation
and the role the corresponding subject was active in. After introducing the
operations in general, we now give details on each operation.
4.4.1 Create
There are three versions of the create operation. There is one version for each
type of object in our model. As stated above, these types are XML element,
attribute and text. Each operation uses a specification of the destination
position as first parameter. The second parameter depends on the version of
the operation. All versions of the create operation and their parameters are
summarized in Table 4.1.
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Operation Parameter 1 Parameter 2 Parameter 3
create element position element name
create attribute position attribute name initial value
create text position new text
Table 4.1: Versions of the create operation and their parameters
The create element operation creates an element without any attributes
or text. It needs a position, where the element should be created as first
parameter and the name of the new element as second parameter.
The attributes of an element are created with the create attribute
operation. This operation also needs a position, where the attribute should
be created as first parameter and the name of the new attribute as second
parameter. The initial value of an attribute is defined by the third parameter.
The create text operation is used to add new text to an element. This
operation has an argument that specifies the position of the new text. This
position can point into an existing text block, before an existing text block
or after an existing block. In the first case, in which the position points into
an existing text block, we split the existing block at the position where the
new content should be placed and the new content is placed in-between the
split blocks. This splitting is required according to Definition 4.3.1. The
second argument of the create text operation is the new text that should
be created.
4.4.2 Delete
In similar fashion to the create operation, there are three versions of the
delete operation. The delete operation is used to delete elements, attri-
butes, text or parts of the text. Since elements and their attributes are
checked in rules, we keep them after deletion in the histories. This approach
enables policies based on the former content of a document as stated as a
requirement (see Requirement 5 in Section 3.2). All versions of the delete
operation are listed together with their parameters in Table 4.2.
Operation Parameter 1
delete element element specification
delete attribute attribute specification
delete text specification of text range
Table 4.2: Versions of the delete operation and their parameters
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The delete element operation deletes an element including its attributes
and text content. Its only parameter is the specification of the element that
should be deleted. The operation can only be applied to elements without
any children. If an element has children elements, these must be deleted
before the element itself can be deleted. The deleted element is stored in the
history.
The delete attribute operation deletes an attribute. Its only parame-
ter is the specification of the attribute that should be deleted. The deleted
attribute is kept in the history.
The delete text operation is used to delete a range of text. In a special
case, the complete text of an element can be deleted. This operation has
an argument that specifies the range of text that should be deleted. Since
the text of an element is structured into text blocks and we must respect
Definition 4.3.1, we delete the text by deleting the corresponding text blocks.
If the start or the end of the range points into a text block, we split the
affected block at the corresponding position. As a result, the deletion of a
range of text can be performed by deleting a range of text blocks.
4.4.3 Copy
The copy operation can be used for elements, text or parts of the text. We
record the copying of elements and text in the history by denoting which
object is a copy of which other object. All versions of the copy operation are
listed together with their parameters in Table 4.3.
Operation Parameter 1 Parameter 2
copy element element specification position
copy text specification of text range position
Table 4.3: Versions of the copy operation and their parameters
The copy element operation copies an existing element to a new loca-
tion. The new location can be within the same document as the source
element or within another document. The operation has two parameters.
The first parameter specifies the existing element that should be copied and
the second parameter specifies the position to where the element should be
copied. The element is copied including its attributes and its text content,
but without its children elements. When a complete tree of elements should
be copied to a new location, the copy operation must be used for each element
individually. If our model is implemented in an editing program for XML
documents, the program can automatically translate the copying of a tree
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into the corresponding sequence of copy operations for individual elements.
The structure of the text blocks of the source element is recreated at the
destination element. For each pair of text blocks, which are copies of each
other, we denote that they are copies of each other in the history.
The copy text operation copies a range of existing text to a new location.
For this purpose, it uses a specification of a text range to denote, which part
of the text of an element should be copied. In a special case, the complete
text of an element can be copied. Since copying text changes to where parts
of the text was copied, we must split the affected blocks before we copy text
to maintain Definition 4.3.1. As a consequence, we copy text by copying
entire text blocks to the destination. If the start or the end of the range
points into a text block, we split the affected block at the corresponding
position. As a result, the copying of a range of text can be performed by
copying a range of text blocks. For each pair of text blocks, which are copies
of each other, we denote that they are copies of each other in the history.
4.4.4 Change Attribute
The change attribute operation allows users to change the value of a spe-
cific attribute. Since former values of an attribute can be checked by rules,
we record the changing of an attribute in the history. The parameters of the
change-attribute operation are shown Table 4.4.
Operation Parameter 1 Parameter 2
change-attribute attribute specification new value
Table 4.4: Parameters of the change-attribute operation
The change-attribute operation has two parameters. The first param-
eter specifies the existing attribute that should be changed in its value. The
second parameters is the new value to which the specified attribute should
be set to.
4.4.5 View
The view operation displays elements, attributes and text content. When a
user wants to view an entire document, the view operation must be invoked
for every objects of the document. In contrast to the read operation of some
other systems, e.g., [BL73, BN89], the view operation does not imply a data
transfer in a technical system. In contrast to this, a view is presented to the
user. Since the user could misuse the viewed information, the view operation
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is logged in the history at the time when the view is created and presented
to the user. All versions of the view operation are listed together with their
parameters in Table 4.5.
Operation Parameter 1
view element element specification
view attribute attribute specification
view text block text block specification
Table 4.5: Versions of the view operation and their parameters
The view element operation is used to view an element. With this op-
eration only the element itself can be viewed, but not its attributes and text
content. This operation also does not allow to view the children elements of
an element. For these elements, the view element operation must be invoked
individually. If our model is implemented as part of an editing program, the
program can invoke the view element operation for every element of the
document the user wants to view. As a result of this process, the program,
can create a view of the document.
In similar fashion, to the view element operation, the view attribute
operation is used to view attributes and the view text block operation is
used to view the text content of an XML element.
4.5 History
We use the history to keep track of changes caused by the operations create,
copy, delete, change attribute and view. As stated above, we use the
history to record how the content of a document was created. Finally, we
can access this information in conditions to define the applicable objects of
an access control rule.
We record the following aspects in the history:
• The context of each performed operation, where the context is a tuple
of subject, role and date.
• The previous values of attributes, where each change is caused by the
change-attribute operation.
• Deleted elements.
• Deleted attributes.
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• Which elements or text blocks are copies of each other. These copies
were created by the copy operation.
Concerning the copy operation, we store which object is a copy of another
object. We store this information by keeping track of the is-copy-of relation
between objects. We define the is-copy-of relation between two objects o1
and o2 as follows:
Definition 4.5.1 (is-copy-of relation). An object o1 is in is-copy-of relation
with an object o2, if o1 was created by applying the copy operation on o2.
To visualize this, we can view the copied objects as a graph, where each
node of the graph represents an object and each directed edge of the graph
represents a copy operation. This directed edges point from the original to
the copied object. In other words, each edge represents an is-copy-of relation
between two objects of the graph.
A
B
E
F
C D
Press Release Report (Main)
Report (Intro.)
Int. Newsletter
Patent Application
Project Summary
Figure 4.1: Illustration of the is-copy-of relation
Figure 4.1 shows a graphical illustration of the is-copy-of relation of the
objects mentioned in the scenario. We refer to this kind of illustration as
copy graph. We define a copy graph as follows:
Definition 4.5.2 (copy graph). A copy graph is a graph, where each object
is represented as a node and the is-copy-of relation between the objects is
represented by directed edges.
Moreover, Figure 4.1 shows two copy graphs. The copy graph on the left
side of the figure shows three is-copy-of relations, whereas the graph on the
right side of the figure only shows one such relation. In this example, all
objects are text blocks. In the general case, objects of a copy graph can be
XML elements as well. In addition, the copy graph in the figure may not
reflect all is-copy-of relations and there can be nodes that are in is-copy-
of relation with the depicted nodes, but these are not shown. In the case,
where no nodes are omitted from the copy graph, we refer to the copy graph
as being complete. Such a complete copy graph is defined as follows:
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Definition 4.5.3 (complete copy graph). A copy graph is complete, if there
is no object that is in is-copy-of relation with an object of the graph and that
is not represented by a node of the graph.
4.6 Access Control Rules
In this section, we define the syntax and the semantics of access control rules.
We define two types of rules. The first type of rule defines permissions for
the unary operations create, view, delete and change attribute. Ac-
cordingly, we refer to this type of rule as unary rule. The second type of rule
defines permissions for the binary operation. Consequently, we call this type
of rule copy rule. The syntax of both types of rules is listed in Figure 4.2.
We define the semantics of the rules below.
Unary rule Copy rule
Element Description Element Description
Role Role Role Role
Operation Operation Operation “Copy”
Object XPath Object XPath
Destination XPath
Mode allow | deny Mode allow | deny
Figure 4.2: Syntax of access control rules
Access control rules consist of several fields, where each field except of
the mode field defines a condition that must be true to apply the rule. If any
of the conditions defined by a field of the rule is not satisfied, then the rule is
not applicable. Next, we continue by explaining the different fields of a rule.
4.6.1 Role field
The role field of a rule describes the role (as described in [SCFY96] and
Section 2.1.2) in which a subject must be active in to apply the rule. In other
words, if a subject is active in the same role as defined in the corresponding
rule, the rule is applicable for him. In addition to this, the rule is also
applicable, if a subject is active in a role that is superior to the role defined
in the rule. Reconsider the role hierarchy from the scenario (see Section 3.1),
where employee is the most generic role and researcher is a role that is
superior to employee. In this example, a rule defined for the role employee
is also applicable for subjects that are active in the role researcher.
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4.6.2 Operation field
The operation field of a rule defines the operation for that a rule is applicable
for. In other words, the operation defined in the rule must be equal to
the operation that a subject wants to perform. Otherwise the rule is not
applicable for that operation. In case of a copy rule, the operation field is
always copy. Moreover, we do not differentiate between the different types
of objects in the operation field of a rule. For example, if the creation of
an attribute should be allowed, the operation field of the corresponding
rule is set to create instead of create attribute. To denote that the rule
allows the creation of a specific attribute, an attribute must be specified in
the object field of a rule.
4.6.3 Object field
The object field of a rule defines for which objects a rule is applicable for.
Instead of listing individual objects in rules in an ACL-like manner [GD72],
we describe objects by their properties, e.g., location within a document or
attribute values. In addition to this, we can describe objects by their history.
We use XPath patterns [CD99] (see also Section 2.2.5) to describe the objects
for which a rule is applicable. We use XPath, since its clearly defined seman-
tics makes the interpretation of the resulting rules unambiguous. Moreover,
XPath has a predefined set of mechanisms that can be used for our purpose,
which also simplifies the implementation of our model. To check whether a
rule is applicable for a specific object, we must evaluate the XPath pattern
for the current object. As a result, we will receive a set of objects that is
specified by the XPath pattern. If the current object is part of this result
set, the rule is applicable for that object.
4.6.4 Destination field
The destination field of a copy rule defines the destinations to where an
object must be copied to be affected by the rule. Since only the copy op-
eration has a destination, only copy rules have a destination field. When
a user performs a copy operation, its destination must be included in the
destination field of a copy rule to apply the corresponding rule. Similar to
the object field, the destination field is an XPath pattern. This pattern
must be evaluated for the current destination document, which yields to a set
of objects that are described by the pattern. If the destination of the current
copy operation is part of this result set, then the copy rule is applicable for
that destination.
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4.6.5 Mode field
Finally, the mode field of a rule does not define a condition that must be
fulfilled. Instead, it defines whether the rule is positive or negative. If the
mode field of a rule is set to “deny”, then the rule is negative. In contrast to
this, if the mode field of a rule is set to “allow”, the rule is positive. Thus, a
positive rule allows the specified operation on the object in question, whereas
a negative rule denies to perform the operation.
4.6.6 Conflict resolution strategy
In some cases, there can be more than one applicable access control rule for
an operation that a user wants to perform. We have no problem if all of
these rules are either positive or negative. But in cases, where some of these
rules are positive and some others are negative, we have a conflict. In these
cases, we either must allow or deny the corresponding operation.
A common conflict resolution strategy is to define that one type of rule
has priority over the other type, e.g., that deny rules always take precedence.
According to Requirement 8 (see Section 3.2), we want to have a more ad-
vanced strategy, which also allows to specify positive exceptions to a negative
rule. We cannot do this with the simple “deny takes precedence over allow
strategy”. Therefore, we use a two step approach in conflict resolution.
In the first step, we compare the role fields of all matching rules. Since
rules also match if the subject is in a superior role to the role defined in
the rule, we can have rules which differ in their role field. In this case, a
rule that specifies a superior role has precedence over a rule that specifies an
inferior role. For example, if we have an allow rule for subjects in the role
senior accountant and a deny rule for subjects in the role accountant,
then the rule for subjects in the role senior accountant takes precedence.
We only apply the second step, if the conflict was not solved with the
first step. The conflict is not solved, if there are still positive and negative
rules remaining, which do not differ in their role field. In these cases, we
finally apply “deny takes precedence over allow”.
4.6.7 Default semantics
In contrast to the previous situation, where multiple rules are applicable for
an object, there also can be objects for which no access control rule defines
access. In these cases, we apply the default semantics of our model, which is
deny. In other words, if the access to the object is neither allowed nor denied
by a rule, then the object is not accessible.
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4.7 Accessing the History with XPath
We use access control rules to define access depending on the content of a
document and on the history. Recall that we use XPath patterns to define
the objects of a unary rule as well as the destination of a copy rule. As
a consequence, we need a method to access the histories within an XPath
pattern.
It is not possible to access the history information with the predefined
mechanisms of XPath, because the mechanisms of XPath are restricted to
the current document and at least some parts of the history should not be
stored within the document itself, e.g., the information about the is-copy-of
relation among elements should be stored separately, since it affects multi-
ple documents. Moreover, the access to the histories should be independent
of the method of storing the histories. This allows to change the storing
mechanism without the need to change all existing access control rules. As
a consequence, to enable access to the history information from XPath pat-
terns, we extend the function library of XPath with a set of functions that
we define in the following sections. The functions are designed to enable ac-
cess to all history information (see Section 4.5) that we record. Since XPath
allows to combine several aspects in a logical condition, we can also define
rules which need to use multiple aspects of the history. All functions can op-
tionally use an element as first parameter. Otherwise, all functions apply to
the current context element. We have organized our functions in six different
groups, where each group consists of functions for a similar purpose.
4.7.1 Getting Copies of an Object
This group of functions is related to the is-copy-of relation of objects among
each other, where an object can either be a text block (see Section 4.3) or
an XML element. The functions of this group are required to express rules
that define access depending on the source of an object or on the locations
to where an object was copied. Figure 4.1 illustrates the is-copy-of relation,
where the examples show the processes of the scenario in Chapter 3. For
each object, we denote in which document it is contained, e.g., object A is
created within a press release.
The function copies returns all elements of the corresponding complete
copy graph, whereas the function predecessors returns all elements that are
on the path to the root element of the copy graph starting from the current
element. Finally, the function successors returns all elements in the subtree
below the current element. The elements occurring as the result of any such
function are sorted ascending by creation time, which enables the author of a
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rule to use the indexing mechanisms of XPath to address a specific element,
e.g., predecessors()[1] refers to the root of a copy graph.
Moreover, the surrounding XML document of the returned elements can
be analyzed in a rule. For example, to check in which type of document
the copies of an element reside, one must retrieve the corresponding root
element of a copied element. As a result, the access rights of one XML
document can depend on the content of several other XML documents. We
refer to these documents as dependent documents. We define whether one
document depends on another document as follows:
Definition 4.7.1 (depending document). A document d1 depends on the
document d2 if at least one object of d1 is part of the complete copy-graph of
an object in d2.
Note that the relation defined above is symmetrical, which means that
if d1 depends on d2 then d2 also depends on d1. For one document d1 there
can be more than one document on which d1 depends on. We refer to all
documents on which the access rights of one document can depend as the set
of depending document, which we define as follows:
Definition 4.7.2 (depending documents). The set of depending documents
of a document d1, is the set of all documents dx, where d1 depends on dx.
The depending document are important, when the access rights of one
document are evaluated, since the content of the depending documents can
be relevant for the access rights of the document in question.
Table 4.6 lists the functions for getting the copies of an object and gives
an example for each one. These examples refer to the left graph of Figure
4.1 and B as the current element.
Function Returns Example
copies() all elements of the copy graph {A, B, C, D}
predecessors() elements on the path to the root {A}
successors() elements in the subtree below {C, D}
Table 4.6: Getting the copies of an object
We can formulate a policy from our scenario in Chapter 3 by writing
a corresponding access control rule with the help of the copies function.
The rule denies the viewing of reports for a subjects in the role “researcher”
if they contain nodes that have been copied to or from a patent application
(PA). To keep the example rule short, we do not check whether the PA is still
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Role: researcher Operation: view
Object: /Report//*[count(copies()[/PA]) > 0
Mode: deny
Figure 4.3: Rule denying view
pending. This would require another term in the condition which inspects
the value of the corresponding attribute of the PA.
The corresponding rule is depicted in Figure 4.3. The object field uses
an XPath pattern, where the path /Report//* denotes that this rule is
applicable to any node of any report. In other words, we do not restrict
objects to be located at a specific position within a report. The following
square brackets define a condition, which uses the count function (predefined
in XPath) to count the number of copies of the current object that reside
in a patent application. As an argument for the count function, we use the
copies function to retrieve all copies of that element in other documents.
The result of the copies function is filtered by another condition in square
brackets. This condition retrieves the root element of the corresponding
document and checks whether its element name is PA. Finally, we check
whether the result of the count function is greater than 0. In this case, the
object matches with the XPath pattern and the viewing of this object is
denied for any subject in the role researcher.
4.7.2 Getting Related Nodes Depending on Time
This group of functions retrieves nodes addressed relatively to the context
node that existed within a specified time interval. We need this group of
functions, since we store deleted nodes in the history and we want to be
able to access these deleted nodes in conditions. XPath offers functions
to retrieve nodes addressed relatively to the context node, but without the
specification of a time interval within which the nodes have existed, since
XPath only considers the current state of a document. This time interval is
required to select related nodes depending on time when they have exisited.
Therefore, each of these functions can have a time interval as parameter,
e.g., childrenAt(t1, t2) returns all nodes that were children of the context
node in the time interval between t1 and t2. To inspect a single point in
time, t2 can be omitted. If no parameter is specified, the entire lifetime
of the corresponding document is inspected. When the entire lifetime of a
document is inspected, all current elements, as well as all deleted elements
are returned. As mentioned, all functions can optionally have an element as
first parameter. The functions for getting related nodes depending on time
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are listed in Table 4.7.
parentAt followingAt precedingSiblingAt
rootAt precedingAt followingSiblingAt
childrenAt descendantAt selfAt
Table 4.7: Getting related nodes depending on time
We illustrate the usage of the functions defined above by an example
rule, which is depicted in Figure 4.4. Recall the policy from our scenario
that denies the viewing of a report if it has contained an element from a
patent application. To do this, the XPath pattern of the corresponding
rule inspects all descendants of the root element of the report in question
by using the descendantAt function. By definition, this function returns all
descendants including deleted nodes. These nodes are filtered by a condition,
which inspects the elements that are in is-copy-of relation with the element
in question. We count whether at least one of these elements is contained in
a patent application (abbreviated by PA).
Role: researcher Operation: view
Object: /Report/descendantAt()
[count(copies()[/PA]) > 0]
Figure 4.4: Rule denying view
4.7.3 Getting the Context of a History Entry
This group of functions offers access to the context of a specific history en-
try. Each function except of getAttrChangeContexts() returns an element
consisting of subject, role and time. In addition to this, the function get-
AttrChangeContexts() also delivers the value to that the corresponding
attribute was changed to. Moreover, we offer functions to retrieve the con-
text of the creation, the deletion and the viewing of nodes. Table 4.8 lists
the functions for retrieving the context of a history entry.
We illustrate the usage of the functions defined above by an example
rule. Recall the policy from the scenario stating that a researcher cannot
delete a section that was created by a senior researcher. The corresponding
rule is depicted in Figure 4.5 and uses the getCreationContext function to
check whether the role of the subject that created the Section is senior
researcher. In that case, it denies the deletion of Section elements for
subjects in the role researcher.
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Function Returns context(s) of
getCreationContext() creation of current element
getDeletionContext() element deletion
getViewsContexts() viewing a node
getAttrChangeContexts() changing an attribute
Table 4.8: Getting the context of a history entry
Role: researcher Operation: delete
Object: //Section[getCreationContext()
/role = ’senior researcher’]/*
Mode: deny
Figure 4.5: Rule denying deleting of a section
4.7.4 Getting Accessed Nodes
This group of functions is used to get all nodes which have been accessed by a
specified user or by a user in a certain role. For example, these functions are
required to express Chinese Wall policies [BN89]. The functions are created,
viewed, accessed, deleted, changedAttr and copied. Each function refers
to a specific operation, e.g., viewed returns viewed nodes. In addition, the
function accessed returns all accessed nodes independently of the operation
and modified returns nodes that have been modified. All functions have two
parameters that define conditions on the returned nodes. The first parameter
user specifies to return only nodes that have been accessed by the specified
user. Analogously, we define the parameter role. Both parameters can be
set to any to indicate to return nodes accessed by any user or in any role.
Optionally, each parameter can be set to current. In this case, the current
user or his current role is used for the check. For example, created(any,
current) returns all nodes which have been created by users who were active
in the same role as the one in which the current user is active in. The
functions of this group are summarized in Table 4.9. We present example
rules using the functions of this group in Section 4.8.
4.7.5 Getting Specific Nodes of Current Rule
We define three functions for accessing specific nodes within an XPath pat-
tern. The function currentNode returns the node in question for which the
XPath pattern is evaluated. This function is required when the pattern’s
context changes to a document that is different from the document for which
58 CHAPTER 4. MODEL
Function Returns
created() all created nodes
viewed() all viewed nodes
accessed() all accessed nodes
deleted() all deleted nodes
changedAttr() all changed attributes
copied() all copied nodes
Table 4.9: Getting accessed nodes
the pattern was initiated. The function srcNode retrieves the source node
in question when checking a copy rule. In a similar fashion, the function
destNode returns the destination node of a copy rule. The last two functions
are necessary to define copy rules which compare the source and destination
objects with each other. The functions of this group are listed in Table 4.10.
We present example rules example rules using the functions of this group in
Section 4.8.
Function Returns
currentNode() inspected node of a unary rule
srcNode() inspected source node of a copy rule
destNode() inspected destination node of a copy rule
Table 4.10: Getting specific nodes of a rule
4.7.6 Additional Extension Functions
This group of functions are required for rules that need to inspect the cur-
rent subject, the role of the current subject or whether a specific node is
deleted. The functions of this group are currentSubject, currentRole and
isDeleted. These functions provide information that is not available within
XPath patterns and can be required in a variety of rules. The functions of
this group are summarized in Table 4.6.
4.8 Modeling Chinese Wall policies
We conclude this chapter by presenting three example rules that demonstrate
how our model can be used to express the policies of the Chinese Wall model
mentioned in the scenario in an effective and flexible way. We show that
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Function Returns
currentSubject() the current subject
currentRole() the role of the current subject
isDeleted() true if the node is deleted, otherwise false
Figure 4.6: Additional functions
our model is better suited for real world scenarios, since it can avoid the
unnecessary restrictions of the original Chinese Wall model.
The Chinese Wall model (described in detail in Section 2.1.3) includes two
policies to define access, namely the “read policy” and the “write policy”.
The first policy is used for read and execute access and states that access to
an object is only granted if the accessing subject did not access any object of
the same conflict-of-interest class that belongs to a different company. As a
consequence, after an access to one object, all objects of the same class that
belong to different company data sets are unaccessible for that subject.
Banks Petroleum Companies
Bank A Bank B Bank C Oil Company A Oil Company B
o2 o3 o4 o5 o6 o7o1 o8 o9 o10 o11 o12 o13
Figure 4.7: An example of the objects in the CWM
The read policy alone is insufficient, because unwanted data transfers
that enable misuse of insider knowledge are still possible via multiple steps.
Consider the following example depicted in Figure 4.7. We have two conflict-
of-interest classes, namely banks and oil companies. A subject s1 reads object
o1, which belongs to “Bank A” and writes the corresponding data to object o8,
which belongs to “Oil Company A”. After that, the subject s2 reads that data
from o8 and writes it to object o4, which belongs to “Bank B”. This transfer
is unwanted since o4 belongs to a competitor of “Bank A”. As a consequence,
the “write policy” is defined to prevent these unwanted transfers. It allows
to write data to an object only if the previous read accesses refer to the same
company data set or the read information is public. Next, we model the
policies of the Chinese Wall model with our history-based approach.
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We assign a conflict-of-interest class and a company to each document by
adding the attributes class and company to its root element. This approach
is reasonable, since each document typically refers to one company. Assigning
these attributes to each element can lead to ambiguous semantics regarding
the part-of relation of elements which are assigned to different companies.
For example, if a “Bank A” element has children that are assigned to “Oil
Company B” it is unclear whether these children are regarded to belong to
“Bank A” because they are part of a “Bank A” element.
Next, we define a set of rules which allow users to execute all operations
on any object, e.g., {employee, view, allow, //*}. Then, we specify two
rules that take precedence over the allow rules and deny accesses that are
not permitted according the policies of the Chinese Wall model. The first
rule corresponds to the read policy and is depicted in Figure 4.8. This rule
denies view access to non-public documents of different companies belonging
to the same conflict class.
Role: employee Operation: view
Object:
//*[count((viewed(current, any)[
(/*/@company != root(current-node())/@company) and
(/*/@class = root(current-node())/@class) and
(/*/@class != ’public’)]) > 0 ]
Mode: deny
Figure 4.8: Rule enforcing the read policy
The XPath expression of this rule first matches with any object (//*) and
then specifies a condition on them. This condition states that the number
of elements viewed by the current subject matching a second condition must
be greater than zero. The second condition checks three properties of each
viewed object. First, its company must be different from the company of the
current node. Second, its class must be the same as the class of the current
node and third its class must not be public. The rule matches if all these
properties are fulfilled. The attributes company and class are accessed in
the expression using built-in functions of XPath, functions defined by us and
the child axis of XPath, e.g., root(current-node())/@company accesses the
company attribute of the currently inspected node. Next, we present the rule
enforcing the write policy in Figure 4.9.
The rule above reflects the write policy as close as possible. The write
operation of the Chinese Wall model can be used to create new data or to
transfer data. Since the write policy aims at denying transfers of data, we
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Role: employee Operation: copy Source: //*
Destination:
//*[count((viewed(current, any)[
(/*/@class != root(dest-node())/@class) and
(/*/@class != ’public’)]) > 0 ]
Mode: deny
Figure 4.9: Strict rule enforcing the write policy
have defined a copy rule for that purpose. This allows users to modify docu-
ments belonging to different classes, which is not possible in the Chinese Wall
model, because the denial of write operations also prevents the creation and
modification of data. However, the rule denies transfers of public informa-
tion that resides in a non-public document, although the transfer of public
information should not be restricted.
Moreover, transfers to documents of different conflict classes are denied
as well to prevent transfers via multiple steps, although the resulting state
of only one such transfer is not unwanted, e.g., the transfer from “Bank A”
to “Oil Company A” is acceptable if the transferred data is not transferred
by another subject to “Bank B” afterwards.
To overcome these shortcomings, we present a more flexible version of the
second rule in Figure 4.10. With the help of history information, we keep
track of the source of information and deny unwanted transfers via multiple
steps.
Role: employee Operation: copy Source: //*
Destination:
//*[(/*/@company != root(copies(src-node())[0])/@company) and
(/*/@class = root(copies(src-node())[0])/@class) and
(root(copies(src-node())[0])/@class != ’public’) ]
Mode: deny
Figure 4.10: More flexible rule for the write policy
The difference between the rule in Figure 4.10 and the rule in Figure 4.9 is
that the latter rule inspects the document from where the object to be trans-
ferred came from. This rule uses the expression copies(src-node())[0] to
retrieve the original node of which the current source node is a copy. This
leads to different semantics, where the source document is relevant for the
attributes class and company of an object rather than the document where
the node is currently located. As a consequence, public information can be
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transferred from any document to another, even if it is currently part of
a non-public document. Moreover, document parts can be exchanged be-
tween documents, which are not in conflict with each other while unwanted
transfers are still denied.
The example above demonstrates that our model can express history-
based policies in a flexible way. Our model provides the same level of security
as the original Chinese Wall model while being less restrictive. Thus, we
believe that our model provides a flexible and expressive method to define
access depending on histories.
4.9 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced our model for history-based access control.
The objects of our model are either XML elements, attributes or so-called
text blocks. Text blocks are parts of the text content of an XML element,
which differ in their way of creation or to where they were copied. We define
that our model automatically keeps track of these text blocks.
We described the set of operations of our model, which are create,
delete, view, copy and change-attribute. All of these operations ex-
cept from the last one can be applied to all three types of objects, whereas
the change-attribute operation can only be applied to attributes.
The operations of our model have a high level of abstraction, which allows
to keep track of many important details of the editing process. We record the
details of the editing process in the so-called “History”. In the history, we
record the context of each performed operation, where the context is a tuple
of subject, role and date, the previous values of attributes, deleted elements,
deleted attributes, and which elements or text blocks are copies of each other.
These copies were created by the copy operation.
To record the last aspect, we defined the is-copy-of relation between two
objects. Two objects are in is-copy-of relation with each other, if one object
was created by applying the copy operation on the other. To visualize this,
we introduced the copy graph, where each node of the graph represents an
object and each directed edge of the graph represents a copy operation. If no
is-copy-of relation is missing in the graph we call it a complete copy graph.
We use access control rules to define access. For this purpose, we pre-
sented two types of rules, namely unary rules and copy rules. The last type
defines access for the copy operation, whereas the first type defines access
for all remaining operations. We model the subjects in rules using the role-
based approach. In addition to this, each rule defines access for a specified
operation only. We use XPath patterns to describe the objects for which a
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rule is applicable. These patterns define objects by their properties, which
includes the content of objects as well as their history. For copy rules, we
also use an XPath pattern to describe the destination. Finally, a rule can be
either positive (allow) or negative (deny), which is specified by the mode of
the rule. If conflicts between positive and negative rules occur, we take the
rule with the more special role and finally apply deny takes precedence over
allow. If no rule matches for an object, access is denied.
We extended the function library of XPath to access history informa-
tion in XPath patterns. For this purpose, we have defined functions in six
different groups. We have functions that retrieve the copies of an object,
functions that can inspect deleted nodes, functions that return the nodes,
which a specified subject has accessed, functions that return the context
of a previous operation, functions to get specific nodes of the current rule
and some additional helper functions. All these functions allow us to define
objects depending on their history.
Finally, we presented an example, which shows how our model can be
used to model Chinese-Wall policies. In this example, we showed that our
model is suited better for real world scenarios, since it avoids the unnecessary
restrictions of the original Chinese-Wall model.
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Chapter 5
System Architecture
In this chapter, we present a system architecture for applying history-based
access control in a distributed environment where multiple users can edit
documents concurrently. The components of the system architecture are
explained in detail in the following sections. Additionally, we describe the
algorithms and protocols that are required for the interaction between the
components. Before we start with the description of our system architecture,
we will explain the challenges concerning its design.
Applying our model in a scenario where multiple users concurrently edit
multiple documents introduces four challenges that are caused by our history-
based access control model. There can be additional challenges, but we will
only discuss the challenges that are introduced by our model and its way of
defining access rights.
First, access rights of one document can depend on the content of other
documents, which we refer to as depending documents (see also Section
4.7.1). Since, we assume that documents are edited in a distributed fashion,
we need a method for accessing these distributed documents when calculating
access rights.
Second, changes to one document require the recalculation of the views of
all dependent documents, which are currently viewed. The straight forward
approach for this is to recalculate the views of all dependent documents after
a document has been changed. However, this results in a much higher number
of view recalculations compared to models which only define access depend-
ing on the currently edited document. For example, editing 20 depending
documents concurrently, leads to a 20 times higher number of view recalcu-
lations with the straight forward approach. Therefore, we need a method
which reduces the number of these view recalculations.
Third, the changes of one user to a document can revoke the access rights
of other users which are currently editing dependent documents. As a con-
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sequence, access rights can be revoked during an editing process, which can
lead to conflicts regarding the content of the document and the access rights.
Consequently, we need a method for handling these conflicts.
Fourth, the aforementioned straight forward approach causes intermedi-
ate editing steps to become relevant for access decisions of other users, which
is not desired. For example, a user can change a policy relevant element of a
document by first deleting it and then replacing it with an updated version
afterwards. In this example, the first step can revoke the access rights of
another user, whereas the second step might restore these access rights. As a
consequence, we need an approach that avoids this problem, more precisely,
we want to avoid that intermediate editing steps become policy relevant for
other documents.
In the following sections, we present a system architecture that solves the
presented challenges. We start with an overview of this architecture. For the
moment, we make no assumptions how the components are distributed of
different physical machines. In Section 5.3, we discuss different ways of dis-
tributing the components of our architecture on different physical machines
and finally present a distributed system architecture.
5.1 Architecture Overview
Our system architecture and its components are depicted in Figure 5.1. Our
system uses four databases. The document database (Doc DB) contains all
documents of the system. The rule database (Rule DB) contains the access
control rules, which specify allowed or denied accesses to the documents and
their parts. The copy database (Copy DB) stores the is-copy-of relation of
the objects. Finally, the user database (User DB) stores the credentials of
the users of the system as well as the corresponding roles including their
hierarchy.
The user interface (UI) presents documents to the user and offers oper-
ations that can be performed on the documents. If the user invokes such
an operation, the corresponding request is sent to the document processor
(DP), which performs the requested operation if it is permitted. Inside the
DP, the policy enforcement point (PEP) intercepts each operation and asks
the policy decision point (PDP) whether the requested operation is allowed.
The PDP uses the four databases to decide whether to allow or deny the
requested operation. In the following, we explain the workflow for editing a
document to illustrate the processes within our architecture.
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Figure 5.1: System architecture
5.2 Workflow
A document must be opened before it can be viewed or edited. Therefore,
the UI offers a command to open a document. This command is sent to
the DP, which loads a copy of the document from the document database.
We refer to this process as check-out , since it has semantics similar to the
check-out command of a version control system [Tic85]. After the check-out,
the user can edit the document by applying the operations of our model.
The changed content of an opened document including the corresponding
history becomes relevant for access decisions of other documents after it is
checked-in. Up to then, the content of the opened document is only relevant
for access decisions concerning that document itself. The document and
the corresponding history are kept as a local copy in the DP. To check-in a
document, the user must invoke the corresponding command of the UI. Then,
the DP stores the copy of the document back to the document database.
The check-in and check-out concept is more efficient and offers a higher
usability compared to directly working on the policy-relevant version of a
document. The first concept is more efficient, because changed content must
be propagated less often, more precisely, only when a document is checked-
in compared with immediately after each change. This also reduces the
overhead for recalculating permissions. The usability is also higher, because
of the transaction semantics of the approach. With this concept a user can
decide when the changing of a document is done, instead of having potentially
unwanted intermediate states to get relevant for access decisions. With this
concept we give a solution for the second and fourth challenge mentioned in
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the introduction of this chapter.
5.2.1 Check-out
When the user user1 invokes the command to check out the document doca,
the DP first loads a copy of doca from the Doc DB. The Doc DB maintains a
list listi for each document doci that denotes by which users doci is currently
opened to support concurrent access to documents. For that purpose, the DP
adds user1 to lista. Next, the DP sends a copy of doca and the credentials of
user1 to the PDP to retrieve a view of doca for user1. To create this view,
the PDP performs Algorithm 1.
This algorithm removes nodes from the document for which the user in
question has no view permission. For that purpose, the algorithm adds a
marker to each node which is set initially to “default”, where a node can
either be an element, an attribute or a text block. In line 3, we sort all rules
by their role, where superior roles are placed before inferior roles. If the role
field of rules is identical or incomparable, we place deny rules before allow
rules. This sorting implements the conflict resolution strategy described in
Section 4.6.6. The loop in lines 4 to 12 iterates over all existing rules. The
condition in line 5 skips rules that are not applicable. In line 7, the XPath
expression for the object of the current rule is evaluated. The result of this
step is a set of nodes that match with the current XPath expression, which
defines the applicable objects of the rule. For each of these nodes, the marker
is set according to the mode field of the current rule (line 8 to 10). In case
all markers of the document are set to a value different from “defualt”, we
can stop evaluating rules and exit the loop (lines 11 and 12). Finally, we
remove every node with a marker set to “default” or “deny” (lines 13 to 15).
After that, the PDP sends the view to the DP, which forwards it to the UI
(line 16).
5.2.2 Editing
To edit a document, the user first selects an operation offered by the UI, which
is sent to the DP, where the PEP intercepts the operation to check whether
it is allowed. For that purpose, the PEP sends the requested operation
together with the current document to the PDP, which evaluates the rules
to answer the request of the PEP. The current document must be sent to
the PDP, since the current content of the document is relevant for its own
access rights. Algorithm 2 performs the evaluation of the rules for a specific
operation.
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Algorithm 1: Create View
Input : rulesall, rolecurr, role hierarchy, doc
Output: doc
add marker to every node of doc1
set marker of every node of doc to “default”2
sort rulesall by role (special first) and mode (deny first)3
for each rulei of rulesall do4
if operation of rulei is not “view” or role of rulei is not inferior5
or equal to rolecurr then
continue with next iteration of loop6
nodesresult ← evaluate XPath of rulei for doc7
for each nodej of nodesresult do8
if marker of nodej is “default” then9
set marker of nodej to mode of rulei10
if all markers of doc are different from “default” then11
exit loop12
for each nodej of doc do13
if marker of nodej is “default” or “deny” then14
remove nodej and subtree below from doc15
return doc16
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The algorithm for rule evaluation sorts all rules like the previous algorithm
(line 1). Then, it checks the applicability of each rule by inspecting its role
and its operation (line 3). For each rule, the XPath pattern is evaluated
(line 5) to check whether it matches with the object in question. In case of
a copy operation, the XPath pattern for the destination is evaluated (lines 8
to 11), too. If the rule is applicable, its mode is returned. After evaluating
all rules, the algorithms returns “deny”, if none of the rules was applicable.
The PDP sends the result of this algorithm back to the DP. If the result is
deny, the DP does not perform the requested operation and informs the user
via the UI. If the result is allow, the DP performs the requested operation.
For that purpose, it executes the algorithm for the selected operation. We
discuss these algorithms in the following.
Algorithm 2: Evaluate Rules
Input : rulesall, rolecurr, role hierarchy, op, doc, obj, docdest, objdest
Output: deny | allow
sort rulesall by role (special first) and mode (deny first)1
for each rulei of rulesall do2
if operation of rulei is not op or role of rulei is not inferior or3
equal to rolecurr then
continue with next iteration of loop4
nodesresult ← evaluate XPath for object of rulei for doc5
if obj is not contained in nodesresult then6
continue with next iteration of loop7
if op is “copy” then8
nodesresult ← evaluate XPath for destination of rulei for docdest9
if objdest is not contained in nodesresult then10
continue with next iteration of loop11
return mode of rulei12
return “deny”13
Since performing an operation can lead to modifications of view permis-
sions, the DP asks the PDP to update the view as described above. The
updated view is presented to the user via the UI.
Create
The create operation can be used to create elements, attributes or text. In all
cases, we add history information that describes the operation. Algorithm 3
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depicts the creation of a new element, where elemdst represents the position
of the new element. After creating the element, the corresponding history
entry is created (line 3) and added to the docdst. Since the algorithm for
creating a new attribute is very similar the one for creating a new element,
we refrain from presenting it.
Algorithm 3: Create Element
Input : docdst, elemdst, subj, role, timecurr
Output:
elemnew ← create new element at elemdst in docdst1
create element history for elemnew2
create hist entry(“Create elem.”, subj, role, timecurr)3
The DP performs Algorithm 4 to add new text to the element elemdst of
the document docdst at the position posinsert. First, Algorithm 5 is invoked
to split elemdst at posinsert. After that, a new text block is created to which
the new content is added (line 2). In line 3, the corresponding history entry
is created.
Algorithm 4: Create Text Content
Input : docdst, elemdst, subj, role, timecurr, content, posinsert
Output:
split block(docdst, elemdst, posinsert)1
blockdst ← create block(docdst, elemdst, posinsert, content)2
create hist entry(“Create text”, blockdst, subj, role, timecurr)3
Algorithm 5 performs the splitting of text blocks, which is needed when
text is created, transferred or deleted.
If the position possplit at which the new text blockold should be added is
not within an existing text block, then the algorithm returns immediately.
In the other case, the existing text block blockold has to be split at possplit.
Therefore, we remove the content after possplit from blockold (line 5). This
removed content is added to the new text block blocknew which is positioned
after blockold (lines 6 and 7). Next, blocknew gets a copy of the history
of blockold (lines 9 and 10). If the split block was in a is-copy-of relation
with other blocks, the effect of the splitting has to be captured. For this
purpose, the DP copies all edges which either point to blockold (line 11) or
originate from it (line 13) and modifies them to point (line 12) or originate
from blocknew (line 14). The DP stores these edges in its internal memory
until the document is checked-in.
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Algorithm 5: Split Text Block
Input : docdst, elemdst, possplit
Output:
if possplit does not point within a block then1
return2
blockold ← text block where (docdst, elemdst, possplit) point into3
content ← text content of blockold from possplit to end4
delete text content of blockold from possplit to end5
posnew ← end of blockold6
blocknew ← create block(docdst, elemdst, posnew, content)7
get subj, role, time from history entry of blockold8
entries ← copy of history entries for blockold9
modify entries to reference blocknew10
edgesto ← copy of edges of Copy DB that point to blockold11
modify all edges in edgesto to point to blocknew12
edgesfrom ← copy of edges of Copy DB that originate from blockold13
modify all edges in edgesfrom to originate from blocknew14
add edgesto, edgesfrom to global set of temp. edges15
Copy
The copy operation can be used to copy elements or text. The first task is
carried out by Algorithm 6. We first create a new element at the destination
document docdest by applying Algorithm 3 (line 1). After that, the DP cap-
tures this transfer by adding a corresponding edge into its internal memory
(lines 2 and 3). The transferred element elemdst gets all attributes including
their values of its source element elemsrc (lines 4 to 6).
Algorithm 7 performs the copying of text. Since this operation has to be
captured, the DP splits both the text blocks at the source document (lines 1
and 2) and the text blocks at the destination document (line 3). In line 6, we
create a new block (blockdst) at the destination document (docdest) for each
of the transferred blocks (blocksrc). We create and store the corresponding
edge reflecting the transfer of blockdst. The new block gets its first history
entry describing its creation context in line 9.
Change Attribute and Delete
Changing an attribute value is also logged with an entry in the history. The
corresponding algorithm is similar to Algorithm 3. The delete operation can
be applied to elements, attributes and text. Since the required algorithms
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Algorithm 6: Copy Element
Input : docsrc, elemsrc, docdst, elemdst, subj, role, timecurr
Output:
create element(docdst, elemdst, subj, role, timecurr)1
edgenew ← create edge(docsrc, elemsrc, docdst, elemdst)2
add edgenew to global set of temp. edges3
for each attri of elemsrc do4
create attribute(docdst, elemdst, subj, role, timecurr, name of5
attri)
change attribute(docdst, elemdst, subj, role, timecurr, name of6
attri, value of attri)
Algorithm 7: Copy Text Content
Input : docsrc, elemsrc, textstart, textend, docdst, elemdst, posinsert,
subj, role, timecurr
Output:
split block(docsrc, elemsrc, textstart)1
split block(docsrc, elemsrc, textend)2
split block(docdst, elemdst, posinsert)3
for each blocksrc within textstart and textend of elemsrc do4
content ← text content of blocksrc5
blockdst ← create block(docdst, elemdst, posinsert, content)6
edgenew ← create edge(docsrc, elemsrc, blocksrc, docdst, elemdst,7
blockdst)
add edgenew to global set of temp. edges8
create hist entry(“Create text”, docdst, elemdst, blockdst, subj,9
role, timecurr)
posinsert ← end of blockdst10
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are similar, we explain only one of them. Algorithm 8 is used to delete text.
Since start or end of the text to be deleted can point into a block, the affected
blocks have to be split (lines 1 and 2) to keep track of the deleted parts. Each
deleted text block gets a final history entry to indicate its deletion (line 4).
Finally, the text block is deleted (line 5).
Algorithm 8: Delete Text Content
Input : docsrc, elemsrc, textstart, textend, docdst, elemdst, subj, role,
timecurr
Output:
split block(docsrc, elemsrc, textstart)1
split block(docsrc, elemsrc, textend)2
for each blocksrc within textstart and textend of elemsrc do3
create hist entry(“Delete text”, docdst, elemdst, blockdst, subj,4
role, timecurr)
delete text block(docdst, elemdst, blockdst)5
5.2.3 Check-in
A user can activate the check-in command of the UI to save his changes to an
opened document doca, which are currently stored only within the DP, to the
Doc DB. As a result of this, the checked-in version of the document becomes
relevant for the access decisions of other documents, which also includes
concurrently opened versions of doca. For both kinds of affected documents
the permissions must be recalculated, which possibly revokes permissions of
currently edited documents. The concurrent editing of a document can also
lead to conflicts, where the editing of one user to doca is incompatible to
the editing of another user, who also has edited doca. For this reasons, we
have to perform two steps when a document is checked-in. In step one, we
have to resolve conflicts between the concurrent versions of a document. In
step two, we must update the permissions of other affected documents whose
permissions depend on the saved document.
To perform step one, we first retrieve the list of concurrently edited ver-
sions of doca, which is maintained by the Doc DB for each opened document.
Next, we must merge all concurrently edited versions of doca to one consis-
tent version. We must do this before we can evaluate the permissions for the
document, because the permissions of an edited document can also depend
on the content of the document itself. We apply a conflict resolution strat-
egy to solve conflicts between concurrently edited documents. It depends on
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the scenario to define a specific strategy. One possible strategy is to resolve
conflicts manually. An automatic strategy can accept or reject changes de-
pending on the role of the subject that performed the changes or depending
on the time the changes were performed, since this information is available
in the corresponding history. After the conflicts are solved, the temporarily
stored edges, which correspond to the accepted operations, are saved to the
Copy DB.
To perform step two, we first inspect the Copy DB to retrieve the opened
documents that might depend on doca. These documents have at least one
node, that is in is-copy-of relation with a node of doca. Then, we recalculate
the permissions of these documents for their current users. In some cases,
permissions of nodes that were edited in this moment are revoked. In these
cases, the UI asks the user whether he wants to reject the current changes
or keep them and accept being unable to make further changes.
5.3 Distributed System Architecture
So far, we have made no assumptions how the components of our system,
which we have described in Section 5.1, are distributed across several physical
machines. Since our system should be able to be used by a large number
of users this assumption is not acceptable, since we must give a specific
design how components are distributed to actually make the system usable.
Moreover, we must define which components are executed on the machine
of the user. We refer to this machine as the client machine or short as the
client. As a consequence, we need to design a distributed system [CDK01]
for the architecture that we have presented so far. In a distributed system,
the components of the system are executed on physically different machines
and communicate over a network with each other.
We will specify a distributed system architecture for three reasons. First,
we want to illustrate that our model can be applied as a distributed system.
Second, we will specify security mechanisms for our system architecture,
which depend on the specific design of the system architecture as a dis-
tributed system, e.g., these mechanisms depend on whether components are
implemented on a server or on a client and on whether components commu-
nicate with each other over a communication network or directly. Therefore,
we need the design of our model as a distributed system as input for the
specification of the security mechanisms. Third, we finally will implement
our model as a distributed system, which requires the specification of the
model as a distributed system as well. We will use the implementation for a
performance evaluation.
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We believe that our model can be implemented as a distributed system
in many different ways and with different properties, e.g., different levels
of security, complexity and efficiency. The way of implementing the model
depends on the requirements of the scenario. In the following, we will inves-
tigate a possible approach to implement our model as a distributed system
for scenarios with high requirements on security, e.g., a business scenario.
In the following sections, we will first decide which overall approach we
will choose and then will we show different alternatives within that approach.
We will argue which of these alternatives is best suited for the type of sce-
narios we described above.
5.3.1 Overall Approach
There are several different approaches to design a distributed system, such
as the service oriented approach, the distributed shared memory approach,
the computing grid or cluster approach, the peer-to-peer approach [Wal03,
ATS04] and the client-server approach. The latter approach is also referred
to as the classical approach for designing a distributed system. We need
to choose one of these approaches for our distributed system architecture.
We will focus on the peer-to-peer approach and the client-server approach,
because we believe these approaches are best suited for our system. To decide
which of these two approaches we will use, we first describe these approaches
and their properties in terms of security, efficiency and availability.
Client-Server Approach
In the client-server approach, there are two different types of machines,
namely clients and servers.
Servers are dedicated machines that perform services for the clients.
These services either store data, e.g., a database, or perform computations,
e.g., the evaluation of access control rules. Servers are dedicated machines on
which no user is working. As a consequence, they can be placed in a secured
area, e.g., a server room. Therefore servers are not physically exposed to
the users of the system. Being less exposed makes servers a better choice for
critical data or critical services.
The second type of machine is the client client machine, which is the
type of machine on which users are working. The data, which is sent to
a client or stored on a client, has a much higher risk of being accessed in
an unauthorized way, e.g., being manipulated, since the user of a client has
more options to manipulate his machine compared to manipulating a remote
server in a server room.
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In addition to this, as servers can be used for only one dedicated purpose,
their set of software can be much smaller compared to the set of software for
a client, which usually must run a lot of different programs. A smaller set
of software helps to make a system less prone to errors and less vulnerable
to intentional attacks. Due to their smaller set of software and to being less
exposed to the users of the system, servers offer a higher level of security for
the software that is executed on them compared to software running on a
client machine.
Nevertheless there are also drawbacks of using servers. If a service is im-
plemented on a single physical server machine, the risk of loosing the systems
functionality is high. The crashing of this single server machine can render
the complete system useless, if the services executes a function which is essen-
tial for the system. To increase the availability of the system, such services
can be replicated over different physical servers. As a result, a service is exe-
cuted on more than one physical server in a redundant way. The replication
helps to increase the availability of the system, since in case that one server
crashes there is a backup server for the functionality of the crashed server.
Moreover, the replication of one service across multiple servers increases the
maximum number of users the system can handle, since the total load of the
service can be distributed to several physical machines.
Peer-to-Peer Approach
In the peer-to-peer approach, each client also acts as the server for other
clients. These types of machines are referred to as peers. Some functionality,
e.g., data storage or computation, is performed by peers instead of using a
dedicated servers as described above. These peers have several drawbacks.
First, their availability is much lower compared to servers, since client
machines are under the control of users, which can turn their machines off
frequently, reboot them or take them to a different place with a different
or with no network connection. As a consequence, a much higher level of
redundancy is required compared to servers. For example, three redundant
servers can be sufficient to increase the availability of a system since the
probability of a simultaneous failure of all three servers is rather low. In
contrast to this, distributing a critical service over three peers is completely
unacceptable, since the chance of three peers being oﬄine simultaneously
is too high. In addition to the higher chance of a peer being unavailable,
peers also enter and leave the system in a much higher frequency compared
to servers, which only crash with a rather low probability. The reduced
availability and the higher frequency of entering and leaving leads to much
higher effort in keeping distributed data in a consistent state. In addition to
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this, the risk of having outdated data is much higher in a peer-to-peer system,
due to the higher frequency of peers entering and leaving the system. The
last aspect is very critical for our system, since access control decisions must
not be performed based on outdated data.
The second and more critical drawback for our regards is the much lower
level of trust of peers, which are under the control of a user. In our system
architecture, we have a lot of sensitive information and critical services, which
should not be executed on a machine with a low level of trust. Although, the
reduced level of trust can be compensated to some degree with additional
security mechanisms, e.g., encryption and integrity measurement, the risk of
data or services being manipulated by the user of a peer is still much higher
compared to a server.
Choosing One Approach
Having the previous discussion in mind, we decide to design our system using
the client-server approach, which has two advantages compared to the peer-
to-peer approach. The first advantage is, that the complexity is much lower,
since we need no mechanisms to secure the distributed storage of data, which
otherwise could be easily manipulated by the user of a peer. Moreover, we do
not need mechanisms to prevent the manipulation of computations performed
on a peer. The second advantage is, that performing security relevant services
on a dedicated server leads to a higher level of security, because servers have
better properties in terms of security, e.g., servers must not be physically
exposed to users, which might have an interest to manipulate that machine.
Moreover, servers typically use a smaller set of software compared to client
machines which are often used for a variety of different tasks. A smaller set
of software usually has less vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, we are confident
that our architecture can be implemented using the peer-to-peer approach.
5.3.2 Client-Server Approach
After we have decided that we want to use the client-server approach to
design our architecture as a distributed system, there are still some open
design decisions concerning the resulting architecture. For every component
we must decide whether we want to implement it on the client side or on the
server side. Obviously, we achieve the highest level of security if we imple-
ment all these components on the server. Nevertheless, we want to discuss
the alternative combinations to show their individual benefits. Table 5.1
summarizes the components of our architecture and describes their function.
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Component Description
User Database Stores user credentials and role hierarchy
Document Database Stores documents
Copy Database Stores is-copy-of relation between documents
Rule Database Stores the access control rules
User Interface Presents document and offer commands
Document Processor Executes commands for editing a document
Policy Enforcement Point Interrupts commands and queries PDP
Policy Decisions Point Evaluates access control rules
Table 5.1: Components of our system architecture
As discussed above, we consider the client to be less secure than the
server. Moreover, implementing one or more of the database on the client
side, would give the system the character of a peer-to-peer system. As we
discussed above, we do not want this. As a consequence, the four databases
of our system should be implemented on the server side. The user interface
must be implemented on the client side, since it is used to communicate with
the user. The document processor can be implemented either on the client
side or on the server side. If the document processor runs on the client, we
must define that the document processor only operates on the documents
of the corresponding user, to eliminate the risk of lost confidentiality. Since
the policy enforcement point is tightly bound to the document processor it
should be implemented on the same side as the document processor. The
policy decision point can be implemented on the client side, too. In that case,
we must define that it evaluates only rules concerning the corresponding user.
Alternatively, the policy decision point can also be implemented on the server
side. We summarize these options in Table 5.2.
If several components are implemented on the server side, it is not re-
quired that these components share one physical machine. Instead each
component can be installed on a different machine and communicate with
the other components using a communication network. Distributing compo-
nents over several physical machines can help to improve the performance of
the system.
Finally, we must decide on which side the document processor, the pol-
icy enforcement point and the policy decision point should be implemented.
These decisions cannot be made independent of each other. Instead, we have
to examine the dependencies between these components. For instance, the
policy enforcement point is not a component itself, instead it is only a com-
ponent in an abstract view of the system. In fact, the policy enforcement
point is an an irremovable aspect of the document processor. As a conse-
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Component Side
User Database Server
Document Database Server
Copy Database Server
Rule Database Server
User Interface Client
Document Processor Server or Client
Policy Enforcement Point Server or Client
Policy Decisions Point Server or Client
Table 5.2: Possible sides to implement the components
quence, the policy enforcement point and the document processor are always
implemented on the same side.
Combination 1: DP and PDP on the client
The first combination is to implement both document processor and policy
decision point on the client side. This combination requires a trustworthy
client, because the client calculates policy decisions for documents that the
user of the platform wants to access. As a result, the interest to perform
a manipulation is high. Moreover, the access control rules must be trans-
ferred to the client, because they are required to evaluate the rules. This
requirement has two disadvantages. First, the rules can contain confiden-
tial information, which should not be exposed to the user of the client. For
example, rules which deny the viewing of some top secret information can
reveal the existence of that information, which might not be acceptable. To
solve this problem, the rules can be sent encrypted to the client, but they
must be decrypted to process them. While the rules are decrypted, the risk
of information leakage is high. Second, this approach is not efficient in terms
of storage and memory consumption. When the rules are transferred to the
client, we cannot decide easily which rules might affect the documents of
the client. As a consequence, we must send all rules to every client. As a
result, the storage and memory requirement of the rules is multiplied by the
number of clients of the system. In this combination, the client needs the
computational resources to evaluate the rules. This increases the demand of
resources on the client side, but reduces the requirements of the server.
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Combination 2: DP on the client and PDP on the server
The second combination is to implement the document processor on the client
and the policy decision point of the server. In this combination, the rules
are not sent to the client, which removes two of the disadvantages discussed
above. In this case, secret information in the rules is not revealed to the
client and the clients do not need additional resources to store and process
the rules. This combination has still a drawback concerning efficiency. The
document processor and the policy decision point need access to the cur-
rent document. The policy decision point requires access to the complete
document to evaluate the rules, whereas the document processor only needs
that part of the document that is accessible for the current user. The disad-
vantage of this approach is that these two version of the document must be
synchronized over a communication network, because both versions reside on
a different machine. As a result, a lot of the efficiency of this combination is
lost, because the latency of the communication network seriously degrades
performance. We illustrate the steps for performing an operation in Figure
5.2, where “S” is the abbreviation for the server and “C” is short for the
client. The direction of the communication is indicated by an arrow.
1. C → S : Request to perform operation
2. S : Evaluate rules
3. C ← S : Send “allow” to client
4. C : Perform operation on censored document
5. C → S : Send censored document to server
6. S : Check whether client performed valid operation
7. S : Merge censored version with the uncensored version
8. S : Evaluate rules to calculate new censored version
9. C ← S : Send new censored version to client
10. C : Calculate new view of censored version
12. C : Present view to user
Figure 5.2: Protocol steps for performing an operation in Combination 2
In step one, the client requests to perform a specific operation on the
document. Then, the server evaluates the rules to answer the request. In
this example, we assume that the operation is allowed. Consequently, the
server sends “allow” to the client. The client performs the operation on
the document, which leads to a new version of his censored version of the
document. We refer to the version of the document on the client as censored
version, because some nodes might be removed due to missing permissions to
view them. In contrast to the client, the server keeps the full version of the
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document, which includes the nodes the client is not allowed to see. Next,
the client sends the updated censored version to the server. The server checks
whether the client performed a valid operation. Next, the server merges the
censored version of the document with the full version of the document and
then evaluates the rules to calculate a new view for the client. After that,
the server sends the new censored version to the client. The client calculates
a view of the censored version, which can have a different representation as
the internal one, e.g., a graphical representation or a text representation.
Finally, the UI on the client side presents the view to the user.
We have described this process to illustrate that the implementation of
document processor and policy decision point on different side leads to a
significant overhead. We will show that these disadvantages can be avoided
by using Combination 4, which implements both components on the server.
But first, for the sake of completeness, we will discuss Combination 3, which
is the least favorable one.
Combination 3: DP on server and PDP on the client
The third combination is to implement the document processor on the server
and the policy decision point on the client. This combination combines the
disadvantages of having the policy decision point on the client side with
the disadvantages of implementing document processor and policy decision
point on different machines. As a consequence, this combination is the least
preferable one.
Combination 4: DP and PDP on the server
In Combination 4, we implement both document processor and policy deci-
sion point on the server, which has two advantages. First, it removes the
overhead of performing the communication between document processor and
policy decision point over a communication network as we illustrated in Com-
bination 2. Second, having both components on the server side, leads to the
highest level of security, since all security relevant components are imple-
mented on the server. As we argued above, we consider that the server has
a much higher protection level than the client. To illustrate the benefits of
avoiding the overhead of Combination 2 and to describe the final protocol,
we depict the protocol steps to perform an operation in Combination 4 in
Figure 5.3.
The first two steps in this combination are identical to the protocol steps
of the protocol of Combination 2. In step three, we can avoid communication
overhead by not having to send the result of the rule evaluation back to the
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1. C → S : Request to perform operation
2. S : Evaluate rules
3. S : Perform operation on uncensored version
4. S : Evaluate rules to calculate new censored version
5. S : Calculate new view of censored version
6. C ← S : Send view to client
7. C : Present view to user
Figure 5.3: Protocol steps for performing an operation in Combination 4
client. As above, we assume that the result is to allow the requested opera-
tion. In step three, we can avoid to perform the operation on the censored
version and to merge this version with the uncensored version, because the
server is allowed to operate on the uncensored version. After this, we evaluate
the rules to retrieve a censored version of the document and to create a view
for the current user for it. If we do this on the server, we can also perform
the view creation directly in one step. Finally, the view is sent to the client
and presented to the user. In total, we have saved communication overhead
by reducing the communication steps by half and to avoid at least 4 steps in
the protocol. On the downside, this combination leads to a high amount of
computations on the server. We will show in the performance evaluation in
Chapter 7 that the resource requirements for the server are acceptable.
Comparison of the combinations
It depends on the requirements of the scenario to choose one of the four
combinations. We have summarized the properties of these combinations
in Table 5.3. In this table, we have listed each combination in a different
row and have rated its level of security and its efficiency. The second and
third column indicate on which side the document processor and the policy
decision point is implemented. Additionally, we have listed the requirements
on the server and on the client. These requirements include both the level of
security as well as the amount of resources the corresponding machine should
have, e.g., high requirements on the client mean that the client should have
a high amount of resources and a high level of security.
Implementing the policy decision point on the client introduces high risks
of compromising the confidentiality of documents of the system and the rules.
To evaluate the rules for one document the policy decision point must also
access the documents which contain nodes that are in is-copy-relation with
node of the currently processed document. As a consequence, a successful at-
tack on the policy decision point on the client can lead to unlimited access to
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DP PDP Security Efficiency Requ. Client Requ. Server
C1 C C –○ +○ high low
C2 C S +○ –○ medium medium
C3 S C –○ –○ high medium
C4 S S +○ +○ low high
Table 5.3: Comparison of the four combinations
all documents of the system. Moreover, the policy decision point must access
all rules of the system which also can contain confidential information, e.g.,
the existence of some top secret information might be revealed by inspecting
the rules. As a result, we regard all combinations where the policy decision
point is implemented on the client as having a higher risk of manipulations.
We choose Combination 4 as basis for our security architecture and for our
implementation, because its implementation of critical services on the server
makes is robust against manipulations. Moreover, the protocol for performing
an operation can be designed in a way that makes the protocol very efficient.
In scenarios where the security requirements are low and servers with high
performance are not available Combination 1 is a good choice. Combination
1 is only acceptable if client machines with a very high protection level are
used. These clients must be setup in way where the risk of manipulations is
very low. Nevertheless, the risk of loosing the confidentiality of all documents
as a result of a successful attack on a client is still present.
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Figure 5.4: Distributed System architecture
The final distributed system architecture is presented in Figure 5.4. In
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this architecture, all components except of the user interface are implemented
on the server side. Since the server has to handle many performance intensive
tasks like rule evaluation, we have the risk that the system does not scale
well with the number of documents or the number of clients. Therefore, we
conclude this section with a discussion on the scalability of our distributed
system architecture.
5.3.3 The scalability of the distributed system archi-
tecture
As mentioned before, the components of the server are not required be im-
plemented on a single physical machine. Instead, every component can be
set up on a dedicated machine. Each component of the server can also be
set up by combining multiple machines to perform the service of one compo-
nent. In this case, each component exists redundantly several times, where
each instance is located on an individual machine. This technique is used to
increase both performance and availability. The workload for the component
in question must be distributed to the individual instances of the component.
This distribution process is referred to as load balancing.
Concerning the four databases of our system, there has been a lot of re-
search on increasing the performance of databases and making them more
scalable, e.g., [DR92, PSTT96, JPPMKA02, Tal03]. The techniques to achieve
these goals are query optimization, replication and efficient mechanisms to
keep the replicas in a consistent state. Query optimization is about to find a
semantically identical expression of a query which can be executed in the
shortest possible time compared to the original expression of the query.
Databases can be replicated across several physical machines to increase the
performance of read operations. On the downside, these so-called replicas
must be kept in a consistent state, when they are updated by a write oper-
ation. Replication increases also the availability of a system, since if one of
the replicas becomes unavailable, the other replicas can still be used. This
also reduces the problem of a single point of failure. Since, the replication
techniques for databases are a well known research topic and since the repli-
cation of the databases does not affect our architecture design, we do not
focus on this topic and view each database as a single component. If replica-
tion is required, it can be applied any time without the need to change the
architecture.
The replication technique can also be applied to the remaining four com-
ponents of the server. Since these components only perform computations
and store their data in databases, replication can be done with less com-
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plexity, since no mechanisms are required to keep the replicas in a consistent
state. Nevertheless, we also do not replicate our components. If this should
be required, we are confident that these components can be replicated with-
out adding to much complexity to the architecture, since these components
are only performing computations and access the data in the databases.
Now, we have defined a distributed system architecture. In the next chap-
ter, we will analyze this architecture and investigate which security mecha-
nisms are required to avoid potential threats.
Chapter 6
Security Architecture
In this chapter, we will design the security architecture for the system archi-
tecture that we have proposed in the previous chapter. For this purpose, in
Section 6.1, we analyze potential threats on our architecture. After this, we
present the security mechanisms that avoid or reduce the risks described in
the risk analysis in Section 6.2. Finally, we evaluate the security mechanisms
and discuss whether they achieve their goals in Section 6.3.
6.1 Risk Analysis
In this section, we evaluate possible attacks on the components of our archi-
tecture. Attacks in general can can aim at different goals, e.g., at stealing
data or at performing sabotage. We present five of these goals, explain them
in general and give an example of what types of attacks are possible on our
architecture.
Confidentiality: A system ensures the confidentiality if only authorized
subjects are able to access protected data. Within our architecture, we
must ensure the confidentiality of the documents and the confidentiality
of the rules. Therefore, we must ensure that the documents and the
rules are not accessed by an unauthorized subject.
Integrity: Integrity defines that data is not manipulated by an unauthorized
subject without detecting the manipulation. If possible the manipula-
tion of data by unauthorized subject can be prevented at all. Within
our architecture, we must ensure that neither the documents nor the
rules are manipulated by an unauthorized subject.
Availability: The available of a system is given, if the system is able to
execute its intended function in a timely acceptable way. If an attacker
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is able to manipulate a system to operate very slow or to be non-
functional then the availability of the system is compromised.
Authenticity: Authenticity defines that the identity of a subject or an ob-
ject is not forged.
Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation defines that a user must not be able do
deny having performed an action that he has performed.
In addition to that, an attack can have different targets and can be per-
formed in different modes. Theoretically, each of the components of our
system architecture (see Figure 5.4) can be the target of an attack, but since
only the document processor must be reachable for the clients, we assume
that for a successful attack this component this component must be attacked.
An attack can be either performed locally or remotely. In a local attack,
the attacker has physical access to the attacked machine and has a user ac-
count on the corresponding machine. For example this type of attacker can
access the local file system or reboot the machine with another operating
system. In contrast to this, in a remote attack, the attacker uses a communi-
cation network to attack his target. The only options for a remote attack are
to use the communication channels of our architecture. We further assume
that an attacker has no physical access to server components, which we think
is realistic, since servers can be protected by placing them in a secured server
room. As a result, local attacks can be performed only on the client machine.
Moreover, we assume that the administrator of the server is trustworthy.
Next, we will describe two different types of attackers, namely the in-
side attacker and the outside attacker. Each type of attacker has certain
characteristics that we will describe in the following.
Inside Attacker: An insider attacker is a legitimate user of the system
who misuses his permissions to perform an attack. We assume that
an inside attacker also has physical access to the client machine, which
enables additional attacks. In addition to this, an inside attacker can
perform remote attacks on the document processor. For example, if our
system is used within a company then an inside attacker is typically
an employee of the company.
Outside Attacker: An outside attacker is a user who does not has legiti-
mate access to the system, which means that he has no credentials to
login into the server and also has no physical access to any machine.
The outside attacker can only perform remote attacks on the client and
the document processor. For example, if our system is used within a
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company then an outside attacker could be either a professional hacker
hired by a competitor, a spy performing industry espionage or a hacker
who tries to perform attacks just for his own entertainment.
An inside attacker can perform local attacks on his client machine on
which the user interface is executed. In addition to that, an inside attacker
can also perform remote attacks on the document processor and on a user
interface, which runs on another client machine. As a consequence, an inside
attacker can perform four types of attacks according to this classification
scheme. An outside attacker can only perform remote attacks on the user
interface and on the document processor. All together, an inside attacker
can perform every attack an outside attacker can perform plus an additional
attack, which only he can do. Therefore, we believe it is sufficient to inspect
the attacks which can be performed by an inside attacker, since this type of
attacker has the most options for an attack. We will start with a discussion
of possible attacks on the client.
6.1.1 Attacks on the Client Machine
In this section, we describe possible attacks in the scenario mentioned above.
We focus on attacks that compromise the confidentiality of the protected
data. Moreover, we organize the attacks in groups, where all attacks of the
group have a common method of attacking the client.
Software Manipulations.
In the following, we discuss software manipulations on the client, which can
be performed on different components of the system.
Extract data from the user interface. An inside attacker can try to extract
confidential information from the user interface. As a result, the user inter-
face must be designed in a way, that it is not possible to extract confidential
data from it and transfer it to another application, e.g., an e-mail client.
Manipulate the user interface. If the user interface prevents the extraction
of confidential data, the attacker can try to manipulate the corresponding
protection mechanisms. Alternatively, the attacker could use another user
interface that is compatible with the protocols used in our system architec-
ture, but allows data to be extracted. Therefore, we must have a mechanism
to ensure that the user interface is not modified and that it is the version
that has been deployed originally.
Use the operating system mechanisms to extract data. The attacker could
also use the underlying operating system on which the user interface runs to
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extract data. One such method is to extract the confidential data from the
memory by writing the memory used by the user interface to a file, which
is also referred to as a memory dump. An attack like this requires that
the application of the attacker runs in kernel mode, which enables access to
the entire physical memory of the machine. There are many other similar
methods, which all have in common that they use the services offered by the
underlying operating system. Consequently, we must configure the underly-
ing operating system in a way that prevents the use of services like memory
dumps to extract the confidential data from the user interface.
Manipulate operating system. If the underlying operating system is con-
figured in a way that prevents the extraction of confidential data using its
services, the attacker could modify the operating system or its configuration.
The attacker could try to re-enable the mechanisms that we have disabled
before. For example, he could exchange a system module, e.g., the module
that performs memory management or the module that displays data on the
screen. Another similar approach is to replace the entire operating system
with a system that allows the extraction of data. As a result, we need a
mechanism to ensure that the operating system is neither manipulated nor
entirely replaced. This mechanism must ensure that the operating system is
authentic, which means that it is the one that has been deployed and it is
configured as we have defined.
Extract confidential data from the swap file. Our system architecture
does not store documents permanently on the client. Instead, our system
architecture keeps them in the memory to display and edit them, which avoids
attacks based on accessing the hard drive of a client machine. Nevertheless,
we must also ensure that the operating system does not swap the memory
used by the user interface to the hard disk, if available memory is getting
low. This again must be done by configuring the operating system. As a
consequence, there is no risk of losing confidential data by stealing a hard
drive of an authorized client.
Masquerading Attacks.
In the following, we discuss different types of masquerading attacks on our
system architecture. We describe the cloning of a client machine and the
spoofing of the server of our system architecture.
Clone a client machine. Another type of attack is to clone an authorized
client machine by creating an exact copy of the configuration of an existing
machine, e.g., by creating an exact copy of the hard disk of the authentic
client or by copying the authentication credentials to another client. For
example, a legitimate user could set up such a cloned client machine in an
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area which is not under surveillance to extract data by taking pictures of
the displayed data. To reduce the risk of this type of attack, we need a
mechanisms that prevents the cloning of a client machine. This mechanism
must ensure that the identity of the client machine is bound to the hardware
of the machine.
Masquerade the server. The attacker can also masquerade the server, e.g.,
by redirecting the network traffic using a DNS poisoning attack. Therefore,
we need mutual authentication between client and server. In our scenario, the
masquerading of a server is less dangerous, since no confidential documents
are uploaded to the server. However, this can be the case in the scenario of
corporate computing on home computers.
Hardware Attacks and Analogue Attacks
In the following, we discuss attacks on the hardware and analogue attacks.
We consider Direct Memory Access (DMA) attacks as hardware attacks and
discuss them in this section, too.
Use DMA to extract data. Another type of attack is to use a device with
DMA to extract confidential data. DMA bypasses any protection managed
by the CPU and allows to access the entire memory.
Extract data using probing attacks. Moreover, the attacker can perform
probing attacks, such as mechanical or electrical probing attacks, on the
hardware components of our system architecture. Using this attack, he can
extract confidential data directly from the hardware, e.g., from the TPM or
from a memory module.
Use analogue channels to extract data. Besides the attacks mentioned
above, the attacker can take an analogous screen shot of the display using a
camera.
All attacks discussed so far are summarized in Table 6.1 together with
the mechanisms that are required to prevent the corresponding attack.
Attack Required mechanism
Manipulate UI Authentication mechanism for UI
Spoof the server Mutual authentication
Use OS to extract data from UI Configure OS to prevent this
Manipulate OS Authentication mechanism for OS
DMA attack Countermeasures against DMA
Extract data from swap space Configure OS not to swap UI
Clone a client Prevent cloning of clients
Table 6.1: Attacks on the client and required mechanisms
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6.1.2 Attacks on the Server
Since only the document processor must be reachable for clients, we assume
that only this component of the server side can be attacked. Moreover,
we assume that the server components run on dedicated machines and no
user is working locally at such a machine. Thus, the server can be attacked
only remotely using the communication network. We further assume, that
the server only runs the services of our architecture and no other services.
As a result, the only way to attack the document processor is using the
interface that it provides for clients. As mentioned in the previous section,
we require that both the client machine and its user is authenticated with
an authentication mechanism. Thus, we do not regard spoofing of clients in
this section.
The attacker can use the interface of the document processor to issue
commands that put the document processor in an unwanted state, e.g., a
crash. These types of attacks exploit flaws of the design or implementation
of the communication protocol. For example, an attacker could send a com-
mand with a parameter outside the specified range. If such an error is not
handled correctly, it could result in a crash of the corresponding component.
In this case, the attacks aims at the availability of the system. A similar,
but more dangerous type of this attack is to send a parameter consisting of
more data than specified in the communication protocol. If the protocol is
implemented careless, then the oversized parameter can exceed the size of
the buffer where the data is written to and overwrite data on the stack of
the executing program. Therefore, this attack is referred to as buffer over-
flow attack [CWP+00, LE01]. This attack can be used to inject executable
code in the binary of the attacked program. This is achieved by overwriting
the return address of the current procedure, because this return address is
stored on the stack too. The new return address points to injected code that
is also part of the oversized parameter. When the current procedures exits
and control flow should be passed to the calling procedure the overwritten
return address is read from the stack and jumped to. At this point the in-
jected code of the attacker is executed. For example, this code can open a
remote login shell. To be able to perform a successful buffer overflow attack,
the attacked program must be implemented careless by not checking the size
of an input parameter. Using this attack method, the attacker can gain the
permissions of the process that he has attacked. In our case, the attacker
could take control over the document processor, which is able to load and
store documents from the document database. Hence, we must implement
our architecture in a way that it is not vulnerable to buffer overflows and
maliciously formatted input parameters.
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Another type of attack aims at the availability of the server by causing
an overload on one component of its components, e.g., by issuing commands
in a high frequency. For example, a legitimate user could request views of
different documents several times per second. Since the server must evaluate
the rules to calculate a view, a lot of computational resources of the server
are used for that process. Such an attack can increase the time the server
needs to execute commands for other clients. If this time exceeds a certain
threshold, the performance of the server is not more acceptable and thus it
cannot be used by the other clients. Therefore, such an attack is referred to as
a deny of service (DoS) attack [Nee94]. Since only authorized users are able
to execute all commands of the server, e.g., the calculation of a view, this type
of user has the most potential to perform a DoS attack. Unauthorized users
can try to perform DoS attacks by performing authentication requests in a
high frequency. DoS attacks are difficult to avoid since they use legitimate
commands. One approach to avoid vulnerabilities against DoS attacks is to
limit the frequency of certain resource-intensive commands. For example, we
can define that at most one view per second can be calculate for a single
authorized user. In this thesis, we will only inspect vulnerabilities against
DoS attacks that are introduced by our components. There are many other
DoS attacks, e.g., attacks that cause a high network traffic, that are not
special for our architecture and therefore discussed in the literature, e.g.,
[SKK+97, Mea99, KK03].
Additionally, an attacker can eavesdrop the communication between the
server and the client. Such an attack can aim both at the confidentiality
of the transferred documents and on the authenticity of client and server,
because the attacker can retrieve either the documents or the user credentials
from the transferred data. To prevent this attack, me must encrypt the
communication between client and server, which is a common method to
achieve confidentiality.
Moreover, a legitimate user could edit a document and deny having done
so later. For example, a user could delete important conditions of a contract
or change the amount of money granted to a project in the corresponding doc-
ument. We achieve the non-repudiation of performed operations by logging
them in the history. As a result, we do not need an additional mechanism to
achieve this security goal.
All attacks on the server discussed so far are summarized in Table 6.2
together with the mechanisms that are required to prevent the corresponding
attack.
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Attack Required mechanism
Bad input parameter Careful implementation
DoS attack Limit rate of certain commands
Eavesdrop network communication Encrypt communication
Repudiation of performed operations handled by the histories
Table 6.2: Attacks on the server and required mechanisms
6.1.3 Requirements for the Security Architecture
In this section, we present the requirements for the security architecture.
The first two requirements apply to any scenario, whereas the requirements
that follow are specific for our system architecture.
Requirement 1: The operating system is configured to support only the
minimum set of services and resources. As we have discussed so far, some
of the mechanisms for securing the client must be performed by configuring
the operating system, e.g., configuring it to not swap the memory occupied
by the user interface or disabling the possibility to take digital screen shots.
Moreover, we must configure the operating system to allow only network
connections to the document processor, which reduces the risk that data is
sent to an unauthorized third party.
Requirement 2: The number of software components of the operating
system is minimal. To reduce the risk of vulnerabilities, it is highly desirable
to employ an operating system that has the minimal set of functions that are
required to execute the user interface, because the chance of vulnerabilities
increases with the complexity of a system. Consequently, we must use a
operating system with the minimal number of user space software and kernel
components, e.g., device drivers. For example, we can use a microkernel-
based operating system and remove not required components from it.
The downside of this approach is that the client machine might by ren-
dered unusable for other software that should be executed on it, because the
operating system that we have installed can be incompatible with this other
software. In the case when the client machine is used to execute only the user
interface this is no problem. But in the other cases, which we think are very
likely, the user either needs a second machine or must reboot the machine to
use the operating system that is compatible with the other applications that
he likes to run.
Requirement 3: Attestation of the client machine. Moreover, we need
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to ensure that the operating system that we have supplied is neither ex-
changed with another operating system nor is its configuration manipulated
to disable the security mechanisms of the security architecture. For that pur-
pose, we will use the mechanisms defined by the Trusted Computing Group
(TCG) and that we have described in Section 2.3. The remote attestation is
a mechanism that allows a remote platform, e.g., the server, to check whether
the system is in the correct state.
Requirement 4: Authenticity of client and server. The user of the
client platform could manipulate his machine to forward an attestation re-
quest to another machine with authentic software. Therefore we must ensure
that the provided configuration values refer to the attested system and that
the authenticity of both client and server is guaranteed.
Requirement 5: Completeness of attestation. The definition of this
state depends on what is measured on the client side. The usual approach
[SZJvD04] is to calculate the hash value of every executed binary and include
it in the state definition. As a result, the verifier receives a list of all bina-
ries that have been executed since the last reboot of the machine. However,
this approach has two problems. First, the received list of executed binaries
gives no hint about what was executed after the remote attestation. For
example, a key logger or trojan horse can be started after the remote attes-
tation. Although the malware was located on the client machine at the time
of the remote attestation, it was not detected, because it was executed after
the remote attestation. The second problem is, that using this approach,
only the executable binaries of applications are inspected. Shell scripts and
configuration files are not included in the measurement. This leads to the
problem, that certain manipulations, e.g., manipulations of the configura-
tion files, cannot be detected by this approach. Consequently, we need an
approach that measures the complete system configuration including scripts
and configuration files.
6.2 Security Mechanisms
As discussed before, we must ensure that the client machine can execute ad-
ditional software, e.g., a web browser or an e-mail client, after the security
mechanisms are applied. This can be a problem when requirements 1 and 2
are fulfilled, since they reduce the compatibility of the client machine with
additional software. For this reason, it is desirable to have a different oper-
ating system for different applications. As a consequence, we need a method
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to run different operating systems on one client machine, which we achieve
by using virtualization techniques and running different virtual machines on
a client machine. Each operating system can be executed in a separate vir-
tual machine. Concerning the security of the system, we must ensure that
these virtual machines cannot influence each other. For example, we must
ensure that malware running in one virtual machine cannot extract confiden-
tial data from another virtual machine. We apply an approach for providing
different virtual machines [SBHE07] and analyze whether the attacks de-
scribed in Section 6.1 can be solved with this approach. The strong isolation
achieved through virtualization guarantees that different virtual machines
cannot influence each other. The approach [SBHE07], on which we base our
architecture, uses virtualization in combination with the mechanisms defined
by the Trusted Computing Group. It establishes several different execution
environments by using various types of virtual machines, which are strongly
isolated from each other. It also provides an abstraction of the underlying
hardware TPM through a virtualized TPM (vTPM) interface. This allows
the different virtual machines to use the measurement and reporting facili-
ties of the TPM, thus they benefit from a hardware-based trust anchor. This
approach has the advantage over the others [Bas06] that the binding between
TPM and vTPM is already specified, which is useful for remote attestation
of virtual machines.
We use this approach to execute the user interface in one such isolated
virtual machine. Other applications are executed in a different virtual ma-
chine. Thus, they cannot interfere with the user interface. Figure 6.1 depicts
the approach applied to our system architecture.
Hypervisor
TPM
Hardware
Management 
VM
Open VM Trusted VM
vTPM
User
Interface
Protection Layer 4
Protection Layer 3
Protection Layer 2
Protection Layer 1
Figure 6.1: Security architecture organized in layers
The resulting security architecture consists of components divided into
four protection layers, in which components located on one layer provide
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security mechanisms to protect the components located on the layer directly
above. In the case of a successful attack on one layer, the layers below can
prevent the attacker from successfully transferring data to another physical
machine. The layers do this by using additional mechanisms that ensure that
data cannot be transferred elsewhere, e.g., by restricting network connections
to the server of the architecture.
These components include three virtual machines, namely the open vir-
tual machine, a management virtual machine and the trusted virtual machine
(TVM). Additionally, a hypervisor partitions the underlying hardware and a
TPM serves as a hardware-based trust anchor. The TPM provides hardware-
based tamper-evident cryptographic functions to protect the software compo-
nents running on the layer directly above from unauthorized manipulations.
Together with remaining hardware components, the TPM forms the lowest
protection layer, more specifically, protection layer 4.
6.2.1 Protection Layer 4: TPM and Hardware
The TPM is the anchor of trust and the basis for the attestation. We store
several non-migratable client-specific keys in the TPM, which are used for the
challenge-response authentication with the server. This prevents the cloning
of a client machine and additional attacks on the authenticity of the client
machine. The attacker must perform a local physical attack, e.g., a mechan-
ical or electrical probing attack, to the TPM to extract these keys. Since
the TPM is specified to be tamper-evident, these attacks are not prevented,
but can be detected afterwards. We assume that the hardware and the TPM
behave as specified.
6.2.2 Protection Layer 3: Hypervisor and Manage-
ment VM
The hypervisor is the first part of protection layer 3 and provides an ab-
straction layer to the underlying hardware. It has privileged access to the
hardware and can grant and revoke resources, e.g., CPU cycles, to and from
the running VMs. This hypervisor provides strong isolation of the virtual
machines, which is the protection mechanism of this layer. It ensures that
different virtual machines cannot influence each other, e.g., by reading each
others memory. In this approach, every virtual machine uses individual vir-
tualized device drivers, which are executed within that VM. The hypervisor
ensures, that these device drivers can only access the memory of the corre-
sponding virtual machine. When running applications of different trust levels
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on a machine without virtualization, an attacker could use a malicious device
driver to gain system wide access, e.g., to read the memory of the user inter-
face and extract the confidential documents. We assume that the hypervisor
and the management VM are set up by a trustworthy system administrator
and that the user of the machine is not able to change this configuration.
Because of its privileged position, the hypervisor needs to be trustworthy,
since it can manipulate the CPU instructions of every virtual machine. We
assume that the hypervisor is trustworthy and therefore guarantees strong
isolation. Currently available virtualization solutions provide strong isola-
tion. However, this still can be circumvented with direct memory access
(DMA) operations [FHN+04]. These operations access the memory without
intervention by the CPU and therefore bypass the hypervisor’s protection
mechanisms. Hypervisors with secure sharing [KZB+91] prevent these at-
tacks, but suffer from a high performance overhead, as well as a large trusted
computing base, since the required I/O emulation is moved into the hyper-
visor layer.
The management virtual machine is the second part of protection layer 3.
It is responsible for starting, stopping and configuring the virtual machines.
It is part of this protection layer, since it is closely connected to the hypervisor
and is a privileged VM, which has direct access to the hardware TPM.
6.2.3 Protection Layer 2: Open VM and Trusted VM
This protection layer consists of the open VM and the trusted VM. The open
VM is allowed to run arbitrary software components. It runs applications
with a lower trust level, such as web browsers or office applications. The
open VM provides the semantics of today’s open machines and therefore
has no additional protection mechanisms for upper layers. Since this virtual
machine is not of interest for our approach, we will not focus on it in the rest
of our work.
The TVM runs the user interface and a tiny OS with a minimal number
of software components, to reduce the possible number of security vulnera-
bilities. This fulfills requirements 1 and 2 without losing the ability to run
other software on the client machine. The tiny OS and the user interface
are part of a virtual appliance (VA), which is a fully pre-installed and pre-
configured set of software for virtual machines. To ensure that the VA is not
manipulated, the management VM measures its integrity before startup.
The TVM runs in protection layer 2 and provides a virtual TPM (vTPM)
as an additional protection mechanism. The operating system of the TVM
uses this vTPM to protect the user interface running in protection layer 1.
We use this vTPM to perform a complete attestation of the entire hard disk
6.2. SECURITY MECHANISMS 99
of the TVM, to ensure that neither the operating system, its configuration,
nor the user interface running on top of the operating system is manipulated.
As a result, the verification of the state of the entire virtual machine requires
only one reference value. This eliminates the need to maintain a large amount
of reference values, which is the main disadvantage of the binary attestation.
Moreover, the server checks in the attestation whether the protection layers
below the operating system, e.g., the hypervisor, are trustworthy. As a result,
this mechanism fulfills Requirement 5. In addition to that, we use the vTPM
to establish an authenticated channel between client and server. We discuss
the corresponding protocol in Section 6.2.5.
The TVM only accepts network requests from the server to reduce the
chance of network attacks. After the booting process, which cannot be inter-
rupted, the operating system of the TVM directly executes the user interface.
As a consequence, the only option for a user to interact with the TVM is
to use the user interface provided by us. This improves the security of the
TVM, since it limits the number of possible attacks.
All I/O interfaces which can be used to extract data from the system
are either blocked or controlled. For example, the management VM ensures
that the hard disk is read only, which prevents an attacker from temporarily
storing confidential data on this disk to extract it afterwards by booting a
different operating system. Additionally, the management VM has a config-
uration file for the TVM, which defines that network connections are only
allowed to the server of our system architecture, which inhibits an attacker
from sending confidential data to a different host. As a consequence, even if
an attacker exploits a vulnerability of the user interface, he cannot transfer
the confidential data out of the TVM.
6.2.4 Protection Layer 1: User interface
This protection layer consists of the user interface. The user interface is
written in Java, which is expected to minimize the risk of buffer overflows.
In addition to this, the user interface can edit confidential documents in
memory and does not need to write them to disk. The server’s authenticity
is checked by verifying the server’s certificate before answering an attestation
request.
6.2.5 Attestation Protocol
To prevent masquerading attacks on the authenticity of the platform config-
uration, we use an enhanced remote attestation protocol [STRE06]. These
100 CHAPTER 6. SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
attacks forward the integrity measurements of a conform host to masquer-
ade a conform client state. The enhanced protocol adds a key establishment
phase, to ensure that the channel of attestation is authentic. It also guar-
antees an end-to-end communication and prevents the attestation channel
from becoming compromised by another application which could take over
the attestation channel after the attestation has succeeded.
Document 
Processor User Interface vTPM
(7) Request attestation
(2) Request vAIK credential
(10) sig and vAIK credential
(1) Initialize vTPM
Virtualization Layer TPM
(3) Request vAIK credential
(8) Request signed PCRs
(9) sig=signvAIK[PCRs] 
(11) sig and vAIK credential
(12) Verify[PCRs]
Verify sig
Verify vAIK
credential
(4) Create vAIK 
credential
... ... ... ... ...
Attestation Entity
VM initialization 
phase
(6) vAIK credential (5) vAIK credential
Attestation 
phase
Figure 6.2: Attestation protocol
The protocol of our remote attestation is illustrated in Figure 6.2. It con-
sists of an initialization phase and an attestation phase. The initialization
phase yields a vAIK credential which is then used in attestation phase to
sign the PCRs. This vAIK credential is signed by an AIK from the hardware
TPM. In the first step of the initialization phase, the vTPM is initialized,
which in turn requests a new vAIK credential from the hardware TPM (steps
2 and 3). The hardware TPM issues a vAIK credential and sends it to the
vTPM (steps 5 and 6). The attestation phase is triggered by the document
processor, which sends an attestation request consisting of a nonce and its
public Diffie-Hellman key pair ga mod m for the key-establishment to the
user interface (step 7). The user interface generates the corresponding Diffie-
Hellman key pair gb mod m and sends this, together with the nonce, to the
vTPM (step 8). The vTPM generates a digital signature using the vAIK
(step 9) and transfers it together with the vAIK credential, to the user in-
terface (step 10). The user interface forwards this data to the DP (step 11).
Next, the DP verifies the authenticity of the user interface and its platform
by inspecting the platform configuration registers (step 12). Finally, both the
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DP and the user interface calculate the shared session key for the following
communication (step 13, not illustrated).
The protocol for performing remote attestations guarantees that the end-
point of the communication is within the attested virtual machine. Therefore,
relay or masquerading attacks are not possible. The combination of attes-
tation and key establishment fulfills Requirement 4, since it prevents the
masquerading of a trustworthy system configuration.
6.3 Evaluation of the Security Mechanisms
In the following section, we evaluate whether the security mechanisms de-
scribed in Section 6.2 prevent the attacks mentioned in Section 6.1.
Software Manipulations.
Each of the protection layers can be either manipulated during runtime or
before it is executed. Runtime attacks are especially critical, since they are
not detected by the current method of integrity measurement, which only
measures components when they are executed. The underlying protection
layer must be manipulated to modify the current layer, because the integrity
of each layer is measured before execution by the layer below. This results
in a chain of trust, with the TPM as a hardware anchor. As a consequence,
the manipulation of any layer either requires a runtime attack or a hardware
attack on the TPM. In the following, we discuss possible runtime attacks on
each layer. The user interface is robust against buffer overflow attacks, since
it is written in Java, which is commonly believed to decrease the possibility
of buffer overflows. On the downside, other attacks, such as exploiting other
programming errors, are still possible. The risk of runtime attacks on the op-
erating system is reduced, because software with lower complexity is expected
to have less errors than software with higher complexity. Moreover, we can
choose a strict system configuration to minimize possible attack methods,
e.g., network connections are restricted to the server, the hard disk of the
TVM is read-only and swapping is disabled. As a consequence, in the case
of a successful attack on the operating system, the attacker has no options
to transfer confidential data to another machine. This is an example of a
lower layer preventing a successful attack, when the protection mechanisms
of the layer above failed. Runtime attacks on the hypervisor are difficult,
since it has a lower complexity compared to operating systems and it does
not expose interfaces to the user which could be used for an attack. The
management VM offers no interface either. Moving protection mechanisms
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of upper layers into this layer, simplifies the verification of the correctness
of these mechanisms due to the smaller size of this layer. A critical example
of a runtime attack on the management VM is to masquerade an authentic
system administrator of the management VM, e.g., by guessing the corre-
sponding password. After that, he can perform an attack, e.g., modify the
integrity measurement of the TVM to masquerade a trustworthy TVM.
Masquerading attacks.
Both client and server can be masqueraded, where the cloning of a machine is
a special type of this attack. Since we assume that the server is trustworthy,
we only focus on cloning attacks on the client. An attacker can create an
exact copy of a client’s hard drive, but he cannot copy the content of the
corresponding TPM. The attacker cannot use this cloned client to access the
server, since our attestation protocol uses secrets stored in the TPM and
therefore detects that the client is not authentic. One such secret is the AIK
of the hardware TPM, which is used to sign the vAIK of the vTPM. This
vAIK in turn, is used in the attestation protocol. The server can check the
authenticity of the vAIK with the corresponding AIK credential that was
installed on the server when the system was set up. Using an honest system
to masquerade a trustworthy system state is prevented by our attestation
protocol. This protocol also detects and prevents masquerading of a server,
since the server’s certificate is checked by the user interface.
Hardware attacks and analogue attacks.
DMA attacks can either be handled entirely in software by emulating all I/O
devices, which causes a high performance degradation. Alternatively, DMA
attacks can be prevented by using hardware support, e.g., Intel’s Trusted
Execution Technology. As a consequence, it depends on the implementa-
tion of our security architecture whether or not DMA attacks are possible.
Probing attacks are difficult to inhibit. At least the TPM is specified to be
tamper-evident, which allows an attack to be detected afterwards. Analogue
attacks are difficult to prevent with software mechanisms. Fortunately, the
bandwidth of this channel is much lower compared to digitally copying con-
fidential data. In addition to that, this attack method has a higher risk of
being detected, if the machine is located at a monitored location, e.g., an
office with many co-workers or an office that is under surveillance by security
cameras. We do not provide a mechanism to prevent this type of attack.
Chapter 7
Implementation
In this chapter, we will describe the implementation of the prototype of
this thesis. This prototype implements the system architecture described in
Chapter 6. The security mechanisms, which we presented in Chapter 6, are
not implemented in this prototype. These mechanisms are implemented in
[RSGE06], [STRE06] and [SBHE07]. The implementations of these mecha-
nisms demonstrate that the described mechanism are feasible. In addition
to this, the current prototype of this thesis can be extended with the mecha-
nisms described in Chapter 6. Since, we do not plan to do a further analysis
on the combined implementation of the model together with its security
architecture, we refrain from adding the security architecture to the imple-
mentation. The prototype of the model is written in Java version 1.5. For
further details concerning the implementation see also [Mel07].
We start by explaining how the implementation represents and stores
the history. Next, we continue with an overview of the components of the
implementation. Then, we present implementation-specific details of each
component. Finally, we will discuss the results of the performance evaluation
of the implementation.
7.1 History
The model does not specify where the history is stored and how it should
be represented. As a consequence, the implementation needs to define a way
how to represent and store the history. In this prototype implementation
the history is split in several parts. One part of the history is stored within
the corresponding document and is represented as XML data. We store the
history within the documents, because this reduces the complexity of the
implementation. In terms of efficiency it is better to store the history in a
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separate database, because databases are better optimized for being queried.
The second part of the history is the is-copy-of relation among objects. We
store this part separately and described it together with the Copy Database
in Section 7.2.2.
We store the history of an XML document by adding an History element
to each existing element of the document. We avoid conflicts with the names
of existing elements of the document by using an individual XML namespace
(namespaces are explained in Section 2.2.3). This History element has two
child elements. The first child element is the Element-History element,
which stores the effects of operations that were performed on the element
itself. The second child element is the Text-History element, which captures
the effects of operations that were performed on the text content of the
corresponding element.
Each part of the History element uses Entry elements to denote the
effects of specific operations. An Entry element is composed of an Action
element and a Context element. The Action element describes the occurred
operation more precisely. For this purpose, it uses two optional arguments
and a mandatory Op attribute, where the Op specifies the operation and the
arguments give additional details that are specific for the operation. Table
7.1 lists the arguments of the operations defined in the model.
Operation Op Arg1 Arg2
Create Document Create Element - -
Create Element Create Element - -
Delete Element Delete Element - -
Transfer Element Create Element - -
Create Text Create Text Block ID -
Delete Text Delete Text Block ID -
Transfer Text Create Text Block ID -
Create Attribute Create Attribute Attribute name Attribute value
Change Attribute Change Attribute Attribute name Attribute value
Delete Attribute Delete Attribute Attribute name -
View (Element) View Element - -
View (Text) View Text Block ID -
View (Attribute) View Attribute Attribute name -
Table 7.1: Arguments for storing operations in histories
We use block IDs to reference individual text blocks. In similar fashion,
we also use IDs to reference subjects and roles. To store the context of
an operation, we use a Context element with three attributes. The first
attribute specifies the date when an operation was performed, whereas the
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second attribute stores the role of the corresponding subject and the third
attribute keeps track of the subject itself.
Figure 7.1 illustrates a History element. This example covers three op-
erations. First, the element itself was created. After this, text content was
added to the element. And finally, the attribute funded-by with the initial
value Company A was created.
<History>
<Element-History>
<Entry>
<Action Arg1="" Arg2="" Op="Create Element"/>
<Context Date="2007-10-26T08:04:31.345+02:00"
RoleID="2" SubjectID="13"/>
</Entry>
<Entry>
<Action Arg1="funded-by"
Arg2="Company A" Op="Create Attribute"/>
<Context Date="2007-10-26T08:07:13.543+02:00"
RoleID="1" SubjectID="67"/>
</Entry>
</Element-History>
<Text-History>
<Entry>
<Action Arg1="0" Arg2="" Op="Create Text"/>
<Context Date="2007-10-26T08:05:45.864+02:00"
RoleID="0" SubjectID="15"/>
</Entry>
</Text-History>
</History>
Figure 7.1: Example of a history element
7.2 Components
All components described in Chapter 6 are implemented in the prototype.
These components are depicted together with the user of the system in Figure
7.2. These components are the User Interface (UI), the Document Processor
(DP), the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), the Policy Decision Point (PDP),
the User Database (User DB), the Document Database (Doc DB), the Copy
Database (Copy DB) and the Rule Database (Rule DB). The arrows indicate
which components communicate with each other.
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Copy DBDoc DB Rule DB
UI
PDP
User
DP
PEP
User DB
Copy DBDoc DB Rule DB
Figure 7.2: Components implemented in the prototype
Each component can be configured to communicate locally or remotely
with the other components. A faster local communication method can be
used, if the corresponding components are executed on the same computer.
In the other case, where the components are running on different comput-
ers, a different communication method must be used. For this purpose,
classes where used to abstract from the current communication method.
For example, to communicate locally with the Copy Database the class
server.LocalCopyDBConnector must be used. If the Copy DB is located
on a different computer the class server.RemoteCopyDBConnector must be
used instead. This approach allows to use the prototype on a single computer,
e.g., when the system is used only by a small number of users. When the
system is used by a large number of users, the components can be distributed
over several computers to give more computational resources to individual
components. After this overview, we discuss the components individually.
We start with the User Interface.
7.2.1 User Interface
Generally speaking, the User Interface presents documents to the user and
offers commands to edit these documents. The component design of the
architecture allows to use any User Interface that is compatible with the in-
terface defined in the implementation. As a consequence, the User Interface
can be designed to edit specific types of data more efficiently in terms of
usability. For example, the user interface can visualize the represented data
in a graphical way and offer editing functions that make use of the semantics
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of the edited data. The user interface of this prototype is not optimized for
specific types of data and is mainly designed to illustrate the concepts of this
thesis. Therefore, the current User Interface only offers a textual represen-
tation of the XML documents and the corresponding editing command are
independent of the semantics of the processed XML documents. Figure 7.3
shows a screenshot of the User Interface of the prototype. We will describe
the functions offered by this User Interface.
Figure 7.3: Screenshot of the User Interface
This User Interface displays an opened XML document in its textual
representation in the middle area of the window. Multiple documents can
be opened simultaneously, but only one document is displayed at any time.
A currently not displayed document can be displayed by clicking in the top
area of the window, where the name of the document is displayed. In the
screenshot in Figure 7.3, only one document with the name Report.xml is
opened.
Buttons that can be used to edit the document are on the upper left
side of the User Interface window, where each such button corresponds to
one operation of the model. Three check boxes that activate different view
options are located below the button for editing. These check boxes can
be used to illustrate the internal operations of the User Interface. The first
of these buttons allows to view the histories, which are stored within the
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document. The second button allows to view deleted elements. Finally,
the third button hides all tags and shows the text content of the opened
document.
The button XPath Evaluator, which is located below the document area
on the left side, allows to manually enter an XPath expression that makes
use of the extended functions defined in this thesis. The entered XPath
expression is evaluated for the currently active document the the resulting list
of nodes is displayed. This function is designed for demonstration purposes,
too.
Finally, four buttons that are used to create a new document, to load
an existing document, to save a changed document and to close an opened
document, are located on the right side of the XPath Evaluator. The loading
of a document performs the check-out, as it is described in Section 5.2.1 of
Chapter 5. In similar fashion, the storing of a document triggers the check-in
mechanism. Both mechanisms are used to efficiently reduce the number of
required view recalculations.
7.2.2 Copy DB
In this implementation, we store the rules in an XML document, which
is loaded when the server components of the system are started. We use
Is-Copy-Of elements to represent individual is-copy-of relations. Within
such an element, the source of a copy operation is captured by a Source
element, whereas the destination is described by a Destination element.
These element denote a source or destination by a sequence of document ID,
element ID and block ID. In case of elements, the block ID is set to “-1”.
<CopyDB>
<Is-Copy-Of>
<Source>(0:3:-1)</Source>
<Destination>(0:4:-1)</Destination>
</Is-Copy-Of>
<Is-Copy-Of>
<Source>(1:1:0)</Source>
<Destination>(4:3:0)</Destination>
</Is-Copy-Of>
</CopyDB>
Figure 7.4: Example of the XML representation of the copy database
Figure 7.4 shows an example of such an XML representation. This exam-
ple features two is-copy-of relations. The first relation reflects the transfer of
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an element within a document with the document ID 0, whereas the second
relation describes the transfer of a text block from the document with the
ID 1 to the document with the ID 4.
7.2.3 Rule DB
The Rule DB stores the rules in an XML document, which is loaded when
the server components are started. Such a policy file, must specify a default
policy which is applied when no other rule is matching. Moreover, it support
two types of rules, namely unary rules and transfer rules.
<Policy>
<Default>
<Mode>Deny</Mode>
</Default>
<Rule Type="Unary">
<Role>1</Role>
<Operation>Change Attribute</Operation>
<Object>//@funded-by</Object>
<Mode>Allow</Mode>
</Rule>
<Rule Type="Copy">
<Role>3</Role>
<Source>/Report[@funded-by="Company A"]</Source>
<Destination>/Report[@funded-by="Company B"]</Destination>
<Mode>Allow</Mode>
</Rule>
</Policy>
Figure 7.5: Example of a policy dcoument
Figure 7.5 shows an example of such a policy document. In this example,
the default policy is “deny”. Moreover, this example shows a unary rule as
well as a copy rule.
7.2.4 Policy Enforcement Point
The Policy Enforcement Point intercepts each performed operation and sends
a request to the Policy Decision Point to ask whether the operation in ques-
tion is allowed. For that purpose, the Policy Enforcement Point offers a
method for every operation defined by the model. The Policy Enforcement
Point can be configured to communicate with different PDPs. However, one
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specific PDP must be chosen. This configuration is made with the Server
Configurator, which we describe in Section 7.3.
7.2.5 Policy Decision Point
The Policy Decision Point loads the access control rules when the component
is initialized. A path must be specified where the XML file containing the
access control rules can be found. After initialization, the Policy Decision
Point can create a view of a document for a specified user and evaluate the
access control rules to check whether a specific operation is allowed.
7.3 Configuration
The server components can be configured by a dedicated Server Config-
urator program. This program allows to define which classes are used for
specific functions. For example, this allows to switch between a local or
remote Copy DB. Moreover, the implementation of specific components, e.g.,
the Copy DB, can be replaced by a different implementation that support the
defined interface. This allows to easily exchange components of the current
prototype without the need to modify the existing source code. In addition
to this, the Server Configurator allows to define where the Copy DB is
stored, where documents are stored and where the policy document is stored.
Figure 7.6 shows a screenshot of the Server Configurator. In this ex-
ample, the prototype is executed locally and the paths to all required files are
set to a HiBac directory within the home directory of the user proeder. The
server uses a directory where all XML documents are stored, which is referred
to as “document folder” in the Server Configurator. In addition to the
directory, the server uses a text file to store the names of all XML documents
together with their document IDs. In the screenshot, the corresponding file
is named docNames.txt.
7.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we summarize the results of the performance evaluation, that
is described in detail in [Mel07]. As the performance of XPath queries has
already been discussed, e.g., in [GK02, GKP03, GKP05], we only evaluate
the performance of the functions that we have added to XPath. Moreover,
we measure the time to calculate a view to determine the impact of our
extension functions on the overall execution time of an XPath query.
7.4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 111
Figure 7.6: Screenshot of the Server Configurator
To determine the runtime behavior of an XPath function, we have tested
several different factors to check whether the runtime depends on one or more
of these factors. We learned from our tests, that the runtime of each function
depends on only one specific factor, e.g., the number of nodes of the current
document. Moreover, we see that groups of functions have identical runtime
behavior and depend on the same factor. These groups of similar runtime
behavior do not exactly match the categories that we have defined in Section
4.7. After we have identified the factor on which the runtime of a specific
function depends, we made a series of measurements where we increased
that factor from measurement to measurement. Each individual test was
repeated five time to reduce random sources of errors. With this method, we
determined how the runtime depends on the factor. For example, some tests
showed that functions have a constant runtime, whereas other functions have
a runtime that increases linearly with a specific factor. The specification of
our test system is listed in Table 7.2.
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Processor AMD Sempron 3100+
Memory 480 MB
Operating System Microsoft Windows XP Home Edition SP2
Java Version JRE 1.5.0 (http://java.sun.com)
XPath 2.0 Implementation Saxon-B 8.8 (http://saxon.sourceforge.net)
Development Environment Eclipse SDK 3.2.2 (http://www.eclipse.org)
Table 7.2: Specification of the test system
7.4.1 Performance of Individual Functions
The first group of functions of similar runtime behavior, is the group of func-
tions that return exactly one specific node or one atomic value, e.g., a string.
These functions of this group are selfAt, parentAt, rootAt, getCrea-
tionContext, currentNode, srcNode, destNode, currentSubject, cur-
rentRole and isDeleted. These functions show a constant runtime inde-
pendent of the tested documents, e.g., independent of the number of nodes
in the document or the size of the tested documents. The runtime of each
of this functions is around 5 milliseconds on the system that was used to
perform the tests. These tests show that the performance of these functions
is acceptable to be used in practice.
The next group of functions of similar runtime behavior is the group that
depends on the number of copies of the tested node. These functions are
copies, predecessors and successors. Our tests show, that the runtime
of these functions depends in a linear fashion on the number of copies of the
tested node. For example, with 25 copies such a function takes 100 millisec-
onds and with 100 copies it takes about one second to compute. These tests
show, that the implementation is sufficiently fast for documents where single
elements are copied less than 100 times. We believe that the performance of
this group of functions is still acceptable for practical usage.
The runtime of the next group of functions is determined by the number
of nodes that are in a specific relation to the node used in the test. For
example, the runtime of the function childrenAt depends on the number
of child nodes of the tested node, whereas the runtime of the functions de-
scendantAt depends on the number of descendants of the tested node. In
all cases, the runtime depends in a linear way on the number of nodes that
are in a specific relation to the node used in the test. The functions of
this group are childrenAt, followingAt, precedingAt, descendantAt,
precedingSiblingAt and followingSiblingAt. The call of a function of
this group that returns 25 nodes takes about 100 milliseconds, whereas a call
that returns 100 nodes takes about 500 milliseconds. Whether the perfor-
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mance is sufficiently fast for practical usage, depends both on the documents
that are used and how rules are expressed. Im some cases, the performance
can be to slow, to use the current implementation in practice.
The functions of the next group of similar runtime behavior are used to
retrieve the context of specific actions, e.g., the changing of attribute values.
The functions of this group are geAttrChangeContexts, getDeletionCon-
texts and getViewContexts. The runtime of these functions depends on
the number of contexts that are retrieved by the corresponding function
and increases linearly with the number of contexts. In absolute numbers,
retrieving 100 contexts takes about 10 milliseconds, whereas retrieving 400
contexts takes about 30 milliseconds. For practical usage, this performance
is absolutely sufficient.
Group of Functions Runtime
behavior
Usability
selfAt, parentAt, rootAt,
getCreationContext, currentNode,
srcNode, destNode, currentSubject,
currentRole, isDeleted
constant highly usable
copies, predecessors, successors linear acceptable
childrenAt, followingAt,
precedingAt,
descendantAt, precedingSiblingAt,
followingSiblingAt
linear limited
getAttrChangeContexts,
getDeletionContexts,
getViewContexts
linear highly usable
created, viewed, changedAttribute,
deleted, accessed, modified
linear needs
improvement
Table 7.3: Summary of the performance of different groups
The functions of the last group with similar runtime behavior, are used to
retrieve accessed nodes. These functions are created, viewed, changed-
Attribute, deleted, accessed and modified. The runtime of this func-
tions increases linearly with the number of accessed nodes. For example, a
function call which retrieves 100 nodes takes about 500 milliseconds, whereas
a call returning 650 nodes takes about 5 seconds. The functions of this group
need further improvement to be used in a real life scenario. As the current
prototype is not optimized towards performance, we see large potential to
increase the performance of the implementation. Finally, in Table 7.3 we
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summarize the performance of the different groups of functions of similar
runtime behavior.
7.4.2 Performance of the Creation of Views
We finally present the results of the performance evaluation for creating a
view. For this test, we used a set of five rules, where three of the rules used
extension functions that access history information. The time to create a view
increases linearly with the number of nodes of the document in question. In
our test case, it took 2 seconds to create a view of a document with 4000
nodes, whereas it took about 7 seconds for a document containing 12000
nodes. We think that this performance is still acceptable for being used
in practice. Nevertheless, the performance can be increased with further
optimizations. In addition to this, there are much faster machines than the
machine that we have used for our tests.
Chapter 8
Related Work
In this chapter, we describe work that that is related to this thesis. We divide
the related work in three areas, which we describe in the following. Access
control can be performed on the server only, which we refer to as Server-side
Access Control . This is also the first area of related work that we discuss in
Section 8.1. Server-side access control controls access only when information
is released to the client. As a consequence, there is no access control after
the releasing of information.
The counterpart of server-side access control is Client-Side Access Con-
trol , which we discuss in Section 8.2. In client-side access control, access
control is only performed on the client. This type of access control is also re-
ferred to as Digital Rights Management or simply Rights Management . The
client can be manipulated easily, since it is under the control of the user, who
can has unlimited access to the machine. Therefore, additional mechanisms
are required to avoid or to detect these manipulations. We also discuss these
mechanisms, which are similar to the mechanisms that we use in our security
architecture in Chapter 6.
The combination of server-side access control and client-side access con-
trol is referred to as Usage Control [PS04]. Usage control protects the infor-
mation at any time during its entire life cycle. To protect the information
while it resides on the client, the same mechanisms are required as in client-
side access control. Also usage control adds additional aspects to access
control, namely provisions and obligations [HBP05]. Provisions are condi-
tions that must be satisfied before access is granted, while obligations must
be fulfilled after access was granted. We discuss both concepts as well as
related work in the area of usage control in Section 8.3.
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8.1 Server-side Access Control
Server-side access control is the oldest form of access control. Here, access is
only controlled when the information is released. After it has been copied,
there is no more access control. Our model performs usage control, since
documents are protected during their entire life-cycle. But since server-side
access control is also one aspect of usage control, we discuss related work in
the area of server-side access control in the following.
8.1.1 “Secure and Selective Dissemination of XML Doc-
uments”
The model proposed in [BF02] supports selective access definition to por-
tions of XML documents based on their semantic structure. Access can be
defined for different nodes of the document together with propagation op-
tions, which specify whether the tree below the node in question is included.
Regarding these aspects, the model is very similar to our work. However, the
supported operations and their semantics are different, since our approach is
able to differentiate between objects with different histories. The support of
data transfers differs from our work, since the model supports only a push
of different views of a document to different sets of users, whereas our model
allows us to define which elements of a document may be reused in other
documents. In addition to this, [BF02] uses a self-defined language to spec-
ify the objects in an access control rule. This self-defined language is less
expressive than XPath, since its expressions have a fixed structure and do
not allow the arbitrary composition of conditions.
Moreover, in [BF02], the smallest unit of protection is an XML element,
which allows to define access in a fine-grained manner. Our model goes a
step beyond this by defining smaller units of protection, namely the text
blocks (see also Section 4.3.3). As a consequence, our model allows even
more fine-grained access control.
Summing up, our model can express conditions on the documents history,
which is not possible in [BF02]. This enables a wide range of additional
policies that can be formulated as access control rules with our model.
Similar approaches to [BF02] can be found in [DCPS00, DdVPS02, MTK03,
GB02], where [MTK03] and [GB02] consider access control rules for the read
operation only. All these approaches consider the XML element as the small-
est unit of protection, in contrast to our approach, which is capable of han-
dling parts of the text content. None of these models is capable of defining
access depending on the history of a document.
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8.1.2 “X-GTRBAC: An XML-Based Policy Specifica-
tion Framework and Architecture for Enterprise-
Wide Access Control”
In [BGBJ05], Bhatti et al. describe their framework “X-GTRBAC”, which is
designed for specifying access to XML documents. They refer to their work as
a framework instead of an model, since some aspects are left unspecified and
need to be specified before the framework can be applied. One such aspect is
the set of operations. X-GTRBAC is based on GTRBAC [JBLG05], which is
build upon on TRBAC [BBF01]. TRBAC itself is designed as an extension
to RBAC [SCFY96].
TRBAC has extended RBAC with so-called temporal constraints, which
are constraints that depend on the current time. TRBAC is limited to specify
temporal constraints only on the role activation and deactivation, but not
on the user-role or permission-role assignments, which both is needed to
define roles more dynamically. Finally, X-GTRBAC enhances GTRBAC
with support for XML in two aspects. X-GTRBAC defines access for XML
documents and also uses XML to denote this.
In contrast to our model, which focusses on how to specify the objects
of the system, X-GTRBAC has a strong focus on the subjects of the system
and how to dynamically change the roles of the system. Concerning these
aspects, X-GTRBAC uses a similar approach as our model. For example,
concerning the user-role assignment, the set of users of a role can be defined
by a condition using the properties of users. This is similar to what we do
with objects in access control rules, where we specify the applicable objects
by their properties. We use the current content of objects and the infor-
mation stored in the history to define conditions for objects in our model.
X-GTRBAC uses properties of users like their age, their experience level,
their qualifications or the region where they live. For example, it can be
defined that a user must have a PhD and must be older than 35 years to act
in the role Design Manager.
Another aspect that is different from our model is that X-GTRAC uses a
self-defined language for specifying conditions. For that purpose, X-GTRAC
uses the language X-Grammar , which follows the notation from the Backus-
Naur-Form (BNF). In addition to regular BNF, X-Grammar allows to specify
tags with attributes. This addition makes it possible to automatically trans-
late specifications in X-Grammar to an XML Schema. In our model, we
use XPath as basic language to formulate conditions, since its clearly de-
fined semantics makes the interpretation of the resulting rules unambiguous.
Moreover, XPath has a large predefined set of built-in functions that are
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required for access control. In contrast to this, in the X-GTRAC framework
every required function has to be specified and implemented.
8.2 Client-side Access Control
Our security architecture of Chapter 6 and the User Interface of our archi-
tecture perform client-side access control. This is related to Digital Rights
Management (DRM), which is an approach to prevent illegal distribution
of paid content. In contrast to DRM, our security architecture focuses on
the protection of confidential documents. Both have in common, that access
control mechanisms are also applied on the side of the client, instead of only
using access control on the server that stores the information. Therefore, we
discuss approaches for digital right management in Section 8.2.1.
The client can be manipulated easily, since it is under the control of the
user, who can has unlimited access to the machine. Therefore, additional
mechanisms are required to avoid or to detect these manipulations. We also
discuss these mechanisms, which are similar to the mechanisms that we used
in our security architecture in Chapter 6. As a consequence, we discuss
mechanisms to detect unauthorized modifications in Section 8.2.2.
A special aspect of this topic is Integrity Reporting, which describes pro-
tocols how to report the system state to an attester. In our security architec-
ture, we use an enhanced protocol for Integrity Reporting [STRE06], which
is robust against a special type of attack. Accordingly, we discuss related
work in the area of integrity reporting in Section 8.2.3.
8.2.1 Digital Rights Management
CIPRESS [IGD01] builds a local quarantine zone by encrypting all local files
with a machine specific key, which can optionally be stored on a tamper resis-
tant hardware module, the Elkey crypto board [CI06]. CIPRESS offers only
coarse grained access rights, since there is no access control on application
level. Moreover, the security of CIPRESS is based on the assumption that
the client system is not compromised, since it offers no mechanism to detect
or to handle a compromised system state.
Microsoft’s Rights Management Services [Cor03] offer much more fine-
grained access rights compared to CIPRESS. These access rights are embed-
ded in a signed usage license, are transferred together with the document, and
are enforced by a local client software, which is assumed to be not compro-
mised. Again, an unauthorized modification of the client system is neither
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detected nor handled. Moreover, the encryption keys are stored together
with the encrypted documents without further protection.
In the Display-Only File Server (DOFS) architecture [YC04], all docu-
ments remain on the server and are accessed by executing the corresponding
applications on the server. Only the display content of these applications
is transferred to the client using windows terminal services. DOFS offers
only coarsely grained access rights, since there is no access control on the
application level. The approach is limited to usage scenarios with a perma-
nent connection to the DOFS server. Moreover, a modified client is neither
detected nor handled.
Besides these three approaches, there are many others such as [Inc04] or
[Aut01]. All of these lack mechanisms to detect a compromised system state,
which could lead to an unauthorized information transfer. The mechanisms
specified by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) provide a possible solution
for the described problem. We discuss these mechanisms in the next section.
8.2.2 Detecting a Compromised System State
In the following, we list some related research projects, which make use of the
TCG mechanisms to detect and handle unauthorized system modifications.
We use some of their results for our security architecture in Chapter 6.
TrustedGRUB [App06] is a bootloader that uses the TPM to extend in-
tegrity measurements to the bootloader and the OS kernel. Perseus [PRS+01]
and Turaya [LP06] are microkernel-based trusted operating systems that can
be combined with TrustedGRUB to establish a trusted computing base (for
details see [Pea02]). The Bear/Enforcer project [MSWM03] includes a TPM-
enabled Linux Security Module (LSM) to compare hash values of applications
with reference values. A similar approach is used in the Integrity Measure-
ment Architecture (IMA) [SZJvD04] developed by IBM, which performs in-
tegrity measurements for all started processes to enable a remote attestation.
The concepts provided in [Rei04] are very similar to our security architecture,
since they determine access rights of the client depending on the result of
the remote attestation. In contrast to security architecture, this work does
not focus on the protection of XML documents.
8.2.3 Integrity Reporting
Since the specifications of the TCG are still in progress, there are still many
open issues. For example, there is a large number of work focusing on the
concepts of trusted computing. One such work is [SZJvD04], which presents
a comprehensive prototype based on trusted computing technologies. In
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particular, it is an architecture for integrity measurement, which contains an
integrity reporting protocol.
Terra [GRB03] is an approach for remote attestation. It supports the
integrity measurement of virtual machines providing runtime environment
for sets of processes. The approach does not build up on TPM and does not
provide a protocol for integrity reporting to remote entities, which are the
main differences to our work.
Our security architecture is based on the assumption that a trusted oper-
ating system measures all executed code. This concept is also referred to as
binary attestation, because the binary files of the executables are measured.
In contrast to that, [HCF04, SS04] focus on semantic attestation based on at-
testing the behavior of software components. However, the idea of attesting
properties instead of binaries is very appealing, but the problem is to define
and measure these properties. There is still a lot of research required until
the concept of property-based attestation can be used in practice. Never-
theless, once all remaining problems are solved, the protocols of our security
architecture can easily be enriched with this approach.
The authors of [BLP05] propose the integration of key exchange pro-
tocols into Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [BCC04] in peer-to-peer
networks, which is basically similar to the attestation protocol of our secu-
rity architecture. However, the objectives of the integration of key exchange
protocols are different, since [BLP05] aims at building stable identities in
peer-to-peer networks. Additionally, the presented approach does not feature
integrity reporting and can not be directly applied to remote attestation.
Another related work is [GPS06] which aims at building secure tunnels
between endpoints. But this approach adds a new platform property certifi-
cate, which links the attestation identity key to the TLS certificate. More-
over, the presented approach focuses on server attestation, which needs in
turn an additional trusted certificate authority that offers the platform prop-
erty certificate. In contrast to that, our approach focuses on client attestation
without an additional trusted certificate authority, since we directly bind the
cryptographic channel to the attestation identity key.
8.3 Usage Control
Usage control combines server-side access control with client-side access con-
trol. As a consequence, the data is protected during its entire life-cycle. In
addition to regular access control, usage control also adds the aspects of pro-
visions and obligations [HBP05] to access control. A provision is a condition
that must be satisfied before access is granted, whereas an obligation is a
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condition that must be fulfilled after access has been granted. For example,
a provision can be that the user must sign a contract that defines how the
access data must be used, e.g., a non-disclosure agreement. However, only
the signing of the agreement can be enforced technically. Whether the user
behaves as he signed in the contract is up to him. Another example for a
provision is the requirement to record the operation in a log file. An example
for an obligation is to delete the accessed data after a certain time or to only
use the data in a specified way, e.g., for a specified purpose.
Our model does neither include provisions nor obligations, because we
believe this will distract from our intended focus. Furthermore, the addi-
tion would cause an increased complexity and would reduce the clarity of
our model. Finally, as stated in [HBP05], obligations and provisions are an
optional concept of usage control, which can be added in case it is needed.
Nevertheless, both concepts can be included in our model by adding corre-
sponding fields to our access control rules (see also Section 4.6).
In the following, we discuss related work in the area of usage control. We
will present different approaches and compare them with our model.
8.3.1 “Relevancy-based Access Control”
Iwaihara et al. allow to define access based on the version relationship of
documents and elements among each other [ICAW05]. The refer to their
approach as “Relevancy-based Access Control”, which is similar to our ap-
proach in some aspects. They refer to the approach as being relevancy-based,
since they capture how versions of a document depend on each other. As a
consequence, some parts of another document version of a document can be
relevant for the current version. In the following, we explain how [ICAW05]
captures which elements are relevant for each other.
The version relationship of documents and elements among each other
is captured by two graphs: the delta version graph and the element version
graph. The delta version graph describes the relation of different document
versions among each other, where each edge denotes the delta between two
versions. A delta is a non-empty set of the operations defined by the model.
The element version graph describes the relations among the elements of the
different versions of documents. There are three possible relations, which are
denoted by edges labeled with the letters ’r’, ’u’ and ’n’. An edge labeled
with ’r’ states that an element was replaced by another element, whereas an
edge labeled with ’u’ denotes that the content of an element was updated,
where an update can represent any kind of modification. Finally, an edge
labeled with ’n’ (no change) either denotes that no operations was applied
on an element within a document or that the element is the result of a copy
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operation from another document.
They define six operations including copy, which is similar to our copy
operation, but can only be applied to elements or subtrees and not to the
text content of an element or parts of its text content.
In contrast to our model, the modification of the content of an element
is modeled by the operation update only, which describes that the entire
content of a node is replaced with a new content. Iwaihara et al. only
consider read and write operations and do not define a copy operation as
part of their privileges. Consequently, they can not express which transfers
among documents are permitted or denied. This is a big advantage of our
model, since we can define which data transfers are allowed or denied between
different documents.
Moreover, they do not have the concept of splitting copied elements to
have different history information for parts from different sources. Doing so,
Iwaihara et al. loose important information, which cannot be used for access
control.
To define the objects of a policy tuple Iwaihara et al. extend XPath
by a set of functions providing access to the element version graph. These
functions enable the traversing of the edges of the element version graph and
offer a similar functionality as our predecessor, successor and copies functions.
This approach allows to express a subset of the policies that we can express.
As we record more details, we can formulate many policies which can not be
expressed in [ICAW05] language. For example, if the text of an element is
composed by copying text from different sources, our model captures every
detail of this process and allows to express policies based on any of that
information. In [ICAW05], this process is only described with an update
operation and all further details are not considered. Especially, the do not
differentiate whether information was created from scratch or whether text
parts were copied from somewhere else. As a consequence, they can not keep
track of data flows as we do.
Additionally, they define a function to inspect the time stamp of an el-
ement. It is not clearly defined what the time stamp is, but it seems that
it is set to the current time whenever an element is created. It is not clear,
whether the update operation affects the time stamp. The time stamp is
similar to our concept of context information. In addition to time, we also
maintain the subject name and the role in which the subject performed an
operation. This additional information enriches the expressiveness of the
rules of our model, where we can permit or deny access depending on the
subject or role of a subject that performed a previous operation.
Finally, the model in [ICAW05] does not distinguish between elements
and attributes and consequently does not exploit the different semantics of
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both types, as we do. In our model, we offer a set of functions to inspect
the former values of attributes, which is required to express certain types of
policies.
Moreover, the distinction between elements and attributes allows us to
gain a higher level of efficiency, since we can save resources by only keeping
track of the former values of attributes, which we consider to contain the
security-relevant properties of a document.
Iwaihara et al. do not include obligations or provisions as part of their
model. Moreover, they do not present a system architecture and an imple-
mentation. They also do not discuss security mechanisms for their model.
8.3.2 “Controlling Access to Documents: A Formal
Access Control Model”
The model described in [SBO06] defines access control for structured data.
The generic document format the present is similar to XML documents,
as a document in their case is a rooted tree of elements, which can also
have attributes. Similar to XML, elements have a name and a text content,
whereas attributes have a name and a value. In similar fashion to our model,
[SBO06] also uses the role-based approach to model subjects.
Concerning the definition of the objects, there is a big difference to our
our model. Instead of describing objects by their properties, as we do it
in our model, [SBO06] states that the owner of each object must define the
policy for each individual object manually. We regard this as a big drawback,
since the manual definition of access rights for individual objects is error-
prone and time-consuming. In contrast to this, our model offers a method to
automatically derive the access right of an objects from its properties. This
saves time and reduces the chance of possible mistakes.
The basic idea of the model in [SBO06], is the concept of sticky policies .
This idea defines that when an object is copied to a new location, its policy is
also copied to the new location. This concept of sticky policies is illustrated
in Figure 8.1
The model in [SBO06] also allows to copy elements and attributes. In-
stead of using a single operation for that purpose, the copying is defined by
a pair of a copy and a paste operation, where the copy operation is used
to select the source and the paste operation defines the destination and per-
forms the actual copying. As an intermediate buffer for the copy operation, a
so-called clipboard is used. We also the pair of copy and paste as part of our
User Interface to define the source and the destination of a copy operation,
but our model uses only one operation for that purpose and we do not need
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Fig. 1. Sticky Policies
1.1 Contributions
We have deﬁned a ﬁne-grained model of a system for processing documents.
As natural languages and semi-formal modeling languages like UML are not
suﬃciently precise, we have used the speciﬁcation language Z [5] to deﬁne the
states and operations of the system. Hence our ﬁrst contribution is a formal
model of an unprotected document-processing system.
Our second contribution is a policy language that allows users to formalize
protection requirements that we have gathered for banking environments. Again
we have taken a formal approach here and deﬁned the policy language’s abstract
syntax in Z and its semantics (how access requests are evaluated) in a combi-
nation of (Object-)Z and the speciﬁcation language Communicating Sequential
Processes (CSP) [6] called CSP-OZ [7].
Our third contribution is to provide a foundation for controlling usage of doc-
uments. Usage control [8] is a notion that subsumes both server-side and client-
side access control.1 It is important in the document context as owners need
assurance that the policies governing access to their documents are respected,
even when other users incorporate parts of these documents in their own docu-
ments. To achieve this, we associate parts of each document with the respective
parts of its policy and maintain this association over the document life-cycle.
This amounts to a ﬁne-grained variant of the sticky-policies paradigm [9, 10]:
when content is copied (or cut) from a document to the clipboard and pasted
into a document, then so is the respective part of the policy (cf. Figure 1).
1.2 Organization
In Section 2, we explain the context of this work and we derive high-level require-
ments from representative use cases. In Section 3, we introduce our document
1 Client-side access control is also called rights management. Note that enforcement
requires the combination of classical access-control mechanisms with hardware-based
or software-based rights-management mechanisms.
Figure 8.1: Sticky policies [SBO06]
an intermediate buffer.
Moreove , the model i [SBO06] only defi es positive permissions, in con-
trast to our model, whic also allows to specify negative rules. Having both
positive and negative rules allows to specifies policies much more flexible, as
exceptions from a given policy can be specified more easily.
In addition to permi sions, the model in [SBO06] allows allows to specify
two types of obligations, which ar log and sign. The log obligation specifies
that the corresponding operation must be logged. In our model, we log every
operation in the history. The sign obligation specifies that the user must
sign a given contract, e.g., an agreement how to use an object, before he can
access it. The signed contract is not enforced in a technical way and it is up
to the user to behave as he agreed o.
Furthermore, the model in [SBO06] allows to specify environmental con-
ditions, which must be satisfied to perform an access. These environment
conditions are similar to our conditions b sed on t c ntext of an opera-
tion. In [SBO06] currently only conditions depending on the current time
are supported, whereas our model also allows to specify conditions on the
context of a previous operation, which enables a wide range of policies that
can not be specified in [SBO06]. For example, it can not be specified that in
a distributed editing process a subject in a senior role has the authority to
declare part of the editing as being final. In our model, such policies can be
enforced.
Currently, the model specified in [SBO06] does not feature a language in
which its policies can be specified. Also there is no system architecture, no
security architecture and no implementation.
Summing up, the main difference to our work is that objects are specified
manually by the owner of an object. In contrast to this, our model allows
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to specify objects automatically by their properties, which also includes the
history of an object. This allows to specify access in a more expressive and
flexible way, where policies for new objects can be automatically derived from
the properties of the objects.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we conclude this thesis by summarizing its main contribu-
tions. In addition to this, we present possible options for future work.
9.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we presented a model for history-based access control, which
allows to specify the objects of an access control by their properties. Our
model allows to define conditions based on the object’s content as well as on
it’s history. The big advantage of this approach is that the permissions for
objects can be automatically derived from their properties, which is less error-
prone and less time-consuming compared to manually define access rights for
individual objects.
There are many other models, e.g., [BF02, DCPS00, DdVPS02, GB02,
MTK03], which also allow to specify objects by their content, but our model
is much more expressive, since we also can define objects based on their
history. For example, this allows to define objects by the origin from where
they were copied, which is not possible in the other models. As another
example, we can specify Chinese-Wall policies in a way that is better suited
for real world scenarios than the original Chinese-Wall model [BN89], since
our model allows to avoid the unnecessary restrictions of the original model.
To be able to record many details of the editing process, we introduced
a set operations, which has a higher level of abstraction than the operation
in many other models. For example, we can record that text content is
composed by copying it from different sources.
In addition to this, we use a finer granularity than XML elements for
access control, since we have introduced text blocks, which are parts of the
text content that differ in their history. Our model automatically keeps track
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of these text blocks, e.g., it splits a text block when a part of it is copied to
a different location. A finer granularity is always helpful, since it allows to
define the objects more precisely.
Moreover, we have both positive and negative rules, which allows in com-
bination with our conflict resolution strategy to specify exceptions to given
policies very efficiently, since every exception can be specified by an addi-
tional rule without the need to modify the existing rules.
Since we have defined our model on an abstract level, we have developed a
system architecture in that supports our model in a real world scenario where
multiple users concurrently edit documents and each user can work on an
individual computer. To define such a system architecture, we have discussed
different alternative ways to design it. Within our discussion of possible
architectures, we investigated both security aspects as well as performance
and efficiency concerns. Finally, we have chosen an architecture that uses
the client/server-approach.
Our model introduces some challenges when it should be applied in a
distributed scenario. Most of these challenges is caused by the fact that
the permissions of a document can depend on the content of other docu-
ments. We presented solutions for each of these challenges, which allows to
implement our model in a distributed scenario. In addition to this, we dis-
cussed the most important algorithms for implementing our model, e.g., we
described the algorithms for view creation and for rule evaluation.
Next, we defined the security mechanisms for our architecture. Concern-
ing this mechanisms, we focussed on how to protect the client from unautho-
rized modifications, since the client is under the control of the user, which
results in a high risk of these modifications. We used the concepts defined by
the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [Pea02, Gro06] to detected unautho-
rized modifications of the client machine. One part of our mechanisms is the
so-called remote attestation, which is used to report the state of a platform to
a remote attester. For this purpose, we used an enhanced version [STRE06]
of the usual remote attestation protocol [SZJvD04] that avoids a common
attack, namely the spoofing of a trusted system state using an additional
trusted machine.
Since our security mechanisms can decrease the system’s compatibility
with additional software, we used virtualization techniques to run the ad-
ditional software in a different compartment on the same physical machine.
A so-called hypervisor ensures that each compartment can use a different
execution environment, e.g., a different operating system, and that these
compartments cannot affect each other.
Finally, we have implemented our system architecture in Java. We pre-
sented the details of the implementation and explained how specific concepts
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were realized. For example, we explained how we represent and store the
histories. The implementation includes a user interface that allows to load,
edit and save XML documents. During the editing process, the histories are
maintained as defined in our model. The server components of the imple-
mentation can interpret and evaluate the access control rules defined by our
model. With these components, we can illustrate the feasibility of our model.
We concluded the implementation chapter with the results of a perfor-
mance evaluation. In this evaluation, we measured the time it takes to ex-
ecute each individual extension function depending on its input arguments
and on the processed documents. We identified groups of functions, which
have a similar runtime behavior. All of these groups except of one showed
an acceptable runtime behavior. The group of functions for getting accessed
nodes was too slow to be used in real world scenarios. As another test, we
measured the time it takes to calculate a view. In our test case, it took 2
seconds to create a view of a document with 4000 nodes, whereas it took
about 7 seconds for a document containing 12000 nodes. We think that this
performance is still acceptable for being used in practice. Since our imple-
mentation was not focussed on optimizing performance, we are confident that
the performance can be increased significantly to meet todays requirements.
9.2 Future Work
This thesis leaves room for future work. Some of this work concerns the
implementation of the prototype. First of all, the security mechanisms that
we have described in Chapter 6 can be integrated into the current implemen-
tation. Moreover, the performance of the implementation can be increased.
For example, we currently use components written in Java to maintain the
databases of our system. We expect a big increase in terms of performance
when we use a relational database system like MySQL [MyS] or PostgreSQL
[Pos] for that purpose.
Furthermore, there are other methods to create a view of a document. In
our implementation, we use the node filtering approach, which first retrieves
the entire document and then removes inaccessible nodes. A more advanced
approach is referred to as query rewriting . This approach modifies the query,
which retrieves the document, in a way that only accessible nodes are re-
turned. This approach is more efficient than node filtering, since it avoids
to retrieve inaccessible nodes. As part of future work, we could adept the
concept of query rewriting to our implementation.
In addition to the future work on the implementation, our model can be
extended in some aspects. In this thesis, we focussed on methods for speci-
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fying conditions on the objects. We use roles as an abstraction to define the
subjects in our access control rules. These roles model one specific property
of subjects, namely the tasks a subject is allowed to perform. In addition
to the tasks a subject is allowed to execute, subjects can have further prop-
erties, e.g., an age, an experience level or a qualification. These additional
properties can also be used in rules to specify the subjects for which a rule
is applicable more precisely. As a consequence, we can extend our model, to
support additional conditions on subjects.
Moreover, we do neither support provisions nor obligations [HBP05] in
our model. These concepts define conditions, which must be fulfilled before
access is granted or after access has been granted respectively, e.g, a condition
stating that the user must sign an agreement before he can access certain
data. We can extend our model by adding another field to our access control
rules which specifies provisions and obligations.
In this thesis, we also support context information to be used as part of a
condition in our access control rules. We can use the subject of an operation,
its current role and the time of the corresponding operation to define such a
condition. As part of future work, we could also use additional information in
our context description. For example, if sensors for the location are available,
we could include the location in our context description.
Moreover, we could use a formal notation language to define the data
structures, operations and functions of our model. This could help us to give
a more precise specification of our model and help to study further proper-
ties of our model. With this method, we could analyze whether all extension
functions are free of side effects, whether they introduce an unwanted infor-
mation flow and other similar properties.
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